Homeowners' Associations in Russia after the 2005 Housing Reform by Vihavainen, Rosa
Rosa Vihavainen
Homeowners’ 
Associations in Russia
after the 2005 Housing Reform
Kikimora Publications/2009
ISBN 978-952-10-5148-7
ISSN 1455-481X
ISBN 978-952-10-5150-0 PDF at http://ethesis.helsinki.fi/
© Aleksanteri Institute and the Author
Cover design: Vesa Tuukkanen
Gummerus Printing 2009
Homeowners’ Associations in Russia 
after the 2005 Housing Reform

5Contents
LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES 7
ACKNOwLEDGEmENTS 9
1. INTRODUCTION 11
1.1.  Housing and Homeowners’ Associations in Post-Socialist Russia 13
1.2.  Homeowners’ Associations in Civil Society 18
1.3.  Homeowners’ Association as a Common-Pool Resource Regime 24
1.4.  Social Capital in Homeowners’ Associations 29
1.5.  Outline of the Book 36
2. HOUSING IN THE SOVIET UNION 37
2.1.  Building the Soviet Housing System 37
2.2.  Housing Conditions and Housing Administration 
 in the 1920s and 1930s 42
2.3.  The ‘Stick and Carrot’ Policy and the Right to Housing 48
2.4.  Cooperative Housing 53
2.5.  Housing Cooperatives in the Later Soviet Period 56
2.6.  Khrushchev’s Housing Reform 59
2.7.  Impact of the Soviet Period on the Present Situation 66
3. HOUSING AFTER THE SOVIET UNION 69
3.1.  Housing Privatisation and Other Reforms in the 1990s 69
3.2.  The New Housing Code 79
3.3.  Housing management Reform 86
3.3.1.  Comparison of the Three management Alternatives  92
3.3.2.  Practical Situation and Challenges Facing Homeowners’ Associations 97
3.4.  Housing in St. Petersburg 102
3.5.  Housing movements and Associations 108
3.6.  House Committees and Other Informal 
 Housing management Organisations 116
3.7.  Conclusions 119
6HOmEOwNERS’ ASSOCIATIONS IN RUSSIA AFTER THE 2005 HOUSING REFORm
4. HOmEOwNERS’ ASSOCIATIONS’ mANAGEmENT 
AND SOCIAL RELATIONS 122
4.1.  Data and Research Approach  122
4.2.  Establishment of the Association 129
4.3.  membership and Social Structure of the Association 136
4.4.  Non-Payment and Other Disagreements 139
4.5.  Decision-making 151
4.6.  Participation and the Soviet Legacy  161
4.7.  Social Relations and Informal Participation 168
4.8.  Conclusions 174
5. HOmEOwNERS’ ASSOCIATIONS’ RELATIONS
wITH OTHER ACTORS 177
5.1.  Property and Land Registration Disputes 178
5.2.  Technical Problems and Relations with Private Companies  189
5.3.  maintenance Practices 196
5.4.  Cooperation with Outside Actors and Relations with the media 199
5.5.  Privatisation and the Common Property 206
5.6.  Homeowners’ Associations and Gated Communities 211
5.7.  Conclusions 214
6. CONCLUSIONS 219
6.1.  managing Common Property 224
6.2.  Social Capital and Relations with Other Actors 229
6.3.  Outcomes of the Reform 235
REFERENCES 240
APPENDIX 1. List of Interviewed Respondents  256
APPENDIX 2. Descriptions of the Homeowners’ Associations of the Data 259
APPENDIX 3. Photos 266
KIKImORA PUBLICATIONS 273
7list of tables and figures
TABLE 1.  Types of goods in homeowners’ association 26
TABLE 2.  worker families’ dwelling types in Leningrad in 1935,
  in percentages 43
TABLE 3.  Housing construction in the Soviet Union, 
 millions of square metres 62
TABLE 4.  Ownership of housing in Russia in 1990, in percentages 71
TABLE 5.  Ownership of housing in Russia and St. Petersburg 
 in 2006, in percentages 72
TABLE 6.  Construction of residential buildings in Russia 82
FIGURE 1. St. Petersburg’s administration 104
FIGURE 2. Homeowners’ associations in the data, by district 126
PHOTOS
1: A typical entrance way in the centre of St. Petersburg. 266
2: Courtyard of an old house. 267
3: Electrical system in an old house. 268
4: An “elite” house. 269
5: Suburban landscape in St. Petersburg. 270
6, 7: “New” building complexes in the suburbs. 271
8, 9: “New” building complexes in the suburbs. 272

9Rosa Vihavainen
Acknowledgements
I am greatly indebted to all the people who have contributed to the comple-
tion of this thesis in one way or another. 
I would like to thank all the respondents who were willing to be in-
terviewed for this study and without whom this publication would not 
have materialised. my deepest gratitude is to my supervisor, Professor 
Risto Alapuro, who gave me the opportunity to participate in the research 
project led by him, called Self-Governmental Associations in North-west 
Russia. I am very much indebted to his guidance and patience in com-
menting my work over the years. I am also truly grateful to other members 
of the research project: Professor Oleg Kharkhordin and my colleagues 
Olga Bychkova, Olga Kalacheva and Evgenia Popova. Thanks are owed to 
research assistant Dilorom Akhmedzhanova, who not only handled the 
practical arrangements of the interviews for me, but also shared the chal-
lenges of the fieldwork with me. I must say a special word of thanks also to 
another research assistant, Anna Tarasenko, for making the arrangements 
for data collection in winter 2008.
I wish to thank my colleagues in the Department of Sociology at 
the University of Helsinki, in particular participants of the Spaces of 
Democracy seminar, for their valuable comments on the drafts of this the-
sis. I attended two post-graduated schools that have been important for 
my work: the Graduate School for Civil Society Research of the Finnish 
Doctoral Program in Social Sciences and the Russia in Europe Graduate 
School in Border Studies. I want to thank the members and Professors of 
both schools for their comments. My work greatly benefited from the re-
marks of fellow researchers at the European Network for Housing Research 
(ENHR) Conferences, which I am grateful for. I am also indebted to the 
pre-examiners Professors markku Kivinen and Elena Shomina for review-
ing the manuscript of my thesis.
I want to express my gratitude towards martti Lujanen, Director 
General in the ministry of the Environment, for his insightful comments 
10
HOmEOwNERS’ ASSOCIATIONS IN RUSSIA AFTER THE 2005 HOUSING REFORm
and enthusiasm on the subject that encouraged me to pursue my work. 
Apart from the people mentioned, I am obliged to the following people 
for their advice and support on my work at its different stages: Aurore 
Chaigneau, Professor Natalia Lebina, Sampo Ruoppila and Anna-maria 
Salmi. I must also give my thanks to fellow researchers Tuula Teräväinen 
and Terhi Tuominen, who shared the same office with me for many years, 
for making the work days a lot more enjoyable than they would have been 
without you. Finally, I would like to express my gratitude for my friends 
and family, my parents maija and Timo Vihavainen, and my siblings Jussi 
Vihavainen and marja Tingelöf, for their support.
writing this thesis has been made possible by funding from the Academy 
of Finland and the Finnish Doctoral Program in Social Sciences. This 
work was carried out at The Department of Sociology at the University of 
Helsinki that provided me comfortable working environment. Kikimora 
Publications at the Finnish Centre for Russian and East European Studies 
(The Aleksanteri Institute) accepted my thesis for publication. The support 
of these institutions is gratefully acknowledged.
11
1. INTRODUCTION
1. Introduction
Since the start of the Soviet era, everyday Russian life has been character-
ised by unsatisfactory housing conditions. For decades a shortage of hous-
ing forced the majority of the urban population to live in cramped condi-
tions in communal apartments.1 Housing stock was owned and managed 
almost exclusively by the state, while new construction and maintenance 
was neglected, which led to deteriorating quality of housing. The common 
areas of a house – including staircases, lifts and courtyards – were consid-
ered public property and treated as a kind of no-man’s land that everyone 
could use but no one cared for. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union peo-
ple have gained the possibility to own their apartments. As the next step 
after the privatisation of housing, the management of housing is now being 
transferred from the public sector to the private sector. 
The right to own has brought with it an obligation to take care of the 
common areas in privatised houses. It is this fundamental change that the 
author examines in this book. The privatisation of state-owned housing 
and housing management is a process that either has been or is current-
ly being implemented in all post-socialist countries. Russia is, therefore, 
one part of the large-scale development taking place in Eastern Europe. 
In 2005 a new Housing Code came into force, making homeowners fully 
responsible for the management and maintenance of their property. One 
way to do this is to establish a homeowners’ association (tovarishchestvo 
sobstvennikov zhil’ia, TSZh). Homeowners’ associations are a new phe-
nomenon in Russia and have not been thoroughly studied to date. A study 
on homeowners’ associations is valuable, therefore, as it can illustrate the 
development of a self-governing housing management association. One of 
the core questions of this study is how homeowners run the associations 
and manage the common property. 
The notion that everyone needs a roof over their head makes housing an 
important social issue. The defects in the Russian housing situation have 
been politically recognised, and housing is now the subject of one of the 
1 The term  ‘communal apartment’ refers to an apartment shared by several 
families, each typically occupying one room and sharing kitchen, bathroom 
and other common facilities.
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four national priority programmes in Russia (along with health, education 
and agriculture). The fact that homeowners’ associations are at the core of 
the new housing reform makes them a topical subject to study. 
Against this background, I use two theoretical approaches for studying 
homeowners’ associations. Firstly, the so-called common-pool resource 
regime approach is used to analyse homeowners’ associations as self-gov-
erning associations, with the main question being the ways in which col-
lectively taking care of common areas succeeds in practice. The change 
from state patronage to collective homeowner responsibility is substantial, 
as Russians have no prior experience in managing private property. Some 
collective-action problems such as free-riding, when some individuals en-
joy the results of others’ efforts rather than cooperating for the common 
good, can be expected. 
Secondly, I use the concept of social capital for examining the internal 
dynamics of homeowners’ associations and their potential to work as a 
breeding ground for democracy. The questions of whether social capital is 
produced when homeowners cooperate in decision-making and whether it 
can help to overcome the free-rider problem are examined. while joint de-
cision-making in the associations may increase cooperation between resi-
dents, it can also be hindered by the withdrawal of some individuals, and 
can create tension and disputes between neighbours. In addition to resi-
dents’ relations within the association, I examine the association’s relations 
with outside parties, such as local housing authorities, housing companies 
and the media – all of which can contribute to or obstruct the develop-
ment of self-government in the associations. In this chapter I first present 
the framework of this study, that is, the situation in the field of housing in 
Russia. The state of civil society in Russia and the position of homeown-
ers’ associations there is described next, followed by an introduction of the 
theoretical concepts I use herein and an examination of their applicability 
for studying homeowners’ associations.
13
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. Housing and Homeowners’ Associations in Post-
Socialist Russia
Housing has been subject to profound changes since the start of privatisa-
tion in 1991, which makes it a particularly interesting field for research in 
a post-socialist context. The so-called transition from a socialist to a mar-
ket economy may generally speaking have been completed by the early 21st 
century but the process in the housing sector is not yet finished. Housing is 
a basic human need and housing reform directly affects the lives of Russia’s 
population of over 140 million people. Housing and housing-related prob-
lems are a constant subject of discussion in the Russian media, which 
speaks to the actuality and importance of the reform. Deteriorating hous-
ing stock, new construction, housing scams and experts’ debates on hous-
ing reform are common topics in the media. Defects in housing have led 
to an increase in activism in recent years and a number of housing move-
ments and organisations have emerged in the country. Recent civic activ-
ity has been strongly directed at housing, which indicates the importance 
of the subject. Although social movements are not very common in Russia, 
defects in housing is one of the major themes on which social movements 
do focus. For example, organisations have been established to represent 
people who have suffered in the course of the reform. Resident organisa-
tions have also become common, such as house committees and home-
owners’ associations for improving the management and maintenance of 
multi-family buildings.
The new market-oriented housing system is being built on the legacy of 
the Soviet housing system, which has a great impact on the current situa-
tion. In the Soviet Union the state had a monopoly on housing ownership 
and distribution, as well as on the provision of housing and communal 
services. The allocation of housing by public authorities and state enter-
prises enabled strong control of citizens. Good citizens and merited work-
ers were rewarded with better housing. The Soviet Union ensured its citi-
zens housing that was almost free and tenants’ rights were very secure, but 
the price for these rights was loyalty to the state. working and living were 
intertwined, which made it virtually impossible to obtain a dwelling with-
out a job and vice-versa. Although the Soviet system officially aimed for 
egalitarianism, there were definite inequalities in the system. In this sense 
housing was no different from other goods: there was a shortage of hous-
14
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ing as there was of consumer products and the elite enjoyed better housing 
and better access to goods that were unavailable to the masses. In order 
to control urban population growth, a residence permit system known as 
propiska was created, which tied people to their place in the countryside 
and restricted their ability to move to the city (see, e.g. meerovich 2004; 
Höjdestrand 2005).
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union the state’s monopoly position 
has been reduced, firstly through the privatisation of housing stock in the 
1990s. Reform of the housing sector continued with the extensive hous-
ing reform that came into force in 2005 and covered the entire housing 
sector. As a continuation of the housing privatisation, the new Housing 
Code transferred the management of privatised housing from the public 
to the private sector. The new legislation ordered homeowners to organise 
the management of multi-family buildings independently. Homeowners 
now have three alternatives: to (1) form a homeowners’ association, (2) 
hire a management company or (3) manage the house directly without an 
association. A homeowners’ association is by definition2 a non-profit or-
ganisation, established for the management and maintenance of common 
property in a multi-family building (Zhilishchnyi kodeks, Article 135). 
Although homeowners’ associations have existed in Russia since 1996, 
they have become much more common since the implementation of the 
reform. In 2007, 35 percent of multi-family buildings in St. Petersburg had 
chosen this type of management; of that 35 percent, 19 percent were home-
owners’ associations or housing cooperatives (Fond Novaia Evraziia 2007). 
The concept of homeowners’ associations is a novelty in Russia, although 
self-management of housing had existed in the country previously in the 
form of housing cooperatives.3 
Of the other two alternatives, direct management by residents is quite 
rare and typically opted for in small houses that only have a few apart-
ments to be managed. Direct management means that every household 
makes a separate contract with the service providers. It can be difficult to 
manage a larger building complex without an association or a company as 
2 This translation is the author’s, as are all translations herein from Russian to 
English.
3 However, after the 1920s and 1930s, cooperatives were not a mass phenom-
enon; in 1990 they accounted for only four percent of the country’s housing 
stock (Struyk 2000, 4). 
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there is no executive organ or account to save money for the repairs, etc. 
The management company alternative, meanwhile, has recently increased 
in popularity. while it avoids some of the problems present in residents’ 
self-management, such as low participation in decision-making and insuf-
ficient knowledge about management, it does have some difficulties of its 
own. The market for management companies in many cities is restricted, 
so there are few alternatives for residents, and some of the companies in 
the market are unreliable and/or incompetent. Furthermore, the manage-
ment company alternative does not allow residents to participate in the 
management process. 
During the Soviet era, not only the apartments but also the common 
areas of the house – staircases, courtyards, cellars, attics, etc. – were owned 
by the state. Private property was nationalised after the Revolution of 1917 
and access to previously private courtyards and houses was opened, dem-
onstrating that it was now the common property of the people. As a result, 
nobody felt responsible for the common areas, which were treated care-
lessly, as a kind of no-man’s land. municipal housing maintenance was 
inadequate (because public sector resources were directed elsewhere, e.g. 
to heavy industry), and the condition of staircases, lifts and other common 
areas became miserable, run-down and dirty. The law on housing priva-
tisation in 1991 made the privatisation of dwellings possible and stated 
that homeowners had a joint financial responsibility to maintain common 
areas. However, housing management was still municipally controlled, 
although some residents started to form informal organisations, such as 
house committees, to improve the condition of their houses. Private man-
agement by homeowners became possible with the 1996 law on homeown-
ers’ associations. wide-scale change did not take place until 2005, how-
ever, when the Housing Code stated that homeowners are joint owners of 
common property and thus responsible for management of the property.
Giving homeowners responsibility for the management of common ar-
eas is likely to be problematic. First of all, residents are not accustomed 
to taking care of their property and they lack the practical and technical 
knowledge to do so. In the Soviet Union the citizen’s role was passive and 
residents had very limited opportunities to improve their housing condi-
tions. Apart from a lack of knowledge, there is also the psychological bar-
rier created by a lack of interest towards common property. The prevailing 
mentality has been ‘my house is my castle’, that is, residents are interested 
16
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only in their apartment and are not concerned with common areas of the 
building. Taking care of one’s property used to end right where the propri-
etary right ended, on the doorstep of one’s apartment. many people are not 
used to considering the common areas as their own property, which can 
make it difficult to get them feel responsible for the condition of staircases, 
courtyards, lifts and other communal areas. 
The Housing Code aims to develop the market and improve material 
conditions but it also encourages people to be effective actors in the mar-
ket. Homeowners’ associations are the embodiment of this task, the deci-
sion-making channel for residents, a sort of experiment in democracy and 
an early step towards civic activity on a grassroots level. However, with the 
ability to take action comes an obligation to take responsibility, whether 
or not the people involved are willing and capable. Accordingly, activating 
residents is a great challenge for the reform. The question of to what extent 
such activation succeeds in homeowners’ associations is studied herein. 
Nonetheless, the role of individuals should not be over-emphasised, as the 
institutional framework is at least as important. while law-making takes 
place on a national level, reform is put into practice locally. Local authori-
ties therefore play a significant role in the success of homeowners’ associa-
tions. The authorities may promote and support the establishment of the 
associations but they also have the power to restrict them or even close 
them down. 
There are also material impediments that hinder effective self-manage-
ment, such as a lack of financial resources. This is due to the fact that priva-
tisation was based on the principle that a tenant could claim ownership of 
their apartment free of charge (Zakon o privatizatsii zhilishchnogo fonda 
1991). This has made the situation very different from that in the west, 
where financial resources are needed to be able to purchase an apartment, 
even when a home loan is taken. The free privatisation has led to a situa-
tion where for many Russians the apartment is their only financial asset 
and they cannot afford to maintain their own living quarters, let alone the 
common areas. The amount of dilapidated housing stock in Russia is high; 
11 percent of the country’s housing was in need of urgent renovation in 
2004 (UNECE 2004, 35). Although new (mostly private) construction and 
repairs have, until recently, been very active in St. Petersburg, there is still 
a large amount of housing in the city that is in ‘emergency’ condition due 
to the large amount of old housing stock, for which proper repairs have 
17
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been neglected for decades. Dealing with deteriorated houses and their 
infrastructure is therefore an obvious financial burden for homeowners’ 
associations.
This study is based primarily on interviews with 40 respondents, made 
up of homeowners’ associations’ chairpersons and residents as well as ‘ex-
perts’ such as local housing authorities, NGO activists and politicians in 
St. Petersburg. Fieldwork was conducted between 2005 and 2008 and the 
interview data is complemented with newspaper articles on the subject of 
housing reform. Through the data I will examine how the new manage-
ment system works in practice and how the residents are adjusting to it.
This study focuses on St. Petersburg, where homeowners’ associations 
are quite widespread but where the city’s characteristics pose special chal-
lenges for housing management. To some extent the data describes home-
owners’ associations across the whole country, but at the same time the 
associations’ management is greatly affected by the city’s distinctive fea-
tures. The city’s housing stock ranges from very old and deteriorated to 
property to new, luxurious, ‘elite’ houses. A large proportion of the city’s 
housing stock was constructed in the early 1900s, the 1800s, and even as 
far back as the 1700s. In addition to the pre-revolutionary housing stock in 
the centre of the city, the city’s suburban districts are shaped by the mass 
construction panel housing of the 1950s and 1960s. There are still a sig-
nificant number of communal apartments in the centre of St. Petersburg4, 
although this number is steadily shrinking. Communal apartments make 
management of the house especially challenging because of their mixed 
social and ownership structure. 
The homeowners’ association is a new phenomenon in Russia and, as 
far as can be ascertained, it has not yet been subject to any sociological 
study, which means that this study offers an interesting presentation of 
the subject. The post-socialist change, in a general sense, has been studied, 
along with certain specific questions. Some research has been conduct-
ed on the development of housing in post-socialist countries, including 
Russia (e.g. Struyk 2000, Clapham et al. 1996) but most of the research on 
housing in Russia has been economic (e.g. Struyk et al. 2001) or histori-
cal (Lebina & Chistikov 2003). Non-academic, empirical research reports 
4 44 percent of apartments in the centre of the city in 1998 were communal (Ko-
rnev 2005, 77).
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on private management in the former Soviet Union have been conducted 
by The Urban Institute on topics such as condominiums in Uzbekistan 
(Rabenhorst et al. 2002). Studies on socialist housing, the communal 
apartment (Utekhin 2001, Gerasimova 2002) and housing cooperatives 
(Andrusz 2002) have also been written. In general, more research on hous-
ing exists in Russian (e.g. Lebina 2003) than in English, which targets a 
different audience. Homeowners’ associations and collective action have 
been studied elsewhere in the world, such as in Chen & webster’s study on 
Taiwan’s homeowners’ associations (2005). There is also a need for a study 
of homeowners’ associations in Russia, a research subject that is topical 
and important in two senses. Firstly, homeowners’ associations reflect the 
fundamental change in the housing sector at the moment and secondly, as 
self-governing organisations they are new actors in Russian civil society. 
1.2. Homeowners’ Associations in Civil Society
I examine homeowners’ associations as social organisations and as part of 
civil society. Civil society has been defined as a ‘third sector’, a counterforce 
to the state and the market. It belongs to the public sphere, apart from the 
private sphere of family. Actors in civil society are ordinary people, which 
differentiates it from the elite-run state and market sectors. Although the 
arenas of political, economic and civil society are separate, they overlap 
and are dependent on each other (Howard 2003, 35). For most scholars, so-
cial organisations are a component of civil society but not necessarily the 
only component. Various forms of civic engagement, such as social move-
ments, social networks and ‘uncivil’ groups (organised crime) are some-
times also counted as civil society actors (Henry & mcIntosh Sundstrom 
2006, 323). The framework for organisations is, to a large extent, provided 
by the state, as civil society operates within the regulations stated in the 
law and the organisations can be dependent on state funding. The spec-
trum of social organisations is wide, ranging from self-help or interest as-
sociations to those that are politically oriented and those that focus on 
solving social problems. 
Although homeowners’ associations do not necessarily fit into any 
of those groups presented above, they are self-governing and voluntary, 
based on collective decision-making. Unlike their counterparts in the 
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west, homeowners’ associations in Russia require participation and effort 
from their members to the extent that they are more than just management 
tools. A social organisation (obshchestvennoe ob’’edinenie)5 is, according to 
the definition of the federal legislation of Russia, a “voluntary, self-govern-
ing, non-profit formation, established on the initiative of citizens, joined 
together on the basis of joint interests for realising joint aims, stated in the 
articles of the social organisation” (Ob obshchestvennykh ob’’edineniiakh, 
Article 5). Homeowners’ associations fit this definition but the term ‘social 
organisation’ is not used in reference to homeowners’ associations in the 
Housing Code. The Housing Code focuses primarily on the management 
function of homeowners’ associations, hinting that their role as social or-
ganisations is of secondary importance. On the other hand, a homeown-
ers’ association is a ‘nekommercheskaia organizatsiia’ (non-profit organi-
sation), as defined in the Housing Code, which is also the name that non-
governmental organisations in Russia use about themselves. 
The general understanding is that there was no civil society in the Soviet 
Union, as all social organisations were either created by the Communist 
Party or made subordinate to it (Evans 2006, 48). Civil society as an arena 
separate from the state did not exist or existed only as an underground 
phenomenon (Szabó 2004, 84). During perestroika it became possible to 
organise ‘informal’ groups (neformaly) (Evans 2006, 44) and social organ-
isations started to emerge in the 1990s when they obtained legal status 
(Cook & Vinogradova 2006, 28). However, later associational activity has 
decreased and it can now be described as extremely low. Survey results 
reveal that 90 percent of the population do not belong to any recreational 
association or organisation (Remington 2002, 84). when estimating this 
figure it should be noted that passive membership is rare in Russia, the 
members that are involved are usually active (Kulmala 2008, 55). 
The weakness of civil society has been explained in terms of the reluc-
tance of its members to participate in associations, the lack of an insti-
5 ‘Obshchestvenaya organizaciya’ is most often translated as ‘social organisa-
tion’ (e.g. Evans 2006, 49–50), although the term ‘obshchestvennyi’ may also be 
translated as ‘public’ or ‘civic’ (Salmenniemi 2008, 4). ‘Civic’, however, trans-
lates better as ‘grazhdanskii’ (cf. civil society - grazhdanskoe obshchestvo) and 
denotes the political nature of the associations. Accordingly, the term ‘social 
organisation’ is used here instead of ‘civic association’. The term ‘nongovern-
mental organisation’, or ‘NGO’ is also used.
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tutional basis for the associations, an emphasis on personal connections 
in state-society relations and the state’s dominating role in the political 
sphere (mcIntosh Sundstrom & Henry 2006, 305). marc morjé Howard 
has argued that low participation in social organisations can be attributed 
to three main causes. Firstly, there is general distrust in organisations be-
cause participation was obligatory in the Soviet era. Secondly, social net-
works are so strong that people do not feel the need to participate in social 
organisations. Thirdly, general disillusionment with post-Soviet social and 
economic development has led to withdrawal from public life. (Howard 
2003, 26-9). However, there seems to be changes afoot in terms of attitudes 
towards civic activity: 70 percent of citizens had a positive opinion of civic 
activity in 2004 (Kulmala 2008, 55). A positive attitude towards civil so-
ciety does not, however, equate to actual participation in social organisa-
tions.
There are differing views about whether the strong role of informal 
social networks has positive or negative implications for civil societies in 
post-socialist countries. Howard has argued that the tradition of strong 
networks of friends and connections has inhibited the development of 
civil society and that people operate through personal, informal networks 
rather than by forming associations (Howard 2003, 27-8). Evans (2006, 49) 
notes that the strong reliance on authority figures and patron-client rela-
tions has prevented the formation of social organisations. On the other 
hand, Laura Henry (2006) found that the division between official organi-
sations and informal networks might be blurred and that associations can 
be formed on the basis of networks, a view supported by Suvi Salmenniemi 
(2008, 224). 
Since the mid-2000s freedom of association has been significantly re-
stricted. The law on social organisations was amended in 2006, tighten-
ing foreign funding and obligating organisations to report their activities 
carefully (Salmenniemi 2008, 2). The reason for this was to prevent foreign 
intrusion into Russian political life, because social organisations have of-
ten received foreign support (Cook & Vinogradova 2006, 29). In addition 
to narrowing organisations’ ability to act, such a change can make them 
more cautious about criticising authorities and more likely to strive for 
cooperation with them. According to Evans, Vladimir Putin’s administra-
tion has publicly promoted civil society but within the limits defined by 
the state. From the government’s point of view, civil society is supposed 
21
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to support the policies of the state and be loyal to it, not to criticise or 
challenge it. (Evans 2006b, 152; Salmenniemi 2008, 230). In Putin’s Russia, 
the state considers that civil society consists of individuals rather than of 
organisations. This viewpoint can be used to undermine the importance of 
organisations and to restrict them (Belokurova 2008). 
However, empirical studies show that the authorities and social organi-
sations are not necessarily in opposition to one another (Kulmala 2008). 
Both the state and local level authorities regard those organisations that 
focus on social questions more positively than politically critical ones. 
Organisations directed at social problems reduce the state’s burden by tak-
ing care of some functions that have traditionally been provided by the 
state (Pursiainen 2000, 24). As noted before, local authorities have the 
power to restrict or even close down social organisations. more often, 
however, local authorities regard social organisations positively because 
the organisations help authorities to fight social problems and provide so-
cial services (Kulmala 2008, 48-9.) Recent local government reform has 
transferred social services to the local level, thereby burdening local budg-
ets (Gel’man 2003, 48). Therefore it is not surprising that local authorities 
welcome organisations that focus on social issues. Organisations can be 
funded by outside actors, some of which are even foreign, which brings ad-
ditional financial resources for the municipality (Kulmala 2008, 49). Some 
municipalities have conducted pilot projects that involve hiring social or-
ganisations as service providers (Chagin & Struyk 2001). 
meri Kulmala has described the relationship between local authorities 
and social organisations as one of interdependence: social organisations 
need to be acknowledged and ‘morally’ supported by the authorities, while 
the municipality needs the help of social organisations in social services 
and funding. Social organisations are not a clear counterpart to the au-
thorities; rather, these two structures overlap and social organisations may 
work partly within the public sector. The division between activists and 
authorities is not clear either, as officials may act in both roles (Kulmala 
2008, 49–50, 55). Social organisations in Russia prefer to emphasise that 
they are not political and that they focus on social questions. This does not 
mean, however, that the organisations are politically insignificant. Some 
activists seem to understand politics in a very narrow sense, only as par-
ty politics. Despite cooperation with local authorities, organisations may 
still confront the authorities and become politicised by objecting to the 
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prevailing order regarding practical questions. (Kulmala 2008,51). On the 
other hand, Cook and Vinogradova found in their study that many social 
organisations in Russia are not really independent but are more like pup-
pet organisations, effectively run by the authorities. These organisations 
are financially supported by the authorities while other, more independent 
organisations operate within the tight legislative restrictions. The puppet 
organisations are opposed to the idea of social organisations as independ-
ent civil society actors (Cook & Vinogradova 2006, 38).
Civic activity in the field of housing increased in the 1990s when new 
homeowners started paying attention to the poor condition of their hous-
es. Residents formed informal associations, such as house committees, to 
improve the maintenance and security of their houses. Some house com-
mittees were later turned into homeowners’ associations, as their aims 
were effectively the same. In addition to maintenance organisations, pro-
test movements have emerged to object to rising housing costs and to 
make housing the responsibility of the citizens. Organisations dedicated 
to spreading information on housing reform and educating residents have 
also emerged since the 1990s, and particularly in the 2000s.
The position of homeowners’ associations in the field of civil society is 
multi-faceted. They are established for the private management of housing, 
which is strongly encouraged by the state. Development of the housing 
sector is currently a top state priority in Russia and there is an on-going 
national priority programme for the development of housing from 2005 
to 2010. Therefore, although homeowners’ associations are self-governing 
resident organisations, they are also the result of reform by the authorities 
and thus closer to the state than other social organisations. In addition, 
homeowners’ associations are also service providers and, as such, are closer 
to the market than social organisations in general. They are a link between 
the state and the economy, taking care of housing management privately; 
not as business enterprises but as non-profit organisations. Homeowners’ 
associations have been encouraged by the state and can therefore be ex-
pected to receive support from the authorities, perhaps even to cooperate 
with them in the management of housing stock. Homeowners’ associa-
tions differ from traditional social organisations in that they do not re-
ceive foreign funding, operating instead on the residents’ own resources 
and possible governmental subsidies. 
Homeowners’ associations are not typical social organisations. Instead 
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of focusing on social problems or challenging the prevailing political or-
der, their intention is for homeowners to take care of their own property. 
They are not clearly professionalised or organised6 but they are more than 
just informal, grassroots associations (c.f. Henry 2006b). They are hous-
ing management organisations based on residential self-government. 
Homeowners’ associations are democratic in form but most have not been 
been established on the residents’ direct initiative. Thus, the associations 
are initiated from the top down rather than from the bottom up, as the 
reform is enforced by the authorities. The associations are voluntary, un-
like homeowners’ associations elsewhere in the world. This is important 
from a civil society perspective, as being a voluntary association makes a 
homeowners’ association a more ‘genuine’ actor in civil society. Although 
homeowners can choose whether to join an association, the members 
are responsible for participating in order for the association to function. 
making membership voluntary may complicate the management if a large 
proportion of the owners decide to stay outside. Although not joining the 
association is rare, it is still a fundamentally significant issue. This study 
looks at how democratic decision-making and self-governing succeeds in 
homeowners’ associations. what role do local authorities, private compa-
nies and other actors play in transferring housing management from the 
municipality to the associations? Do they facilitate or hinder the ability of 
associations to achieve effective self-governance and management? Because 
local authorities have a considerable role in the reform’s implementation, 
it is important whether they act favourably for the associations or whether 
there are disagreements and conflicts between the two parties.
A key issue is the extent to which the homeowners really are in power. 
This question arises because some homeowners’ associations have hired a 
management company or manager to handle practical management issues. 
In this case the real power may lie with the professional company and, if 
so, the idea of self-government would not apply. Secondly, authorities may 
impede the association’s self-governance by preventing it from working in-
dependently. Further, studies have shown that participation in homeown-
ers’ associations in the former Soviet Union was low (see Rabenhorst et 
6 The degree of professionalism varies greatly. Some associations operate solely 
on voluntary basis, while others have paid bookkeepers, managers and other 
staff. 
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al. 2002). Considering the similar institutional and political background, 
with the general low associational activity, this may also be expected to oc-
cur in contemporary Russia. If an association’s decision-making ends up 
in the hands of few individuals, the original intention of the association as 
the residents’ self-governing organisation, as stated in the Housing Code, 
is not fulfilled.
1.3. Homeowners’ Association as a Common-Pool Resource 
Regime
The theoretical framework presented here consists of theories and con-
cepts that are closely interrelated. with the help of these concepts I ex-
amine homeowners’ associations by taking collective action and using the 
dilemmas that arise from it as the starting point. An appropriate starting 
point is the approach known as the common-pool resource regime theory. 
A common-pool resource is a “natural or man-made resource system that 
is sufficiently large as to make it costly (but not impossible) to exclude po-
tential beneficiaries from obtaining benefits from its use” (Ostrom 1990, 
30). Common-pool resources are common goods that are characterised by 
the difficulty of exclusion and subtractability. Subtractability means that 
one person’s use of the resource reduces the opportunity of others to use it. 
Common-pool-resource literature has traditionally concentrated on nat-
ural resources such as water resources, fisheries, forests and land tenure, 
especially in developing countries (see Hess 2000). It might seem odd to 
consider a homeowners’ association as a common-pool resource regime, 
as natural resources and housing associations are so different from one an-
other. However, the purpose of establishing homeowners’ associations is 
to take care of common property and they therefore face the dilemmas of 
subtractability and excludability as CPR regimes. 
In classic economic literature, the two dimensions mentioned above, 
exclusion and subtractability, divide goods into public, common, club and 
private (see Bychkova forthcoming). Opinions differ, however, as to which 
category different goods belong. Table 1 presents the classification used in 
this book on the goods in homeowners’ associations. Firstly, the ‘private 
goods’ category consists of goods that are simultaneously excludable and 
subtractable. Others can be prevented from using them and they are lim-
25
1. INTRODUCTION
ited, so use of the resource leads to others having less to use. Naturally, 
apartments are private goods in homeowners’ associations; every home-
owner has their own apartment, which cannot be used by others with-
out the owner’s permission. Secondly, public goods are non-excludable, as 
their use cannot be restricted, and they are also non-subtractable, as they 
do not run out if someone uses them. In homeowners’ associations, most 
common property qualifies as public goods. It is impossible to exclude 
residents from using the staircases, courtyards, lifts, basements, attics and 
the infrastructure of the house and the risk of overusing these facilities is 
small. 
As a third group, it is also difficult to make common goods excludable; 
they are subtractable, however, meaning that one person’s use reduces the 
amount of the resource. Hot water supply is an example of a common good 
for a homeowners’ association. Its use cannot be restricted but if enough 
people are using it by, for example, taking a shower at the same time, hot 
water may run out. Another example of a common good is the parking 
lot.7 There are a limited number of parking spaces in the association’s area, 
which makes it a subtractable good. However, unless the parking lot is 
controlled with gates or guards, people cannot be prevented from parking 
there. Common goods are the core of the common-pool resource theory, 
the use of which creates the collective-action dilemma. Although there is a 
difference in subtractability between common and public goods, both are 
in common possession and common use in a homeowners’ association. 
The subtractability dimension is also relative: it is possible that someone 
could occupy an attic or basement for their own use, thereby leaving less 
space for others, for example. In this sense both common and public goods 
constitute the ‘common’, for which homeowners’ associations are respon-
sible. Therefore I take into account both types of goods when analysing the 
success of managing common property. 
Fourthly, club goods are characterised by their excludability and non-
subtractability. They can be made accessible only to certain people and do 
not diminish with use. If, for example, use of the parking lot was restricted, 
by way of gates and guards, to members of the homeowners’ association 
who paid for it, it would become a club good. It would be excludable, acces-
7 Parking is a classic example of a common good, presented by Garrett Hardin 
in his influential work, Tragedy of the Commons, in 1968.
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sible only to members, and non-subtractable, because members would all 
have their own parking space and would not need to compete for it. A gym 
is also a club good, if it is accessible for members only and the number of 
members is limited. A homeowners’ association may also have other serv-
ices, such as a children’s play room, cable television or Internet connec-
tion, that are chargeable and restricted to certain members. Excludability 
makes them club goods; if they are not restricted to certain members they 
are public goods.
Table 1. Types of goods in homeowners’ association
Subtractable
Excludable Yes No
Private goods Club goods
Yes Apartment Regulated parking (paid)
  Gym, other extra, chargeable services
  Cable television, Internet connection
Common goods Public goods  
No Unregulated parking (free) Heating, electricity, cold water and gas supply
Hot water supply
Common areas: staircases, attics, basements, 
courtyard
CPR research has shifted recently towards what scholars call the ‘new com-
mons’, which means “technology-driven, human-made common-pool re-
sources” that can be local, regional or global in nature. For example, the 
Internet and intellectual property rights have been examined using the 
CPR approach (e.g. Ostrom 2003; Hess & Ostrom 2003). Organisations 
have also been studied, among them residential associations (Hess 2000). 
This study is not the first to use the new commons approach in hous-
ing community research; it has been applied previously by Betty morgan 
on low-income housing communities in the United States (1998) and in 
Jaesong Choe’s dissertation on Korean residential housing communities 
(1992). The approach has also been used to study housing privatisation and 
non-privatised common areas in Estonia (Scott et al. 1999), which is close-
ly related to the research in this book. Nonetheless, this is the first time 
that CPR theory has been used to study housing associations in Russia.
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I use Elinor Ostrom’s so-called design principles (see Ostrom 1990, 90) 
as a guideline for analysing homeowners’ association as a CPR regime. 
These principles describe the characteristics of a successful CPR regime 
and are introduced in detail in the context of the data. By fulfilling the 
design principles, the regime may overcome the collective-action prob-
lems that otherwise threaten it. The design principles concern boundaries, 
membership, rule-making, monitoring, sanctioning, conflict-resolution 
mechanisms of the regime and its recognition by the authorities. I use the 
design principles for examining how the self-government and democratic 
principles, stated in the Housing Code, are fulfilled in practice in home-
owners’ associations. 
The abolition of private property was a key aim of socialism and, ac-
cordingly, private ownership of housing was severely restricted in the 
Soviet Union. Dwellings were considered to be common goods, as private 
ownership in cities was rare and most of urban housing took the form 
of state-owned, communal apartments. Housing was also a subtractable 
good because there was a constant shortage of housing (Alapuro forth-
coming, 17). Since the start of housing privatisation reform in Russia, in 
1991, owner-occupation has become the most common type of housing 
tenure in the country. According to the State Statistics Bureau, 79.7 percent 
of housing stock was under private ownership in 2006 (Federal’naia sluzh-
ba statistiki). This is a substantial change from the Soviet era; 79 percent 
of urban housing in Russia was state-owned in 1991 (Struyk et al. 2001, 
1047). This book examines the change of regime that has led to apartments 
becoming private goods, while the common areas are jointly owned by the 
homeowners, who are obliged to take care of them collectively. This situa-
tion makes the common-pool resource regime theory particularly suitable 
for examining the subject.
Collective action to accomplish a common good requires participation 
from all involved parties. It is, however, common for some individuals to 
‘free ride’. This is known as the prisoner’s dilemma, in which two individu-
als are given the opportunity to cooperate or to defect from cooperation. If 
only one cooperates and the other defects, the defecting one wins and the 
cooperating one loses. The best solution for both two parties, however, is 
achieved when both cooperate, although it may require the individual to 
act irrationally. If both parties defect, they will both lose (Axelrod 1984, 
7–9). Therefore, the collective (public and common) good requires non-
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rational acting from an individual’s point of view, while an individual’s 
rational behaviour can be destructive for the collective. 
In a common-pool resource context, free-riding is encountered in the 
form of the so-called tragedy of the commons. The usual problem in CPR 
regimes is overuse of a good, leading to scarcity of the resource. when every-
one acts only in their own interest, the result will be ‘tragic’ for the common 
good. The free-rider problem stems from the difficulty of exclusion of the 
common good. Non-cooperation is a tempting alternative because the re-
sources are easily available, regardless of cooperation. However, if everyone 
was to free-ride and no one cooperated, there would be no resources to use.
The problem of free-riders is closely related to the commons and is cen-
tral for housing associations in general, as the collective action and contri-
bution of all members is required in order for the association to function 
properly. Free-riding can take different forms, such as not making housing 
payments in time, which obliges neighbours to pay the free-rider’s share 
or else the association will become indebted or run the risk of being dis-
connected from housing services. Not participating in common meetings 
for decision-making is also a form of free-riding, as others do make the 
effort to participate. As Ostrom notes: “whenever one person cannot be 
excluded from using the benefits that others provide, each person is mo-
tivated not to contribute to the joint effort, but to free-ride on the efforts 
of others” (Ostrom 1990, 6). It is important to prevent free-riding, as it 
threatens the preservation of the common resources and coherence of the 
community. The extent to which free-riding affects residents’ relations is a 
question that is addressed through the data in this book. Free-riding may 
lead to conflicts between an association’s members, especially in houses 
that have significant variation in terms of residents’ social status and fi-
nancial resources. As John Field points out, if individuals share the same 
values, they are much more likely to cooperate for a common goal (Field 
2008, 3). Consequently, neighbours’ varying social backgrounds and dif-
ferent values may create problems for cooperation. 
The free-rider problem and the tragedy of the commons have been ex-
amined in the context of housing privatisation and associations in Estonia, 
a country with circumstances similar to those of Russia (Scott et al. 1999). 
In Estonia the first step after privatising housing was to create homeown-
ers’ associations known as Dwelling Owner Associations (DOA) in order 
to maintain the otherwise ownerless common areas. According to Scott 
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et al’s study, the new homeowners in Estonia lack the financial, legal and 
technical resources to manage their property. As a solution the authors 
suggested government intervention: regulation, training and motivation 
of the homeowners. This includes the government repairing part of the 
housing stock and offering repairs and maintenance subsidies for the poor 
(ibid., 426). The study was conducted ten years ago, since which time the 
situation in Estonia has no doubt changed, but it is likely that similar prob-
lems are being experienced in Russia, as housing reform in both countries 
is being built on the legacy of the socialist housing system.
1.4. Social Capital in Homeowners’ Associations
I consider the collective-action dilemmas described above by using the 
concept of social capital. Since the 1990s, this concept has become espe-
cially popular in the fields of social and political sciences, economics, ur-
ban studies, criminology, health science, etc. (Field 2003, 2). This is largely 
due to Robert Putnam, whose studies regarding the decline of social cap-
ital in the US have attracted wide attention in academic circles and have 
also raised public debate. The concept of social capital may have suffered 
from inflation due to the wide interest but it still has relevance for stud-
ying homeowners’ associations. This study relies mostly on Putnam but 
also, indirectly, on James Coleman, who has influenced Putnam’s theori-
sations. while another influential social capital theorist, Pierre Bourdieu, 
viewed social capital as a character of the individual, Coleman considered 
both the individual and the collective to be important actors in social capi-
tal. Putnam emphasises the role of community to an even greater degree. 
Because homeowners’ associations are about collective action, it appears 
that Putnam’s ideas are the most useful for this study.
For Putnam, the value of social capital lies in its potential to solve 
collective-action dilemmas. Social capital and its elements are what make 
people cooperate, even though it would be rational for the individual to de-
fect. According to Putnam, social capital consists of norms of reciprocity, 
social networks and trust (Putnam et al. 1993, 167).8 These three elements 
8 In his later writings Putnam refers only to social networks and reciprocity as 
elements of social capital but all three aspects are considered in the present 
study (Siisiäinen 2003, 205).
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are interconnected and reinforce one another so that norms of reciproc-
ity and social networks create trust and cooperation. In the same way, the 
opposites of these features – defection, distrust, exploitation, isolation, etc. 
– lead to cycles that constitute an uncivil society (ibid., 177). According 
to Putnam, networks of civic engagement, such as those in associations, 
create social capital (ibid., 173). Homeowners’ associations are based on 
the cooperation and social relationships of their residents, which makes 
a homeowners’ association a potential breeding ground for social capital 
but also for collective-action problems. The present study also questions 
whether norms of reciprocity, social networks and trust can help home-
owners’ associations overcome collective-action dilemmas. 
According to Coleman, social capital is part of a structure that is cre-
ated by and can be used by all who are part of it, not only by those who 
make an effort to accomplish it. Social capital therefore requires coopera-
tion from individuals who are, at the same time, striving towards their 
own interest (Field 2008, 26–28). Putnam shares this view, arguing that 
social networks also benefit those who do not participate in the networks 
themselves (Putnam 2007, 138). Therefore, social capital and its compo-
nents can be used as tools to reach common objectives, and that strength-
ening networks, norms and trust are not the main goals (Schuller et al. 
2000, 9–10).
Norms of reciprocity can either be balanced (specific) or general (dif-
fuse) in nature. Balanced reciprocity occurs when two goods of equal value 
are exchanged. Generalised reciprocity occurs when the good or favour is 
not exchanged for something immediately but is expected to be returned 
some time in the future, possibly in a different form or by another member 
of the same group or community. Generalised reciprocity can take place 
between people who do not know each other personally but belong to the 
same group. Generalised reciprocity is relevant for social capital as it can 
strengthen social networks in a community and vice-versa; dense social 
networks strengthen norms of reciprocity. Exchange is more common in 
communities with widespread generalised reciprocity, which makes the 
community more efficient (Putnam et al. 1993, 172–173). Generalised reci-
procity is not truly altruistic, as some return is expected, albeit not im-
mediately. michael Taylor has described reciprocity as “short-term altru-
ism and long-term self-interest” (Putnam 2000, 134). However, when the 
return comes at a very general level or over a long period of time, such as 
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when voluntary work to enhance the security of the area decreases the 
crime rate over a number of years, it may be difficult to differentiate gener-
alised reciprocity from altruism (Putnam 2000, 135). 
Social networks can either be vertical or horizontal in nature. Vertical 
networks are based on unequal, hierarchical relationships and depend-
ence, whereas horizontal networks are based on equality and the even 
distribution of power (Putnam et al. 1993, 172–173). A vertical network 
“cannot sustain social trust and cooperation” because the relationships are 
uneven and generalised reciprocity cannot be generated. Horizontal net-
works, based on mutuality, are more useful for solving the dilemmas of 
collective action (ibid., 174–175). Homeowners’ associations are based on 
horizontal networks. However, not all members are in equal positions, as 
their decision-power is based on the size of their apartment; the owner of a 
large apartment has more leverage than the owner of a small apartment. 
Networking in a slightly different sense, used during the economy of 
shortages, was widely exercised in the Soviet Union. Friends, colleagues, 
neighbours, etc. relied on each other to acquire certain goods or services 
(see Salmi 2006). The practice of exchanging favours for resources (includ-
ing public resources) that were otherwise difficult to obtain is known as 
blat. It is exercised in conditions of shortage, in a system where access to 
goods is defined by privileges rather than money. Blat is based on reciproc-
ity, although the return is delayed and might come from someone else in 
the same network (Ledeneva 1998, 37). However, blat cannot be termed as 
a form of generalised reciprocity because there is a certain chain of people 
involved; it is not used among strangers with no connection to each other, 
as is the case with generalised reciprocity. The importance of blat seems to 
have decreased in post-socialist Russia. The use of networks and contacts 
has been partly replaced with money in the new, market-oriented society, 
although the practice has by no means disappeared completely (Remington 
2002, 87; Ledeneva 1998; Howard 2003, 131). Instead, blat may be used to 
find a good job or instead of bribing authorities, for example. Still, the na-
ture of blat has changed significantly and the term is not used as much 
as it used to be (Ledeneva 1998, 178–179). It has been argued that social 
stratification and the resulting inequalities have damaged friendships and 
connections that used to be based on equality. In his study, Howard comes 
to the conclusion that while social networks have changed for some peo-
ple, they have stayed more or less the same for others, irrespective of age 
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or occupation (Howard 2003, 133, 136). It is noteworthy that several years 
have gone by since Howard’s and Ledeneva’s studies and, as the standard 
of living has risen in Russia during this time, neighbours may not need 
each other today as much as they did before. On the other hand, the recent 
economic crisis may have led some people to resort to personal connec-
tions as their personal financial position declines.
Blat is probably not needed for everyday survival within homeowners’ 
associations. Instead, the associations could work as a form of replace-
ment for blat, as a formal structure to handle the tasks for which social 
networks were used. when a resident needs a plumber, instead of using 
their connections to find one they can call the association’s maintenance 
service, which is covered in the monthly housing payments. From another 
perspective, if contact between neighbours becomes more infrequent and 
fragmented, it can decrease the motivation of homeowners to participate 
in common decision-making. Or, on the contrary, joint decision-making 
might increase cooperation and generate closer social contacts. 
The ‘Soviet legacy’ is often used to explain the passivity that is allegedly 
a hangover from the Soviet era. A possible example of this is the ordi-
nary people’s indifferent attitude towards the condition of their backyards. 
Corruption, local authorities bending the law for their own good instead 
of following it literally, is also typically labelled as part of the Soviet legacy. 
However, the concept can also have a different meaning, with a positive 
connotation, when used to refer to the innovativeness and cleverness that 
was necessary to cope in everyday life in the Soviet Union. As it was difficult 
or even impossible to obtain certain goods directly from the market, social 
networks were used to acquire certain goods through alternative channels. 
Dense networks can strengthen cooperation between neighbours, facilitat-
ing the functioning of homeowners’ associations. However, the role that 
social networks play in taking care of common property is different from 
the role they play to cope in everyday life, as has been the case with blat. 
This book seeks to determine the extent to which people’s behaviour still 
seems to be affected by the ‘Soviet legacy’ in the context of housing. Simply 
applying the term ‘Soviet legacy’ to difficulties in adjusting to reform is, 
however, too one-sided, and the Soviet legacy is considered here as only 
one aspect that may affect people’s response to the reform.
One particular element of social capital, trust, is a precondition for the 
smooth functioning of social relationships. It is important for the members 
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of a homeowners’ association to trust each other as well as the association. 
They need to trust that the association will serve their interests and that 
their neighbours will make their housing payments and not violate com-
mon property. The current housing reform is problematic from the point of 
view of trust in that homeowners may form associations but trust between 
homeowners cannot be created or imposed from above. Accordingly, al-
though homeowners’ associations are based on a contract between their 
members, trust is needed to ensure that other parties obey the rules.
According to Howard (2003) there is still general distrust towards insti-
tutions and organisations in post-communist countries. A lack of interest 
among residents in participating in the association’s decision-making may 
be related to a general negative attitude towards organisations. However, 
this may not concern all associations, especially homeowners’ associa-
tions, which, as noted before, are in a somewhat different position than 
other associations. In addition, there is a tradition of residential housing 
management in Russia, which took the form of house committees in the 
early Soviet era, and housing cooperatives, although they only played a 
marginal role after the 1930s. But there is also a tradition of indifference 
among residents regarding common areas. Furthermore, the reform is ini-
tiated by the authorities and as the initiative does not come from the resi-
dents themselves, they may not be interested in participating. In summary, 
there are factors for and against residents’ self-management, and the data 
of this study is expected to show the relative practical importance of these 
elements. 
Putnam has been criticised for viewing social capital only in a posi-
tive light, not taking into account the fact that while a community may be 
strong, it may simultaneously be destructive for the society as a whole. In 
his later works (2000), Putnam does acknowledge the ‘dark side’ of social 
capital. Some associations generate ‘negative’ social capital, which benefits 
the members of the association but is harmful to others outside the as-
sociation. Putnam has further developed his theories on social capital by 
making a distinction between bridging (inclusive) and bonding (exclusive) 
types of social capital. Bridging social capital is outward-looking and brings 
different people together, while bonding social capital is inward-oriented 
and reinforces homogeneity within the group. when an individual needs 
support, comfort is provided by strong ties between close friends, that is, 
bonding social capital. In the case of finding a job, for example, weak ties 
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with more distant acquaintances, characteristic of bridging social capi-
tal, are more useful. Bridging social capital fosters generalised reciproc-
ity, while balanced reciprocity is more likely to take place in relationships 
based on bonding social capital. while bridging and bonding social capital 
can both be productive, inward-oriented associations with bonding social 
capital, such as criminal gangs, primarily provide psychological support 
for their members and may even have negative implications for society as a 
whole. Bridging social capital contributes to the strengthening of civil so-
ciety in a more obvious manner. However, Putnam notes that bridging and 
bonding capital are not ‘either-or’ categories, rather they are ‘more-or-less’ 
dimensions. Both types can exist within the same community, in different 
situations (Putnam 2000, 22–23, 363; Field 2008, 96–97).
In the Soviet Union and in the period of transition in the 1990s, close 
connections and networks, which can be regarded as bonding rather than 
bridging ties, were important for daily survival (see Field 2008, 127–128). 
Although one’s social network could include a range of different people, 
thus implying bridging social capital, the closest circle probably consisted 
of people with similar backgrounds, thus strengthening bonding social 
capital. Homeowners’ associations have the potential to create a bridging 
type of social capital, in the sense that it forces people living in the same 
house to cooperate, regardless of their social status. This applies especially 
to those homeowners’ associations with widely varying residential social 
structures. 
The role of social capital in civil society has been widely discussed (Henry 
& mcIntosh Sundstrom 2006, 323). Theorists such as Putnam believe that 
social capital has the potential to strengthen a society. Associations can 
foster social capital, thereby helping to reinforce civil society. This idea 
originated from Alexis de Tocqueville, who saw 19th century American 
civil associations as “nurseries of democracy”, where the experience of 
equal reciprocal relations spread from the associations to society as a whole 
(Reichardt 2004, 38). The so-called neo-Tocquevillean theorists, of which 
Putnam is one, are interested in the “socialising effects of associations” and 
the ability of social networks to create trust and social capital (ibid., 43). In 
this way, associations contribute to the strengthening of civic engagement 
and, in turn, civil society. 
A homeowners’ association is a democratic association in which all 
members can take part in common meetings for decision-making. Surveys 
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show that many Russians support democratic values and the right of po-
litical participation. On the other hand, the right to not participate is also 
valued. many people are largely dissatisfied with the prevailing political 
system and have a low level of trust in political institutions (Remington 
2002, 85–86; 123–124). This distrust could be why, according to previous 
studies, grassroots social organisations feel the need to emphasise their 
apolitical nature (Henry 2006b). Also, in Salmenniemi’s research on so-
cial organisations in Tver’, the social organisations’ workers did not feel 
that their organisations had any political influence. while politics was 
regarded as a sphere in which to strive for personal gain, social organisa-
tions were considered to be altruistic, working for the good of the people 
(Salmenniemi 2008, 230). As noted before, however, although the asso-
ciations themselves stressed their non-political nature, the picture is more 
ambiguous in practice. Social organisations may attain political signifi-
cance when confronting authorities and questioning the prevailing order 
(Kulmala 2008, 51). 
Although homeowners’ associations do not have the burden of political 
nature that could lead people to avoid them, surveys show that getting peo-
ple to participate can be a challenge. A 2006 survey by the Levada-Center 
showed that a relatively large proportion of people (48 percent) did not feel 
responsible for what was going on in their neighbourhood, and 57 percent 
felt that they could not have any impact on such events (Levada-Tsentr, 
Problemy demokratii). On the other hand, homeowners’ association could 
be case to which the Levada-Center’s survey does not apply. Homeowners’ 
association are located where people actually live, which many individuals 
consider to be closer and more immediate than their neighbourhood. The 
threshold for participation is lower, as the association is located right at 
their home. Homeowners’ associations may therefore serve as the first step 
for civic activity, as a ‘school of democracy’. Involvement in a housing asso-
ciation does not automatically lead to participation in other organisations 
or in a wider public sphere, but the action of residents in taking charge 
of housing management is valuable nonetheless. An association teaches 
its members about democratic discussion, organisation, reconciliation and 
approval of dissenting opinions. Norms of cooperation and trust can be 
adopted in such an environment. 
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1.5. Outline of the Book
This book is structured as follows. Chapter 2 puts the current situation 
into historical context. How was the Soviet housing system developed and 
how does it affect the current situation? The Soviet housing system has 
had, and still has, a great impact on the architecture, housing adminis-
tration, practices, and even the way of thinking, of ordinary people. The 
state’s strong control of housing, along with the critical shortage of hous-
ing that led to overcrowded and unsatisfactory housing conditions, has left 
its mark. Having said that, residential housing management did exist in 
the Soviet era in the form of house committees and housing cooperatives 
that are the predecessors to today’s homeowners’ associations. Chapter 3 
examines the aims of post-socialist housing reforms, privatisation of hous-
ing stock and housing management and the obstacles encountered in im-
plementing them. It studies the way in which theory – the legislative basis 
– and practice – the actual situation – differ from each other, with a focus 
on St. Petersburg in perspective to all of Russia. The chapter looks at hous-
ing movements and associations, notably the defects in the housing situa-
tion and the importance of housing to people.
Chapters 4 and 5 examine St. Petersburg’s homeowners’ associations 
based on the interview data. Chapter 4 considers how the management of 
homeowners’ associations works in practice. The role of social relations in 
collective decision-making is analysed, particularly whether cooperation 
has produced social capital or whether relationships between neighbours 
are characterised by conflicts and disagreements. Chapter 5 looks at how 
other actors, such as local authorities, housing companies and the media, 
are connected with homeowners’ associations by contributing to or pre-
venting the associations’ self-government. Chapter 6 concludes the study 
by drawing together its various outcomes.
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2. Housing in the Soviet Union
This chapter looks at Soviet housing policies and practices and their effect 
on the current housing situation in Russia. Today’s system is significantly 
impacted by the system of state-owned and allocated housing, overcrowd-
ed housing conditions in communal apartments (kommunal’nye kvartiry) 
that housed several families, with each household occupying one room 
and sharing the kitchen, bathroom and other common areas, and poorly 
built and maintained housing stock. Therefore, the Soviet9 housing system 
is described from a present day perspective. The study starts in the Soviet 
era rather than at an earlier point in time because the effect of that period, 
with its combination of modernisation, industrialisation and mass urbani-
sation, is particularly strong. This chapter examines how the Soviet hous-
ing system was created and developed over several decades. The state had 
strong control over housing, yet residential organisation was also possible 
for most of the Soviet era, particularly in the form of housing cooperatives. 
Special attention is paid to the elements that can impede current housing 
reform in Russia, but also to residential participation that is relevant from 
the point of view of homeowners’ associations. 
2.1. Building the Soviet Housing System
After the revolution in October of 1917 all aspects of the Tsarist Empire 
– economics, politics, culture and architecture – were to be rearranged 
to correspond with the new, socialist order. Housing played an important 
role in the search for the new society. In addition to the public sphere, do-
mestic life was also restructured, as the material world was supposed to 
determine consciousness (“byt opredelaet soznanie”) (Buchli 1999, 23–24). 
This provided the reasoning for the radical reorganisation of housing and 
the establishment of communes in the 1920s. The old capitalist city was to 
9 This study concentrates on the urban areas of Soviet Russia, that is, the Russian 
Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (SFSR), instead of the whole Soviet Union. 
However, the principles of the housing systems were the same throughout the 
Soviet Union, although regional variation existed because the republics had 
their own Housing Codes.
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be replaced with a socialist one and housing was to play a role in the proc-
ess of creating the ‘Soviet man’ (Semenova 2004, 56). Housing was also 
used to control citizens, through the spatial solutions of the communal 
apartment, in which residents were under each others’ surveillance, as well 
as through allocation of housing by state institutions. 
Socialist urban policy focused strongly on cities, paying less attention 
to rural areas (Harloe 1996, 14). The new housing system was built ini-
tially by nationalising land and housing and transferring administration 
of housing to local councils. The government’s decisions were driven by the 
shortage of housing in cities but the measures taken to change the prevail-
ing situation were ideologically grounded. The so-called rehousing policy 
(zhilishchnyi/ kvartirnyi peredel), was put into practice in Petrograd10 from 
1918 until 1921 or 1922. It meant the municipalisation and redistribution 
of housing, relocating workers to old ‘bourgeoisie’ houses, that is, taking 
the homes of upper-class citizens and giving them to the proletariat. In ad-
dition to homes, furniture, food, money and clothes were also taken from 
the bourgeoisie and given to the workers, who did not even have to pay rent 
at first (Chernykh 1995, 71). According to Natalia Lebina, this was done 
primarily for propaganda reasons; the main concern was not the residents’ 
comfort (Lebina 1999, 182). Lebina’s view is supported by the fact that the 
urban population in the Soviet Union diminished between 1914 and 1926 
(Bater 1980, 21), particularly due to the Civil war (1918–21), so there was 
no acute need for the rehousing at the time. Housing conditions were poor 
but the shortage of housing was not as critical as in the years that followed. 
Rehousing, what Richard Stites (1989, 128) calls “the housing revolution”, 
was a mass phenomenon involving 300,000 inhabitants of the city (ibid., 
213). 
However, industrialisation and migration inflicted population growth 
and Leningrad’s housing stock was soon unable to accommodate any more 
new inhabitants. The growing housing shortage had escalated into a crisis 
and rehousing was undertaken for the second time. The result of this was 
that people from extremely different social backgrounds were compelled 
to live close to each other and share the same domestic space (Bertaux et 
al. 2004, 14–15). On 1 August 1927 a decree on the “right to self-consoli-
10 St. Petersburg was known as Petrograd from 1914 to 24 and Leningrad from 
1924 to 1991.
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dation” (pravo na samouplotnenie), came into force. If the living space per 
person exceeded eight square metres, the residents had the ‘right’ to take 
other people, that is, total strangers, to live in their homes. If the regu-
lation was not implemented within three weeks, the housing authorities, 
domoupravlenie, would allocate people to settle there. People refusing to 
follow the order could lose their apartment and be obligated to move to a 
worse dwelling or even be incarcerated (Lebina 2003, 41–43). Some people 
managed to fill the ‘surplus living space’ of their apartment with relatives, 
thereby keeping the apartment in the family (Semenova 2004, 63). 
The rehousing policy was practised until the end of 1929. It was especial-
ly tough on former businessmen after the cessation of the New Economic 
Policy (Novaia ekonomicheskaia politika, NEP, 1921–1928), which had 
allowed small trade. The so-called NEPmen and the elite of the Tsarist 
era, who were now known as ‘former people’, became lishentsy (disenfran-
chised) and were deprived of basic human rights such as housing, employ-
ment, higher education and medication (Brovkin 1998, 31–33.) many of 
these disenfranchised people were deported in the 1930s and, when some 
of them were able to return later, they found it very difficult to get their 
apartments back from the new occupants (Fitzpatrick 1999, 125). The re-
housing policy did not solve the housing crisis; instead, it led to an increase 
in the number of communal apartments, which became the main housing 
type in the city in the 1920s and 1930s (Lebina 2003, 44).
The former elite clearly suffered as a result of the rehousing, being forced 
to give up their apartments or to take total strangers, from entirely differ-
ent backgrounds and cultures, to live with them. workers’ housing condi-
tions, on the other hand, improved, as many of them now had a separate 
dwelling – a room or even an apartment – for themselves. For them, the 
policy meant upward social mobility (Semenova 2004, 59), but the housing 
situation as a whole did not improve (Chernykh 1995, 73). It was not just 
the former upper class who found it uncomfortable to share a dwelling, but 
also the workers, who were not being used to living in fancy apartments in 
the centre of the city. Furthermore, bourgeois apartments were not always 
particularly comfortable. They required a lot of firewood to keep them 
warm and the workers’ factories were often located on the outskirts of the 
city, which meant long journeys to and from work (Lebina 1999, 182–183). 
According to Chernykh, the large, luxurious, but unpractical apartments 
did not attract workers who were not used to such living conditions and 
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ended up being occupied by more affluent people (Chernykh 1995, 72). It is 
possible that the nationalisation of housing has created the problem that is 
so well known today: unclear property rights to premises and apartments. 
Disputes about whether premises belong to the state or to homeowners’ 
associations are quite common in contemporary St. Petersburg as will be 
later demonstrated in this book. 
The first decades of Soviet rule have been described as the “age of uto-
pianism” (Fitzpatrick 1999, 67). In urban planning, architects sought a 
new, socialist city as a part of the socialist way of life (Bater 1980, 21) and 
architecture was driven simultaneously by aesthetic innovations of revolu-
tionary art and strong social factors (Khan-magomedov 1987, 12). Urban 
planning was urgently needed in those outmoded and deteriorated cities 
that were subject to rapid population growth as a result of industrialisa-
tion. Soviet architects were split roughly into urbanist and disurbanist 
schools, each having different views on how the new society should be built. 
Both schools were influenced by foreign scholars. Englishman Ebenezer 
Howard’s idea of a garden city had inspired Russian disurbanists even be-
fore the Revolution. Disurbanists painted horror pictures of the city as a 
monster struggling with problems of excessive traffic and overpopulation 
and saw decentralisation as the answer. The urbanist school, influenced by 
the French architect and designer Le Corbusier, believed that the socialist 
city should be densely constructed. Urbanists planned house-communes 
for a new, communal way of living that would contribute to constructing 
the Soviet citizen (Ylikangas 1998).   
Short-term experiments in collective living were realised during 
the Civil war in Petrograd. Luxury hotels such as the Astoria and the 
Evropeiskaia were nationalised and turned into dwellings for higher party 
officials, known as Doma Sovetov (‘Houses of the councils’). They were a 
form of obshchezhitiia, hostels or dormitories that have separate rooms 
but joint kitchens and dining rooms. Non-elite party workers were able 
to reside in the less comfortable Oteli Sovetov (Lebina 1999, 161–162.) At 
first, communal living, that is, living in Doma or Oteli Sovetov, or working 
communes, was regarded as a sign of belonging to the ‘right’ social class 
(meerovich 2004b, 111), while separate apartments later came to indicate a 
higher social position. In the summer of 1921 Petrograd’s Doma and Oteli 
Sovetov had 800 permanent inhabitants and thousands of temporary visi-
tors. In 1923, at the end of the Civil war, as the situation in the city began 
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to stabilise, some Doma Sovetov and Oteli Sovetov were restored to their 
previous function as hotels and party officials were given separate apart-
ments (ibid., 113–115). 
Communes for people other than party officials were realised in the 
form of house-communes or communal houses (doma-kommuny) in the 
1920s. The first house-communes were designed to be enormous build-
ings that would house hundreds or even thousands of people, providing all 
facilities, from dining and reading rooms to day-care centres. Their main 
purpose, supported not only by party officials but also by residents, was to 
fight the patriarchal and capitalist concept of the family. The house-com-
munes were intended to cut service costs and save valuable housing space 
by communalising the services, while also promoting equality by releasing 
women from domestic work. One of the most important principles of the 
house-commune was to fight the bourgeois model of the nuclear family by 
removing the ‘heart’ of the home – the kitchen – where family socialising 
had traditionally taken place, replacing it with shared kitchens and dining 
rooms where all the residents would eat together. Furthermore, adults were 
to be separated from their children, who were taken care of in other parts 
of the building. This idea generated a lot of controversy at the time (Stites 
1989, 200–204). 
Eventually, although several plans of house-communes were made, 
only a few were ever actually built (Stites 1989, 200–204). However, they 
are worth describing as they portray the ideology that later led to the estab-
lishment of communal apartments, the prevailing type of urban housing 
throughout most of the Soviet era. Construction in the 1920s was quite 
modest compared to later decades, especially the 1960s (see Table 3 later in 
this chapter). Communal experiments were mostly conducted on existing 
housing stock, if the plans were realised at all. House-communes never 
became a widespread mode of living because they did not attract strangers 
to each other to move in together, and of the few that were built, some were 
insufficiently equipped to work as the architects had planned (Stites 1989, 
239). Interestingly, although the house-communes were intended to realise 
the utopia of communal living, the spacious house-communes in moscow 
and Petrograd were never turned into communal apartments. Instead they 
were reserved for the elite, offering more luxurious living conditions than 
the average communal dwelling (Boym 1994, 128). 
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2.2. Housing Conditions and Housing Administration in the 
1920s and 1930s
Housing conditions deteriorated for many Leningrad dwellers in the 1920s 
and the actual living space per person remained below the official ‘sanitary 
norm’ that defined the minimum amount of healthy living space, of nine 
square metres per person (Lebina 2003, 44). The sanitary norms defined the 
living space to which every citizen was entitled. It is noteworthy that people 
were entitled to a mathematically calculated and bureaucratically distrib-
uted number of square metres rather than a room or a private space (Boym 
1994, 125). Bedrooms and living rooms were counted as living space, while 
the kitchen, bathroom and common areas of the apartment were ‘non-liv-
ing space’ (nezhilaia ploshchad’) (Sosnovy 1959, 3). Having a small enough 
living space made it possible to register for improved living conditions, 
which involved queuing up for a larger apartment from the municipality 
or from a state enterprise. The real living space was lower than the norm, 
5.85 square metres per person throughout the Soviet Union in 1926. The 
situation in Leningrad, 8.73 square metres per person in 1926, was better 
than it was in the less industrialised, peripheral cities (ibid., 4–6). 
Naturally, some people had considerably more living space than the 
norm, while others had less. Striking inequality and a large variety existed 
in the housing conditions between different social groups. Families in the 
1920s and 1930s were officially settled to bathrooms, hallways, kitchens 
and other common areas by the authorities while new apartments were 
being built for the elite (Fitzpatrick 1999, 98–99). ‘Doma spetsialistov’ were 
built in Leningrad for specialists in various cultural spheres and sciences. 
These were built for propaganda reasons: to show that a successful career 
would be rewarded by the state and that better living conditions could be 
achieved through hard work. As an example, Aleksei Stakhanov11 (along 
with other exemplary workers) was reported to have been given an apart-
ment to himself (meerovich 2004b, 164–170). However, only very few peo-
ple were fortunate enough to get their own apartment. 
11 A record-breaking miner who was presented as the embodiment of a hard-
working Soviet citizen. Other Stakhanovites were workers who became privi-
leged because of their ‘outstanding performance’ at work. Their achievements 
were widely publicised to set an example to the people (Fitzpatrick 1999, 74).
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Table 2. Worker families’ dwelling types in Leningrad in 1935, in percentages
Old housing stock  New housing stock   
Separate apartment/several rooms 10.8 Separate apartment/several rooms 16.2
Separate room 46.5 Separate room 69.5
Part of a room 25.6 Part of a room 14.3
Kitchen/similar space 5.2
Space in communal dwelling 11.9
Total  100 Total   100
Share of old and new housing of total housing stock not defined in source.
Source: Sosnovy 1959, 10.
Table 2 presents the types of living in Leningrad in 1935. As the table 
shows, a separate apartment was the dwelling type of a minority of work-
ers’ families. In the old housing stock almost 90 percent of families lived 
in communal apartments and the corresponding number in the new hous-
ing stock was almost 84 percent. The ‘several rooms’ category may indicate 
a communal apartment but it still entailed more spacious living condi-
tions than the other categories. ‘Space in communal dwelling’ refers to less 
than a room in a regular communal apartment, merely a corner in a com-
mon area. It should be noted that Table 2 refers to families, not individu-
als. Thus, part of a room means that an entire family shared the room with 
other people. Almost 12 percent of Leningraders lived in ‘corners’, that is, 
they slept on the kitchen floor, under the stairs, in a hallway, or a similar 
area. This suggests that a separate room in a communal apartment was far 
from the least desirable type of living at the time. Barracks and dormito-
ries, the “standard housing for students and also common for young un-
married blue- and white-collar workers” in the 1930s, were much worse, 
usually lacking running water (Fitzpatrick, 1999, 49–50). 
It has been claimed that the material conditions existed for happy 
communal living but that psychological adaptation failed to take place as 
expected (Humphrey 2005, 40). On the other hand, the practical living 
conditions in communal apartments did not actually meet the require-
ments for the utopia of “socialism in one building” as Richard Stites has 
called it (1989, 200). Communal apartments were usually established in 
old single-family apartments or houses (Semenova 2004, 59) that were 
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not designed for communal living. There was only a small kitchen and no 
communal services like dining rooms or libraries, as the house-communes 
were planned to have. In spite of these defects, communal apartments re-
mained the most common type of urban living for decades (Stites 1989, 
239–240). They were particularly common in Leningrad, as there were a 
lot of existing old houses with spacious apartments, with rooms that could 
be further divided with partition walls (Gerasimova 2002, 213). The apart-
ments usually housed one family in each room, although one room could 
even be shared by two or three families (Sosnovy 1959, 17). Not all com-
munal apartments were alike, of course; they differed in the quantity of 
living space and the old apartments often had very spacious rooms, some-
times dozens of square metres in area. A four-room apartment might be 
inhabited by four households, whereas another apartment of the same size 
might house only two families. In any case, the low living space per per-
son reveals that the living conditions were very tight indeed. Furthermore, 
the low, heavily subsidised rent system actually favoured the better-off, as 
those people living in spacious, separate apartments paid the same amount 
per square metre as the inhabitants of communal apartments (morton 
1980, 254, 256).   
The communal apartment is the symbol of the Soviet era for many, not 
least for those who lived or still live in them (see e.g. Bezzubcev-Kondakov 
2005). Because these exceptional living circumstances framed the every-
day life of ordinary Soviet citizens for decades, they have had a great im-
pact on the psychology of people. Life in a communal apartment, includ-
ing the complicated relationships and eccentric neighbours, has inspired 
numerous Soviet writers (such as mikhail Bulgakov, mikhail Zoshchenko 
and Sergei Dovlatov) and has been thoroughly examined by contemporary 
scholars such as Ilya Utekhin, Katerina Gerasimova, Natalia Lebina and 
Svetlana Boym, among others. Living in very close quarters with neigh-
bours extended the limits of privacy. Strategies of ‘privatisation’ includ-
ed residents using furniture and personal belongings as markers of their 
space in common areas of the apartment (Gerasimova 2002, 221–222). As 
a result, communal living evoked precisely those ‘petty bourgeoisie’ and 
‘counterrevolutionary’ feelings that it was intended to abolish (Bezzubcev-
Kondakov 2005). The lack of space and privacy led to constant queuing 
and compelled residents to make arrangements to cope with everyday life. 
This included scheduling the use of a bathroom (Gerasimova 2002, 217) 
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and giving each resident a different code for the doorbell, to be able to 
tell whose visitor was coming (Utekin 2004). Everyday life in a communal 
apartment has been pathologised and described as a “war of all against all” 
(Bezzubcev-Kondakov 2005) but also as mutual help between neighbours 
(meerovich 2004b, 224). Living under the stressful conditions of over-
crowding and a lack of privacy put a psychological strain on residents and 
even “exacerbated mental illness” (Fitzpatrick 1999, 48). However, if neigh-
bours were able to get along, they could help each other in everyday tasks 
like grocery shopping and babysitting (meerovich 2004b, 224). 
The Soviet Union as a whole has been compared to a closed institu-
tion, to an army, prison or school (Fitzpatrick 1999, 226–227). Communal 
apartments have been viewed as representing the Soviet Union on a mi-
cro scale (“socialism in one building”), or as a physical expression of the 
“Soviet mentality” (makarova 2005, 11), living under constant control with 
the ambiguity of public and private space as its dominant features. For 
Katerina Gerasimova, the communal apartment is an expression of “public 
privacy”, that is, the “openness of personal life to public scrutiny and lo-
cation of everyday domestic activities in collectively controlled territory” 
(Gerasimova 2002, 224). Another type of dwelling with stricter and more 
obvious control mechanism was the hostel, obshchezhitie. Hostels were di-
rected at students and workers, especially temporary workers (limitchiki), 
and had custodians (dezhurnye) who restricted entry to residents with 
an entry card (propusk). while other countries also have student hostels, 
Soviet hostels had certain distinctive characteristics. These included the 
starosta, a resident-activist that organised cleaning tasks and kept order on 
every floor, and informers who reported politically suspicious behaviour 
(Humphrey 2005, 46–47). 
The cramped living conditions offered neighbours the opportunity for 
close surveillance of each other and the state used communal apartments 
as an instrument of social control. Neighbours reported each other to 
the authorities, often in the hope of acquiring the room of those they de-
nounced. The risk of being exposed by a neighbour was especially high in 
the years of the Great Purge in the 1930s (Lebina 1997), when massive ar-
rests, executions and labour camp convictions of ‘counterrevolutionaries’ 
were exercised. Although meant as a communal mode of living, communal 
apartments were not free from hierarchy. One of the residents was chosen 
as the kvartupolnomochennyi, the apartment supervisor, and this person 
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was in touch with domkom (domovoi/domovyi komitet), the house com-
mittee that managed the whole apartment block (Hosking 2004, 16). The 
head of the house committee was the upravdom (upravliaiushchii domom), 
or superintendent (Lebina 2003b, 190). The kvartupolnomochennyi were 
important for the authorities because they had the dual task of controlling 
residents’ housing service payments and reporting on their neighbours’ 
daily life (Lebina 2003, 44–45). while the apartment supervisor’s informa-
tive task may be morally questionable, some organisation was probably 
necessary to keep order in large kommunalki. modern homeowners’ as-
sociations are led by a chairperson, whose task of maintaining order in the 
house is similar to that of the apartment supervisor but without the job of 
reporting of its members to the authorities. 
Another person who was responsible for maintaining order in the 
house, even in the pre-Soviet era, was the janitor (dvornik). The janitor 
was tied to his12 workplace, as his apartment was located in the house in 
which he worked. There were strict rules for janitors related to keeping 
order, especially during state holidays, when the yard had to be kept in an 
‘exemplary’ state and the janitor had to wear a uniform (Zakirova 2006, 
17). According to Boym (1994, 129), janitors were often individuals who 
had recently moved to the city and had to ‘earn’ their residence permit by 
providing information about residents to the house committee. Janitors 
also often socialised and drank with the local authorities (ibid.). 
The communal apartments, as with separate apartments, were admin-
istrated by the house committee, which was an important institution in 
raising ‘good’ Soviet citizens (Boym 1994, 129). House committees had 
already been established by 1914, when residents’ representatives formed 
committees inside houses to maintain order and protect the residents dur-
ing politically unstable times (Lebina 1999, 160). Some house commit-
tees also distributed ration cards for food (Shomina 2004, 10). After the 
Revolution, the new Soviet authorities were not pleased with the original 
house committees because of their reluctance to function as control or-
gans. The house committees were reorganised from above and the staff 
were chosen by the authorities so that the committees would be loyal to 
the Soviet rule and would supervise the enforcement of the housing pol-
12 Janitors were usually men, although female janitors became more common 
during and after the Second world war (Zakirova 2006, 17).
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icy at the local level. Thus, the house committee was transformed from 
an organ of self-management by the residents into a controlling author-
ity. Existing house committees were considered too independent and were 
given less leverage and not considered to be official administrative organs 
(meerovich 2004b, 35–38). 
The house committees also had a positive effect. Control meant that 
places in common use were well looked after and residents cooperated in 
activities such as planting flowers. Nonetheless, for most of the Soviet era 
the house committees rarely represented the residents’ interests; instead 
they were used to implement social and political control imposed from 
above (Shomina 2004, 10). In the post-Soviet era house committees have 
been formed by residents, based on the model of the original domkomy, in 
order to improve the maintenance of their house. House committees are 
similar to contemporary homeowners’ associations but they are less for-
mal and have less legal leverage. Residential administration was therefore 
already in existence in the Soviet Union, in the form of apartment super-
visors, janitors and house committees, but more in terms of control and 
surveillance than joint decision-making in the spirit of democracy, which 
is the idea behind homeowners’ associations. 
The 1920s is often viewed as the period of innovation and free exper-
imentation, in arts, for example, before totalitarianism took over in the 
1930s. On the other hand, the foundation for the impending ideological 
control was in fact laid during this decade (Brovkin 1998, 1–2). Ordinary 
people did not find the experiments with communal living, in the form of 
various communes and consolidated housing, to be particularly comfort-
able. Victor Buchli has claimed that the totalisation of the domestic sphere 
in the 1920s was so strong that, in comparison, Stalin’s era offered relief, 
a “delimited… degree of empowerment”, and gave people the chance to 
participate in governance (1999, 186). According to official propaganda, 
the purpose of communal living was the people’s well-being. However, the 
real agenda behind the housing policy and architectural design was hidden 
from the people and even from the architects who planned the communal 
dwellings. In reality, the communal mode of living was used to control 
people (meerovich 2003, 172–173). Although housing conditions were es-
pecially drastic in the 1920s and 1930s and only improved from the late 
1950s onwards, the communal apartment was for decades the main type 
of housing in urban areas. Communal apartments housed the masses, and 
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as long as a majority of the people lived in equal housing conditions, there 
was no one to envy, except for the small number of elite who lived in better 
housing. Housing was a psychologically important tool that made the peo-
ple feel equal on one hand and subordinate to the elite on the other. Living 
under the constant surveillance of neighbours, with minimal living space 
and privacy, certainly had psychological implications (Semenova 2004, 
65–67). As the state owned and managed most of the urban housing stock, 
people had very limited possibilities to change their housing situation. The 
system did not encourage people to be active consumers, in fact the op-
posite was true. In the post-Soviet era the system changed dramatically, 
and people who lived for many years in the Soviet system were expected to 
take matters into their own hands, without the experience or knowledge 
required to do it. Ignorance and confusion about how to act under the new 
rules of conduct can potentially lead to withdrawal from decision-making 
in homeowners’ associations. On the other hand, the experience of living 
in such close contact with each other may facilitate cooperation and collec-
tive decision-making in the current situation. 
2.3. the ‘Stick and Carrot’ Policy and the Right to Housing
Housing tenures in the Soviet Union were categorised as (a) state-owned, 
consisting of (i) municipal (i.e., the local soviet) and (ii) ‘departmental’ (ve-
domstvennyi) enterprise housing. In addition, there was a small amount 
of housing stock that was (b) owned by social organisations (such as un-
ions), (c) cooperative or (d) private (Andrusz 1992, 140). The private hous-
ing stock consisted mostly of detached single-family units (Gentile & 
Sjöberg 2006, 706). The socialist doctrine said that private property would 
eventually become meaningless in a communist society as all needs would 
be satisfied collectively (Held 1996, 142–143). Instead of private proper-
ty, ‘personal ownership’ was possible, which meant that items, including 
dwellings, could be appropriated for personal use, but no profit could be 
made from them. Apartment-ownership was, however, rare in urban are-
as. Buildings were considered separate from the land on which they stood. 
Land was nationalised completely and could not be owned by private indi-
viduals (marcuse 1996, 129–130). 
In the Soviet Union the state was the employer as well as the owner of 
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the housing stock and thus it provided both work and housing for most 
people. Low rents went hand in hand with low wages (Kagarlitsky 1989, 
77, as cited in marcuse 1996, 150). most of the housing was distributed 
by state enterprises (Bychkova & Popova forthcoming, 8), which made 
workers directly dependent on their place of work. According to Andrusz 
(1990), by the end of the Soviet period 40 percent of housing was distribut-
ed by employers (the ‘departmental’, vedomstvennyi, housing stock). mark 
meerovich (2003, 4) claims that the uncomfortable housing conditions in 
Soviet Union were due less to the absence of construction materials or the 
state’s financial problems and more to a deliberate state policy. The state 
prioritised heavy industry at the expense of housing construction, mainte-
nance and management, which affected citizens’ well-being (morton 1980, 
254). The government used housing as part of its ‘stick and carrot’ policy, 
allowing housing only for those who worked, not according to need as of-
ficially stated in the Constitution (meerovich 2003, 4–5).
Early examples of combining working and living were the “working and 
living communes” (trudo-bytovye kommuny), established during the re-
housing policy in the 1920s. The communes, or collectives, provided medi-
cal and cultural services for factory workers and opportunities to socialise 
with each other, thereby connecting employees with their workplace. Good 
Soviet citizens were raised by the collective and, because workers not only 
worked together but also lived together, the collective would control and 
correct their work and behaviour at all times. The idea was that workers 
would be competing to achieve the best performance at work, which would 
be rewarded with privileges (visits to fine sanatoriums or holiday resorts, 
additional square metres of living space, personal cars, etc.), thus improv-
ing their position in the collective (meerovich 2004b, 115–119). 
An effective control mechanism was the residence permit (propiska), 
which was introduced in 1932. It was also an instrument of demograph-
ic control that prevented overpopulation of cities. According to socialist 
principles the optimal city size was 50–60,000 inhabitants and propiska 
were used to limit city growth (Bater 1980, 27). A passport system existed 
in the Tsarist era and was liquidated after the Revolution, but the later 
mass migration to cities justified the introduction of a domestic passport 
and registration system (Höjdestrand 2005, 36). Kolkhoz workers were in 
the worst position because the passport system concerned only those who 
lived in cities, working villages and sovkhozes. Kolkhoz workers were tied 
50
HOmEOwNERS’ ASSOCIATIONS IN RUSSIA AFTER THE 2005 HOUSING REFORm
to their place as they could not move to the city without a passport. People 
in rural areas only won the right to propiska and the possibility to move 
to the city in 1974 (exceptional cases were permitted in 1970). Propiska be-
came an effective way to regulate migration. City-dwellers living without a 
propiska were fined and could be sentenced to maximum of six months of 
open prison for continuous disobedience. Furthermore, propiska violation 
was often used as an excuse to arrest and convict dissidents (Liubarskii 
1993). The propiska system made it very difficult to improve one’s housing 
conditions and achieve upward mobility (morton 1980, 256).
In 1940 the legislation was complemented with regulations that also 
tied people to their place of work so that they could not choose where they 
lived or where they worked (Liubarskii 1993). Propiska and work became 
prerequisites for each other – it was impossible to get a job without a pro-
piska or a propiska without a job. A person without a propiska was also 
denied certain civil rights and social benefits such as medical insurance, 
education, unemployment benefits, the right to vote and access to hous-
ing (Höjdestrand 2005, 37–38). Propiska and trudovaia knizhka, a work 
document introduced in 1938 on which working merits were listed, an-
chored people even more tightly to the places where they lived and worked 
(meerovich 2003, 35). Allocating housing through the Soviet enterprises 
guaranteed a worker’s loyalty to their employer. At the beginning of the 
1930s trudovaia knizhka became the main document for an urban inhabit-
ant. This was another identification document, which expired unless it con-
tained monthly notes, and getting or changing a job, travelling or finding 
an apartment was impossible without it (meerovich 2004). Accordingly, 
housing was intertwined with work and functioned as an instrument of 
social control. 
One group was excluded from housing rights. Ex-criminals were de-
clared bomzh (bez opredelennogo mesta zhitel’stva, without a defined place 
of living) in their propiska after release from prison, effectively making 
them homeless (Höjdestrand 2005, 41). This was a way of exercising the 
stick and carrot policy on criminals, who were punished for their crimes 
by being denied housing. This was also a way to keep unwanted elements 
away from the cities. Propiska regulations and punishments for breaking 
the rules were loosened in the 1970s (Liubarskii 1993). In 1993 propiska 
were made illegal but they were replaced with a similar system, registration 
to a permanent residence (registratsiia na mesto zhitel’stvo) (Höjdestrand 
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2005, 44). The registration system still exists today but it is not as strict 
and people do not necessarily live in the apartment to which they are reg-
istered. 
In the Soviet Union for some people to obtain a propiska was extreme-
ly difficult, so alternative ways were devised to get one, such as fictitious 
marriages. A new profession even emerged, ‘marriage brokers’, who would 
help people find a suitable partner for such a purpose. Couples sometimes 
divorced in order to acquire more living space, although they actually con-
tinued living together (morton 1980, 249–250). Or it would sometimes oc-
cur the other way around: a divorced couple could be forced to live togeth-
er because separating would lead to worse housing conditions (Fitzpatrick 
1999, 47). ‘manipulation of registration’ also existed, for the purpose of 
improving one’s housing conditions. This could include taking care of an 
elderly relative in exchange for registration to the apartment and the right 
to inherit it (Salmi 2006b, 198–199).
Acquiring a dwelling through a waiting list was slow and only possible 
for those whose living space per person did not exceed 4.5 square metres 
(in Leningrad). As a result, one way to improve one’s housing situation was 
to exchange apartments (Lebina 2003b, 192–193). Exchanges were adver-
tised in notices plastered in public places like kiosks, bus stops, walls and 
in the Bulletin for Housing Exchanges that was published in most big cities. 
In every large city there was also a Housing Exchange Bureau, an agency 
of the Department of Registration and Allocation of Housing Space. The 
Bureau published the Bulletin and approved exchanges but did not help 
people to find exchange partners. The exchange could be cancelled if the 
bureau suspected that money was involved in the exchange, as was indeed 
often the case (morton 1980, 243–246). 
Although Soviet society was ostensibly equal, political merit was im-
portant for obtaining housing. The intelligentsia, that is, the upper mid-
dle-class cultural and scientific professionals, were in a better position in 
the housing queue. High-ranking military officers, distinguished artists, 
scientists and war invalids were legally entitled to additional living space 
and the elite often lived in spacious apartments that had been specially 
built for them (Sosnovy 1959, 10–11). Jumping the housing queue, even 
building a cottage on the state’s account, was possible for employees in 
high-ranking positions. A shadow housing market also existed and unof-
ficial channels were used to acquire better housing (Andrusz 1990). money 
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played an important role in improving housing conditions. In this shadow 
housing market apartments were illegally rented above the official pric-
es (morton 1980, 242). The distribution system was corrupt and a ‘free’ 
apartment could be bought from the authorities (Berezin et al. 1996, 86). 
Alternatively, a ‘procurement agent’ could be (illegally) hired to improve 
one’s position in the housing queue (Schwartz 1981, 290–292). Social net-
works were also crucial in acquiring a dwelling, as they were for other con-
sumer goods (Salmi 2006b). Housing was not the only commodity in short 
supply in the USSR, so personal relationships were needed and used to 
access those items that were otherwise out of range (Hosking 2004). Good 
connections were essential in finding a dwelling; knowing the right person 
could result in moving ahead of the official waiting list (morton 1980, 250). 
Blat, the system of exchange of favours, was also used to find materials 
for house repairs, of which there was a shortage, or to obtain a desirable 
place to build a dacha (cottage) or a garage (Ledeneva 1998, 30–31). Blat 
and networks were a means of survival in the era of shortages. Blat is still 
used today, although to a lesser extent, and the meaning of the term has 
changed somewhat (Ledeneva 1998, 178–179). As Hosking notes, “Soviet 
society intended to be an egalitarian society based on abundance; it actu-
ally became a hierarchical society based on scarcity” (Hosking 2004, 13). 
Even though control of housing was strict, employment usually guaran-
teed a secure dwelling for life, as eviction was extremely rare. Because rents 
were low and housing was allocated by the authorities, financial reasons 
did not prevent people from acquiring a dwelling. According to one com-
mentary on the Soviet Constitution, housing was based on social issues 
rather than financial ones; instead of one’s ability to pay, the determining 
factors were the number of people in the family, their health, participa-
tion in the Great Patriotic war, and the like (Alexeev 1988, 414). Now, in 
the post-Soviet era, principles of the market economy direct the housing 
sector. Although, in theory, the state still guarantees housing for everyone 
(Constitution of the Russian Federation, Article 40), it does not specify ex-
actly how this is guaranteed. Social housing is available only for the poor-
est people, while the majority are expected to buy or rent their apartments 
on the market. This is a huge change to the policy of state-provided hous-
ing. many people were used to this situation, which is reflected in how 
they speak of having been “given” housing, using the passive tense, instead 
of actively buying or renting (Semenova 2004, 54). Accepting the chang-
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ing situation would have been hard for some people, who felt that state-
provided housing was the state’s moral responsibility towards its citizens. 
Protests against increasing rents and housing payments, as well as eviction 
for non-payment, can be expected. 
2.4. Cooperative Housing
The first housing cooperatives, established in the 1920s, were residential or-
ganisations that managed and/or provided housing to the people. They were 
ideologically-driven experiments that followed the more radical house-
communes (Buchli 1999, 29). Economic cooperatives were established in 
Russia as early as 1865 in the Baltic area but due to opposition from local bu-
reaucrats they remained limited in number until the 1905 revolution, when 
regulations on cooperatives were changed. In 1921 there was a “network 
of cooperatives” in Soviet Russia and “there was scarcely anyone who was 
not a member of, or linked in some way, to a co-operative” (Andrusz 1992, 
138–139). Cooperatives have been seen as a transition from capitalism to so-
cialism, somewhere between the two regimes, setting the conditions for so-
cialism. Although cooperatives were popular, the first housing cooperatives 
only emerged in the 1920s. In the era of the New Economic Policy, from 
1921 to 1928, the difficult economic situation in the country forced Lenin to 
allow limited private trading. This also made the climate more favourable 
for private management in the form of housing cooperatives. A very differ-
ent form of housing, the communal apartment, soon became dominant.
Following the massive municipalisation of housing, the state was not 
able to directly manage the entire housing stock. The old house commit-
tees could not be relied on to control residents, as they were led mostly by 
the previous upper-class homeowners and other politically unreliable ele-
ments. Housing management was supposed to be in the hands of workers, 
so house committees were reorganised (as described above) and, shortly 
thereafter, housing cooperatives were created (meerovich 2004b, 32–35). 
In 1924 the idea of housing cooperatives was raised in the XIII Party 
Congress and the decree on cooperative housing associations (zhilishchnyie 
kooperativnye tovarishchestva, ZhSK) came into force (Andrusz 1992, 141). 
There were two main types of cooperatives: rental cooperatives (zhilish-
chno-arendnye kooperativnye tovarishchestva, ZhAKTy) and house-build-
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ing cooperatives (zhilishchno-stroitel’nye kooperativnye tovarishchestva, 
ZhSKT). The rental cooperatives rented municipalised housing and were 
an efficient way to manage municipalised housing (ibid.). The idea behind 
rental cooperatives was that tenants of municipal housing would renovate 
and maintain their own dwellings, which would entitle them to reduced 
housing payment fees, especially when large-scale renovation was needed 
(Dolgushina 2006). The most comfortable housing in Petrograd was in the 
centre of the city, where 97.5 percent of housing stock had water pipes and 
sewerage. In the traditional workers’ district of Vyborgskii, however, 80 
percent of apartments lacked basic amenities in 1924. The cooperatives did 
improve the housing stock. For example, in 1926 a cooperative at house 
#72, in 25 October Street managed to install heating, sewerage and bath-
room in every apartment of the building (Lebina 2003, 35–36). 
The second type of cooperative, house-building cooperatives (ZhSK), 
included workers’ cooperatives (rabochie zhilishchno-stroitel’nye koopera-
tivnye tovarichshestva, RZhSKTy) and general citizens’ cooperatives (ob-
shchegrazhdanskie zhilishchno-stroitel’nye kooperativnye tovarishchestva, 
OZhSKTy). As the name implies, the main difference between rental cooper-
atives (ZhAKTy) and building cooperatives (ZhSK) was that the latter were 
not established in existing housing but were built (or renovated) by their 
members. The house-building cooperatives built new houses, completed the 
construction of unfinished houses and renovated deteriorated houses for 
their members (Dolgushina 2006; Lebina 2003, 36). According to Andrusz, 
workers’ cooperatives were reserved for employees of the state, the coopera-
tive and other public organisations, while anyone could become a member 
of the general citizens’ cooperatives (Andrusz 1992, 141). Chernykh, on the 
other hand, has claimed that OZhSKTy were accessible for those people who 
had the financial resources to build their own dwellings, such as craftspeo-
ple and the petit bourgeoisie (Chernykh 1995, 74). workers’ cooperatives 
had more rights than general cooperatives; they were entitled to credit and 
building materials from the state (Andrusz 1992, 141). Besides cooperatives, 
a group of residents could rent a whole building. Cooperatives were a way 
for citizens with adequate financial resources to improve their housing situ-
ation (Shomina 1995, 80). In addition, the state encouraged self-construc-
tion that could also be realised in the form of a house-building cooperative. 
Private constructors were offered free lots and 10-year tax exemptions as a 
way to ease the housing shortage (Harris 1999, 284–285).
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To some extent, the 1920s cooperatives socialised the domestic realm: 
laundry, housing maintenance, preparation of food and, to a limited ex-
tent, childcare were performed collectively. However, this did not liber-
ate women from being the equal counterparts of men in industrial work. 
Instead, both tasks were placed on women’s shoulders, resulting in the dou-
ble burden of wage-work and housework (Buchli 1999, 29–31). Partly as a 
communitarian project of the residents and partly as a policy ordered from 
above, so-called self-managed canteens (samodeiatel’nye stolovye) were es-
tablished from 1929 onwards. The canteens, often set up by ZhAKTy, were 
an experiment in the “collectivisation of daily life”, with the aim of releas-
ing women from domestic work. One canteen provided meals for 250–300 
people during the food crisis and they were quite widespread in moscow, 
Leningrad and other industrial centres. The canteens were eventually 
closed down in the mid-1930s, as they became unnecessary once food ra-
tioning had ended (matsui 2008). 
Cooperatives were a significant phenomenon in the 1920s. Financially 
they were quite independent and they could determine how housing was 
redistributed (Lebina 2003, 35). Accordingly, their power to distribute va-
cant apartments attracted people to become members. There was a mem-
bership fee defined by the joint meeting but it had a legally stated upper 
limit, and members could be evicted for neglecting housing payments or 
disturbing neighbours (Dolgushina, 2006). According to Buchli, the fees 
were high enough that poorer workers could not afford them, making 
them a movement of urban professionals (1999, 31). Rental cooperatives 
were the main type of housing in Petrograd in the mid-1920s: 75 percent of 
housing were ZhAKTy, while only five percent was private housing stock 
(Lebina 2003, 35). This was before the ‘consolidation’ and rehousing policy 
was put into practice in 1927. ZhAKTy were subject to it as well at the time 
and some of them were abolished (ibid., 42–43). 
The number of cooperatives also started to decline in the mid-1930s, for 
several reasons. The building cooperatives could not handle the large-scale 
construction or the more sophisticated building techniques that were re-
quired. Secondly, the financial position of the local soviets (authorities) had 
improved, which allowed them to again take charge of housing manage-
ment (Andrusz 1992, 142). Furthermore, as the cooperatives gained more 
financial independence over time and were able to renovate and construct 
houses without state support, they created a potential threat for the state’s 
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dominance of the housing sector. Because housing was to be tied to labour, 
dwellings should not be obtained through any channel other than from the 
state, which allocated housing through workplaces (meerovich 2004b, 27–
31). Cooperatives sought greater independence and tried to avoid fulfilling 
the state’s regulations, and the state could not tolerate this indiscipline. 
For example, cooperatives transformed kommunalki into separate apart-
ments, which went against the state’s idea of housing that was ‘transparent’ 
and easily supervised. As a result, housing cooperatives such as ZhAKTy 
were abolished in 1937 (ibid, 266–267). The cooperatives of the 1920s and 
1930s are an interesting phenomenon because they show that efficient 
self-organisation and management of housing existed in the Soviet Union 
before the state completely took over the housing sector and compressed 
people into communal apartments. On the other hand, some researchers 
have regarded ZhAKTy less as democratic management organisations and 
more as control organs that did not make a great difference to later mu-
nicipal housing management (Siegelbaum 2006, 10). However, the coop-
eratives of the 1920s are important because they show that some degree of 
self-management of housing existed before the state completely took over 
the housing sector. Furthermore, the early cooperatives set a model for the 
cooperative system that was established in the 1960s.
2.5. Housing Cooperatives in the later Soviet Period
Having being prohibited for over 20 years, cooperative housing returned 
in the 1960s, when attitudes towards private ownership became more per-
missive. The building cooperatives of the later era, zhilishchno-stroitel’nye 
kooperativy, ZhSK, can be seen as an alternative to homeownership. The 
idea was to offer a means of acquiring a separate apartment through hire 
purchase, thereby easing the housing shortage. In 1962 a new law for devel-
oping cooperative construction came into force, which allowed state loans 
for up to 60 percent of construction costs with a repayment term of 10 to 
15 years. In 1964 the credit part was increased to 70 percent in rural and 
remote areas and the repayment time increased to 20 years (Andrusz 1992, 
143). However, despite the state’s enthusiasm, cooperatives did not increase 
in the desired phase; instead, cooperative construction decreased in the 
1970s, although it did increase again in the 1980s (ibid., 146). Cooperative 
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residents had fewer rights than tenants; they could not get state subsidies 
for housing maintenance, which was available for residents in all other 
types of housing, not only in municipal housing (Shomina 1995, 81).
In 1982 the terms were improved by extending the 70 percent credit 
part to apply to the whole country (except for Siberia, with 80 percent) 
and the repayment term was extended to 25 years (Andrusz 1992, 143). 
In the late 1980s, Gorbachev revived the cooperatives to enable restricted 
private trading (Andrusz 2002, 129). Two decrees came into force in 1988, 
one  to accelerate the development of individual housing construction (O 
merakh po uskoreniiu razvitiia individual’nogo zhilishchnogo stroitel’stva) 
and another to accelerate the development of housing cooperatives (O mer-
akh po uskoreniiu razvitiia zhilishchnoi kooperatsii). In order to fulfil the 
goal of providing every Soviet citizen a separate apartment or house by the 
year 2000, private construction was to be increased with the help of the 
local soviets. In rural areas credit for construction was to be given with 
a repayment term of 50 years, while in the cities the term was 25 years. 
Credit was to be given for capital repairs as well, with a 10-year repayment 
term. Enterprises and sovkhozes could sell houses to their employees, with 
the price determined by the employee’s position. The quality of private 
construction was also to be increased (O merakh po uskoreniiu razvitiia 
individual’nogo zhilishchnogo stroitel’stva). 
The 1988 decree on cooperatives specified two types of cooperatives 
that resembled those of the 1920s and 1930s (Andrusz 1992, 150). One was 
the house-building cooperative that could build a house or occupy one 
after making capital repairs to it. The other was the type that could buy 
either a newly built or repaired house from an enterprise or local soviet (O 
merakh po uskoreniiu razvitiia zhilishchnoi kooperatsii). The local soviets 
had the right to add up to 15 percent to the construction costs of houses in 
particularly desirable locations. According to Andrusz, this had two main 
consequences: it strengthened the local soviet’s financial position and au-
tonomy and it forced rental charges to correspond with the location more 
than they had previously (ibid., 151). 
The state promoted cooperatives in the 1980s on the basis that housing 
maintenance would be improved because owners would be more motivat-
ed than tenants to take care of their houses (ibid.). This assumption seems 
to have held true, as the common areas of cooperative houses were known 
to be in better condition (Shomina 1999, 1). Although people treated the 
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state-owned apartments in which they lived as their own (Reid 2006, 159), 
they did not seem to take care of the common areas with the same in-
tensity. The current housing reform also aims to improve the condition 
of the common areas in multi-family buildings by privatising them and 
transferring the responsibility from the public sector to the homeowners. 
Cooperatives were meant to increase the rate of housing construction as 
much as two to three times by 1995 (O merakh po uskoreniiu razvitiia 
zhilishchnoi kooperatsii). Between 1996 and 2000 cooperatives were to ac-
count for 30 percent of new construction in towns (Andrusz 1990). 
However, cooperatives’ share of the housing stock remained modest and 
by 1990 they accounted for only four percent of the housing stock (Struyk 
et al. 2000, 4). Cooperatives were more widespread in larger cities, partly 
because it was easier to construct there, as pre-fabricated panels were eas-
ily available in the vicinity of the factories that produced them (Andrusz 
1992, 146). waiting lists for better housing tended to be long. In 1990 there 
were 14.3 million families in the queue for housing and 1.8 million for co-
operatives across the whole Soviet Union in 1989 (Andrusz 1992, 145, 149). 
Certain restrictions applied for eligibility to a cooperative: the person had 
to be registered in the district and the applicant’s living space had to be be-
low the average for the area, as determined by local authorities. Residents 
of Leningrad cooperatives were often young families with children who 
had moved out of a communal room they had shared with their parents 
(Gerasimova 2000). In the late 1970s cooperatives were established that 
were specially targeted for the young (molodezhnye zhilishchnye koopera-
tivy, MZhK) (Shomina 1995, 81).
Officially, people could be rewarded with a cooperative for working 
hard or under especially difficult circumstances, such as in a harsh climate, 
or as compensation for a handicap or a dwelling that was to be demolished. 
However, the system of allocating cooperatives was somewhat corrupt, as 
was the entire housing system. Illegal practices of paying extra ‘key money’ 
were common and privileged people received cooperative apartments out-
side the official waiting list (Andrusz 1992, 144). According to morton, co-
operatives were “largely occupied by the intelligentsia and their children”, 
who could afford to pay to improve their housing conditions (1980, 255). 
This contradicts Gerasimova’s view of cooperatives as dwellings for young 
families (Gerasimova 2000), a contradiction that could be due to regional 
variation in cooperatives’ residential structure. Also, Berezin et al. note 
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that cooperatives’ residents were “not from high-income sectors of the 
population”, but were families with average financial positions (1996, 87). 
According to the Law on Cooperation in the USSR (O kooperatsii v 
SSSR), a housing cooperative’s administrative structure closely resembles 
today’s homeowners’ associations. It consists of a common meeting of the 
members, a chair and, in the case of a large cooperative, a board (Article 
14). This makes homeowners’ associations the successors to cooperatives. 
The tradition of cooperatives can simplify the idea of homeowners’ associ-
ations for people today, which is very important in order for the successful 
management of homeowners’ associations. However, cooperatives were a 
small-scale phenomenon and they could not be considered a sufficient ex-
ample for making homeowners’ associations comprehensible for residents. 
Although cooperatives were not that common in the later Soviet era, they 
are relevant for this study as they represent both an important step towards 
homeownership and a housing management organisation that closely re-
sembles the present homeowners’ associations.
2.6. Khrushchev’s Housing Reform
Stalin’s housing policy had failed to reduce the housing shortage. After his 
death, the ‘Stalinist’ neo-classicist architectural style was abandoned as a 
part of the de-Stalinisation process. Stalinki were monumental buildings 
that had spacious, usually communal, apartments with 3–3.5 metre high 
ceilings (Lebina 2003b, 162–164). Ever since their construction, stalinki 
have been regarded as prestigious (Taranov 2002, 85), and today they are 
among the most sought after dwellings in the housing market. After the 
Second world war, however, the country desperately needed new hous-
ing and the grandiose Stalinist houses could not be built in a short time 
at a limited cost. The new first secretary of the Communist Party, Nikita 
Khrushchev, declared that ‘people do not need beautiful silhouettes of cit-
ies; they need square metres’ (Taranov 2002, 83). New technology was used 
for the effective large-scale production of simple houses known as khrush-
chevki. 
Despite the population decrease caused by the war, the Soviet Union 
had also acquired new territories (Bater 1980, 63) and because the existing 
housing stock had been damaged, the situation was critical and required 
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immediate action (Harris 1999, 297). People were living in barracks, cel-
lars, lofts and abandoned industrial buildings, which may have been bear-
able as a short-term emergency solution but definitely not suitable for per-
manent human habitation. These dwellings often lacked sanitary facilities, 
water supply and gas and the living conditions caused illnesses, such as 
rickets and dysentery, and were hazardous; the dwellings sometimes lit-
erally collapsed on top of the residents. Dissatisfaction with the housing 
conditions is illustrated by the number of complaints13 that citizens sent to 
the Communist Party in the hope of receiving a new place to live. Housing 
was the most common subject of complaints in the 1950s (Kulavig 2002, 
41–51).
Considering the widespread discontent in the country, housing was 
politically a very serious issue. Complaints were taken seriously by the 
party because discontent with the housing situation could lead people to 
question socialism. was the country really heading to right direction if 
the system could not provide decent housing to its citizens? (Kulavig 2002, 
41–51). The general discontent therefore also became a risk to the existing 
political power and, in order to restore trust in the system, the situation 
had to be relieved. As a result of of the housing deficit, private construc-
tion and the purchase of homes for private ownership was made possible 
by a decree in 1948 (Sosnovy 1959, 13). The quality of private construction 
was very low, houses were built with poor materials, sanitary or technical 
standards were not met and the houses were located on the outskirts of the 
cities (ibid., 15). The state helped the owner-builders by providing them 
with tools, advice and building materials (Harris 1999, 300).
Khrushchev’s era was the first time since the 1920s that the Soviet pow-
er openly admitted the country’s housing crisis (Sosnovy 1959, 14). The 
real living space per person across the country had diminished from 5.85 
square metres in 1926 to as low as four square metres in 1940 and it was still 
under five square metres in 1958 (in Leningrad the corresponding number 
was 5.18 square metres in 1956) (ibid., 4–5). In 1955 communal apartments 
13 Letter writing was encouraged by the authorities, who felt it was “a democrat-
ic practice that brought citizens closer to their government” (Fitzpatrick 1999, 
176). Remington (2002, 89) calls this “parochial contacting”, pointing out that 
while citizens were able to express private claims, the system did not allow 
them to organise politically to drive their demands. Letter writing continues 
to be the main channel for contacting the authorities today.
61
2. HOUSING IN THE SOVIET UNION
were still being designed, but architects admitted that this kind of hous-
ing was not desirable and complaints were received from residents (ibid., 
7). Two years later, however, in 1957, a   document “On regarding the de-
velopment of housing construction in the USSR” (O razvitii zhilishchnogo 
stroitel’stva v SSSR) stated that communal apartments and several families 
living in one apartment was unsuitable. It was claimed that this was not 
the state’s deliberate policy but rather a result of economising during the 
era of industrialisation. “A separate apartment for every family” became 
the slogan for the reform, effectively saying that separate apartments were 
no longer solely the privilege of the elite.
The huge task of relocating people from communal to separate apart-
ments had to be realised with minimum expenses, in accordance with the 
‘minimisation’ principle. All unnecessary architectural and furnishing de-
tails, such as bay windows and lifts, were removed. Instead, prefabricated 
panels were used to build houses in serial production. Khrushchevki were 
typically five-storey buildings with one-, two- or three-room apartments. 
The typical apartment size was 40 square metres and the ceiling height 
ranged from 2.2 to 2.5 metres. In order to reduce expenses, cheap, low-
quality materials were used and the houses were built quickly. This new 
construction mode saved between 30 and 35 percent in building expenses 
but contributed to the small apartments being uncomfortable and unprac-
tical. The five-storey multi-family houses started to be built in Leningrad 
in 1956 (Lebina 2003b, 171–178). 
Because of their defects, khrushchevki were given the nickname khr-
uschoby, in reference to the word trushchoba, or slum (Boym 1994, 125). It 
has been said that the whole building could laugh at an anecdote told on 
the fifth floor due to the poor soundproofing (Lebina 2003b, 162). Because 
the houses were built in a rush in order to fulfil the construction plans, 
the facades were sometimes left unfinished and the courtyards without 
landscaping (Sosnovy 1959, 12). The poorly built houses had cracks in the 
walls and problems with heating. Residents and architects were equally 
dissatisfied with the ugly panel houses that created districts that all looked 
alike. This is parodied in the famous Soviet film entitled Irony of the Fate, 
in which a character arrives in a strange town but mistakes it for his home 
because it looks just like his and even the street name is the same (Taranov 
2002, 85–86; Ruble 2001, 146, 150). 
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Table 3. Housing construction in the Soviet Union, millions of square metres
Year Total State workers Kolkhozes
1918–28 203 23.7 27.5 151.8
1929–32 56.9 32.6 7.6 16.7
1933–37 67.3 37.2 7.1 23
1938–45 184.2 75.7 24.5 84
1946–50 200.9 72.4 44.7 83.8
1951–55 240.5 113 65.1 62.4
1956–60 474.1 224 113.8 136.3
1961–65 490.6 300.4 94 96.2
1966–70 518.5 352.5 72.8 93.2
1971–75 544.8 407.3 64.3 73.2
State: State and cooperative enterprises, organisations and housing cooperatives
workers: workers and employees on their own expense and state credit
Figures reported at intervals of the five-year plans, starting from 1929.
Source: Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1977 g.
As Table 3 shows, although khrushchevki were not the ideal housing solu-
tion, the scale of new housing construction was massive. Housing construc-
tion prior to the 1950s had been on a very small scale, especially in the 1920s 
and 30s. New housing was built and it was modernised by installing gas and 
heating to more apartments (Aksyutin 2004, 346). It has been claimed that 
khrushchevki were only meant to last for about 25 years rather than for 
a lifetime (Glock et al. 2007, 208). However, Khrushchev himself said the 
houses were constructed to last a century (Taranov 2002, 86), as was the 
idea in socialist urban planning in Stalin’s time (Lebina 2003b, 164). 
In the late 1960s the existing housing stock began to deteriorate strong-
ly. This was the result of a policy that kept rents at a low level while simul-
taneously constructing a large amount of new housing. Because of this, 
however, there were not enough resources left over to maintain and repair 
the existing housing stock. Furthermore, new construction was concen-
trated on the outskirts of cities, leaving the old districts in the centre to de-
teriorate (Szelenyi 1996, 304–305). Housing construction in Brezhnev’s era 
was similar that of his predecessor, except that the buildings had between 
nine and 13 storeys instead of five storeys (Staub 2005, 339). Brezhnev-
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era housing was slightly more spacious, comfortable and better equipped, 
with lifts and rubbish chutes but it was also panel constructed (moscow 
Times 1999, Nevskii prospect website). The quality of housing improved 
in the later decades of the Soviet era. Better building materials were used, 
existing houses were renovated and new houses were more spacious and 
convenient (Gentile & Sjöberg 2006, 704).  
Despite the problems in terms of the quality and comfort of the new 
housing, Khrushchev’s reform managed to create much-needed new hous-
ing. However, most of Leningrad’s population still lived in old, pre-revolu-
tionary housing stock and communal apartments (Lebina 2003b, 187–188). 
Estimates of the living space per person in the Soviet era vary considerably 
across different sources but it is clear that Khrushchev’s reform increased 
living space. According to Ruble (2001, 139), the average living space per 
urban dweller doubled between 1956 and 1989, from 7.7 to 15.8 square 
metres. most sources give lower figures than Ruble. For example, morton 
(1980, 235) claims that the average living area per person in the USSR in 
1970 was eight square metres and 10 square metres in moscow. By way 
of comparison, the average living space per person in Russia in 2006 was 
21.1 square metres (Rossiiskii statisticheskii ezhegodnik 2007). According 
to morton, 30 percent of the Soviet Union’s citizens lived in communal 
apartments in 1974. Although this is still a high number, it is a substantial 
improvement over the situation in 1960, when 60 percent of the nation 
lived communally (morton 1980, 235–236). The amount of communal 
apartments has always been higher than average in St. Petersburg, so the 
number is likely to have been higher in the city. The housing situation did 
not improve as much, or as equally as it could have, because of the unequal 
distribution of housing. Erik Kulavig describes the situation as follows: 
Between 1959 and 1960, homes were built for 227,500 families in moscow, but 
only 22.3 per cent of those who received apartments had been on the wait-
ing list. The reason for this was that most of the new buildings were reserved 
for particular ministries, factories and institutions which gave first priority to 
their own employees, and first and foremost to those in the highest positions. 
There was thus a striking social inequality in the sharing-out of apartments 
and building materials. Of the most needy 70 per cent were workers, but they 
were awarded only 30 per cent of the new housing, while the remaining 30 
per cent received around 70 per cent of the newly built apartments. (Kulavig 
2002, 41–42).
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The urban landscape changed significantly in Khrushchev’s Thaw pe-
riod, during which new construction was directed at new neighbourhoods. 
The 1950s saw the creation of the first microdistricts (mikroraiony), au-
tonomous neighbourhoods that would provide all the services its inhabit-
ants needed: kindergartens, schools, a clinic, shops and cultural amenities. 
microdistricts were planned to have between 8000 and 12,000 residents and 
to consist of smaller housing units, ‘superblocks’ (kvartal’i), components 
of 1000–1500 people. Several microdistricts constituted a district (raion), 
an administrative unit comprising between 30,000 and 50,000 inhabitants. 
The plan was influenced by the garden city idea of the 1920s, meaning that 
everything in the district would be within walking distance, without the 
annoyances and dangers of the districts of old industrial towns. However, 
many employers were reluctant to move their enterprises to the suburbs, 
so most microdistricts ended up as dormitory districts, forcing residents to 
travel long distances to work on overcrowded public transport (Staub 2005, 
337–340; Ruble 2001, 148–150). Secondly, the services that were planned 
for microdistricts were only built decades later, if at all (molodikova and 
makharova 2007, 53). As a result of all this, a separate apartment in an old 
house in the city centre, close to services and workplaces, remained the 
most prestigious type of accommodation (see morton 1980, 255–256). In 
any case, microdistricts still form the residential complexes and local level 
administrative units in contemporary Russian cities. Housing manage-
ment became more centralised in 1957 and the number of janitors, who had 
taken care of maintenance in every buliding, was reduced. Several house 
committees in Leningrad were merged together and re-established into 
200 housing-management offices, or ZhEKi (zhilishchno-ekspluatacionnye 
kontory) (Lebina 2003b, 190). ZhEK14 continues to be the local authority in 
charge of housing management.
Khrushchev’s reform also entailed new stratification of housing. Until 
the mid-1950s the masses had lived in cramped communal apartments. 
Although the housing situation was not satisfactory by current standards, 
there was “equality in poverty” as Victoria Semenova put it, and there was 
no significant social stratification in housing before the 1960s (Semenova 
2004). The great masses all lived in similar circumstances, so there was no 
14 In some cities, such as St. Petersburg, ZhEK has been renamed ZhES, or zhil-
ishchno-ekspluatatsionnaia sluzhba (housing management service).
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one to envy (ibid., 66); only a small number of elite had lived in separate 
apartments. In the 1960s, however, such accommodation became acces-
sible for ordinary families. Social stratification among the masses began to 
increase, bringing Soviet Union closer to the west in this sense, although 
on a much smaller scale. In the Soviet Union social stratification was based 
on privileges and access to things other than money. There were “no mil-
lionaires around” as one respondent recalled in Alena Ledeneva’s study 
on post-Soviet economy and blat (1998, 181). Housing, along with educa-
tion, health care and employment, was provided for everyone (with the 
exception of bomzhy). Differentiation in housing conditions grew but on a 
much smaller scale than in the post-Soviet era and it was not clearly visible 
because communal and separate housing existed within the same block 
(morton 1980, 254). This continues to be the case in St. Petersburg today in 
the old housing communal apartments that still exist alongside privately-
owned apartments. 
However, the massive amount of construction had a positive effect in 
easing the housing shortage. The average amount of living space increased 
and communal apartments became more spacious for the remaining resi-
dents. This was the first time that the housing shortage had been taken 
seriously in the Soviet Union in the form of concrete and effective meas-
ures to improve the situation. However, the low-quality, hasty construc-
tion and neglect of proper repairs have led to problems that remain today. 
Khrushchevki are frequently found in a dilapidated state and in need of 
capital repairs or demolition. Although a separate apartment meant more 
privacy than a kommunalka, the state wanted to ensure that the ‘com-
munist way of life’ was retained. Standardised housing, built from iden-
tical prefabricated panels, and the mass production of furniture ensured 
that the frame of private life remained common. The state continued to 
monopolise the housing sector and the new apartments were not private 
property. The home was still a public concern and with the ‘gift of the state’ 
came the responsibility to take good care of it. The official propaganda 
nominated residents of the separate apartments as khoziainy, caretakers, 
who were expected to keep the apartments in good condition (Reid 2006, 
148–156). However, more space and reduced proximity of neighbours cer-
tainly allowed more personal liberty and privacy than before.
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2.7. Impact of the Soviet Period on the Present Situation
The Soviet housing system had specific features that are relevant for the 
present housing situation in Russia. Housing policy was driven by social-
ist ideology and housing was used as an important tool to raise Soviet cit-
izens. Housing stock was nationalised at the beginning of the Soviet era; 
privately owned apartments were taken from the former elite and redis-
tributed to workers. A new, communal way of living was to be realised 
in house-communes. This did not, however, gain popularity among the 
people and never became widespread. Instead, due to the severe short-
age of housing throughout the Soviet era, communal apartments became 
the most common type of urban living. Living in uncomfortable prox-
imity to neighbours and the lack of private space took its toll on people. 
Although the housing shortage was exacerbated by population growth, 
some scholars believe that the shortage was actually produced intention-
ally by the state, as it enabled control of citizens on a macro level and at a 
micro level (meerovich 2004b, morton 1980, 254). The state monopolised 
the housing sector because it owned most of the housing stock, which was 
allocated to citizens following the ‘stick and carrot’ policy. Officially, the 
Soviet Constitution from 1936 (Article 128) stated that the right to hous-
ing was based on need, but in practice it was earned by working for the 
state. Housing was largely allocated by state enterprises, making workers 
dependent on their workplace. Housing was intertwined with work and 
good workers were rewarded with better housing, while ex-criminals were 
excluded from the housing-distribution system altogether. The close quar-
ters within communal apartments allowed neighbours to keep a close eye 
on each other and it was common in the early decades to report political-
ly suspicious behaviour to the authorities. Propiska, a registration system, 
was used to control mass migration to cities and tied people to their place, 
making it very difficult to change one’s housing conditions or to achieve 
upward mobility. Alternative channels, such as blat and unofficial housing 
market, were used to acquire better housing. 
On the other hand, residential segregation did exist but only to a lim-
ited extent; for example, cooperative members tended to represent the up-
per stratum of society rather than the lower classes (Bater 1980, 104, 111). 
Housing differentiation increased in Khrushchev’s era when large-scale 
new construction made separate apartments accessible for the masses. 
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However, stratification was not as great as in the west or even in contem-
porary Russia, as homeownership remained virtually impossible in cities. 
Khrushchev’s housing reform relieved the housing shortage through new 
housing but it was hastily constructed and of poor quality. In order to re-
duce the costs of the new construction, renovations and maintenance of 
the existing housing stock were neglected. The effects of this policy can be 
observed today, even though the ‘emergency’ condition housing stock is 
now being repaired or demolished.
As a form of compensation for unachievable owner-occupation, tenant’s 
rights were strong, practically equal to homeowner’s rights (IUE 2003) and 
rents were kept stable and low (Andrusz 1990). It has been claimed that 
tenants felt that state-owned apartments or rooms were their own proper-
ty, resulting in a feeling of “pseudo-homeownership” (Reid 2006, 159). The 
state tried to make the residents of separate apartments consider them-
selves as khoziainy, caretakers, of their apartments (ibid., 154). However, 
although people may have felt morally responsible for their dwellings, this 
is quite different from being legally in charge of property. Thus, housing 
privatisation in the post-Soviet era has brought a significant change in this 
respect. Secondly, homeowners nowadays are, along with their neighbours, 
legally responsible for the maintenance and management of the common 
areas of the building. This idea may be difficult to comprehend for people 
who are used to the state handling those duties and who regard the com-
mon property as no-man’s land. Even if the system is understandable in 
principle, implementing it in practice may be difficult without prior ex-
perience of joint housing management (with the exception of residents of 
ZhSKs, a small minority).
The difficult housing situation made it necessary for people to use their 
creativity, blat and connections to obtain better housing as well as other 
goods (Salmi 2006b, 197–198). However, the system did not encourage 
creativity; instead, people were raised to be passive recipients of state-al-
located goods and employees had little or no opportunity to impact their 
housing situation. Unlike in the west, individual housing strategies were 
not based on choice and people were subject to the actions of the authori-
ties (Semenova 2004, 54). In the Soviet Union the state was the ‘caretaker’ 
and the provider of housing. This is not to say that the Soviet citizens were 
completely passive, but activity took different forms, as the rigidity of the 
Soviet housing policy forced people to use alternative channels to improve 
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their housing situation. Nonetheless, the Soviet housing system did not 
give its people the skills and readiness necessary to actively participate in 
the current, market-economy-based housing system.
On the other hand, a model of residential housing management also 
existed throughout most of the Soviet era in the form of housing coop-
eratives. It is worth noting that a self-management housing organisation 
already existed in Russia in the 1920s, preceding today’s homeowners’ as-
sociation, although the two systems were quite different. The cooperatives 
from the 1960s onwards were never especially widespread but they are 
relevant because of their similarity to today’s homeowners’ associations. 
Cooperatives’ members were responsible for common property, and the 
model of members’ collective decision-making is basically the same as in 
homeowners’ associations. Cooperatives are well known by the people and 
their example can make homeowners’ associations more comprehensible 
for ordinary people in modern society. The ‘original’ resident-based house 
committees, which existed before the state took over housing management, 
are also reminiscent of today’s residential housing organisations. 
It is evident that the Soviet era has left a legacy for the present day hous-
ing situation in Russia that is problematic in several respects. The poor con-
dition of the housing stock and the communal apartments on one hand, 
and the unreadiness of people to be active consumers in the market on the 
other, both descend from the Soviet era. The following chapters will exam-
ine how the demolition of the socialist housing system and the creation of 
a new, market-oriented one in its place has succeeded or otherwise.
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3. Housing after the Soviet Union
This chapter examines the housing situation in post-Soviet Russia. The 
housing sector has been subject to a profound change, from a socialist to-
wards a market-oriented system. The chapter starts by introducing the 
housing privatisation reform and its consequences, both intended and un-
intended. It then covers the housing reform that came into force in 2005, 
describing its aims and analysing the problems that have been encountered 
in the course of its implementation. The privatisation of housing manage-
ment, of which homeowners’ associations are an intrinsic part, is then ex-
amined in detail, along with other management alternatives stated in the 
legislation, and their positive as well as negative aspects. This research fo-
cuses on St. Petersburg, so the chapter mainly describes the housing ad-
ministration structure and housing conditions in that city. The housing 
movements and organisations that have sprung up in the post-Soviet era 
are also introduced, as contemporary civic activism in Russia largely fo-
cuses on housing issues. The volume of civic activity shows that there are 
clear problems in housing and that people are willing to take action to 
improve the situation. Finally, the chapter draws together the aims of the 
post-Soviet era reforms and the obstacles involved in implementing them. 
This chapter is based primarily on previous studies and newspaper articles 
but also on expert interviews of this study. Empirical data from the study 
is used to support the analysis of the current macro-level situation in the 
housing field. This chapter constructs the framework for examining home-
owners’ associations in practice in the two chapters that follow.
3.1. Housing Privatisation and Other Reforms in the 1990s
In the early 1990s a vast reform begun, aimed at reducing the state’s role as 
the primary actor in the housing sector, taking a step towards a capitalist 
housing market. Similar changes have been made across Eastern Europe 
since the 1990s, aimed at creating a more efficient housing market by pri-
vatising housing stock and then moving housing management and mainte-
nance to the private sector. The point of departure for the reforms has been 
similar in all of the Eastern European countries: the overwhelming pres-
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ence of the state in the market as the owner and manager of the housing 
stock. The poor condition of housing stock due to neglect and the state’s 
lack of resources for housing maintenance are problems that are character-
istic of all these countries. However, different countries have taken differ-
ent approaches to implementing the reform. As a result, a particular ‘East 
European model’ of housing has not developed and there are great differ-
ences in the housing policies of the various countries (Clapham & Kintrea 
1996). Here I am concentrating on Russia’s situation, realising that the re-
form in Russia is part of a wider pattern of change.
State financing of Russian housing construction decreased from 80 
percent in 1991 to 11 percent in 1999 (Kosareva et al. 2000). In the early 
1990s responsibility for housing construction, administration and housing 
services was moved to local governments along with other social policy 
tasks, as a part of the municipal self-government reform. This decentrali-
sation has also been executed also in other former Soviet countries (Struyk 
2001, 1046). Housing administration and other social infrastructure tasks 
placed a financial strain on local governments, which relied on budget al-
locations from federal and regional governments (Gel’man 2003, 48; Evans 
2000, 119). 
Housing stock in the Soviet Union was divided into (a) state-owned, 
consisting of (i) municipal (i.e. the local soviet) and (ii) ‘departmental’ (ve-
domstvennyi) enterprise housing. In addition, there was a small amount of 
housing stock that was (b) owned by social organisations (e.g. unions), (c) 
cooperative or (d) private (Andrusz 1992, 140). The private housing stock 
consisted mostly of detached single-family units (Gentile & Sjöberg 2006, 
706). Seventy-nine percent of urban housing stock in Russia was state-
owned in 1991 and this number was as high as 90 percent in the largest 
cities (Struyk et al. 2001, 1047). 
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Table 4. Ownership of housing in Russia in 1990, in percentages
 Urban Rural All
State 44 35 42
Departmental 35 2 25
All state 79 37 67
Public housing 1 9 3
Cooperatives 5 0 4
Personal property 15 54 26
Total 100 100 100
Public housing: trade unions and collective farms
Source: Berezin et. al. 1996, 84.
Table 4 shows that personal property accounted for 15 percent of housing 
in urban areas in 1990, with one percent owned by trade unions and col-
lective farms and five percent by construction cooperatives (Berezin et al. 
1996, 84). Ownership was first permitted15 in Russia in 1988, when resi-
dents of cooperative houses were allowed to become owners of their apart-
ments by paying the remaining value of the apartment16 (Kosareva et al. 
2000, 153). Steps towards owner-occupied housing had, therefore, already 
been taken in the 1980s, when housing cooperatives approached private 
property (Andrusz 1992). 
Privatisation of state-owned housing stock started in 1991 with the 
Law on Housing Privatisation (O privatizatsii zhilishchnogo fonda), the 
first step towards moving the responsibility of housing to private citizens 
(UNECE 2004, 27). So-called free privatisation was implemented based 
on the principle of vouchers (Kosareva et al. 2000, 153). According to the 
law, everyone is entitled to free privatisation but only once. Under-aged 
children have the opportunity to become co-owners of the apartment in 
which they live with their family, or if they live alone, with the consent of 
15 This refers to apartment-owning characteristic to urban areas. Ownership of 
single-family houses was already permitted but is more common in rural ar-
eas.
16 Thirty percent of the price was paid when one became a member of the coop-
erative, while the state gave credit for the rest of the price (Andrusz 1992). 
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their parents or guardians. Having come of age they can privatise another 
apartment (O privatizatsii zhilishchnogo fonda, Articles 2, 11). Restitution, 
the return of nationalised housing to its former owners, has never been ap-
plied in Russia as it has in other East European countries except Bulgaria 
(Clapham 1995, 686–687).
Table 5. Ownership of housing in Russia and St. Petersburg in 2006, in per-
centages
 Russia St. Petersburg
State 5.6 27.1
municipal 14.6 0
Private 79.7 72.9
of which in citizens’ property* 76.5 69.8
Other 0.1 0
Source: Federal’naia sluzhba gosudarstvennoi statistiki.
* Other privately owned housing stock belongs to private companies and organisations.
A comparison of Tables 4 and 5 shows that housing ownership changed 
fundamentally between 1990 and 2006. Just under eighty percent of hous-
ing stock in Russia was privately owned in 2006, of which 76.5 percent was 
owned by citizens ownership (the rest was owned by legal persons; private 
companies and organisations). Just 5.6 percent of the housing stock was 
owned by the state and 14.6 percent was municipally owned. The share 
of privately owned housing stock in St. Petersburg, 72.9 percent, was al-
most as large as it was in the whole country, while the share of state-owned 
housing stock was 27.1 percent.17 According to the Law on Implementation 
of the Housing Code in 2005, the right for privatisation was supposed to 
end on 1 January 2007 and for municipal housing already in 2005, in case 
the rental agreement was made after 1 may 2005  (Article 6). However, 
the time limit was considered to be too tight and the period was extended 
so that neither of the rules hold true anymore (Rossiskaia gazeta, 18 July 
17 All public sector housing in St. Petersburg is state-owned and there is no mu-
nicipal housing stock.
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2006). According to current legislation, the free privatisation in Russia will 
end on 1 march 2010 (O vvedenie v deistive Zhilishchnogo kodeksa, Article 
2, Point 34). 
Not everyone has taken advantage of the opportunity to privatise 
at no cost. This can hardly be seen as a problem, given that the private 
housing stock already accounts for nearly 80 percent of the entire hous-
ing stock. However, analysis of who has decided to privatise and why is 
relevant because it reveals information about housing circumstances in 
general. According to Kosareva et al., at the forefront of privatisation have 
been pensioners and older people who have wanted their children to in-
herit their apartments (2000, 155). Transferring apartments to another 
generation was already possible in rented apartments in the Soviet era if 
the heir was registered in the apartment. As a result, inheritance may not 
have been a very strong incentive for privatisation. Secondly, good quality 
apartments with high market value and a good location have often been 
subject to privatisation (ibid.).
There are some negative incentives that have prevented privatisation 
(ibid., 156). State-owned housing was the most common tenure type in 
cities and tenancy rights were so strong that people did not think of them-
selves as tenants in the Soviet Union; instead, the permanent nature of 
dwelling fostered a feeling of “pseudo-homeownership” (Reid 2006, 159). 
Tenants’ positions have not changed much since the Soviet era (Glock et al. 
2007, 207). Tenants are entitled to sublet the apartment, have other people 
occupy the apartment and to exchange the apartment. The tenant is re-
sponsible for making the housing payments, but also for carrying out cur-
rent repairs on the apartment (Zhilishchnyi kodeks, Article 67). However, 
municipal, social housing is no longer available for the masses as it used 
to be in the Soviet Union, as the new Housing Code has restricted the op-
portunities to acquire social housing (see Chapter 3.2).  
Due to the secure tenancy, home ownership has not been associated 
with increasing security of occupancy. In the Soviet Union tenants were 
nearly impossible to evict, and even today eviction is rarely exercised, even 
in the case of non-payment of rent. As mentioned, tenants have the ability 
to bequeath their occupancy to their children or grandchildren registered 
in their apartment. Furthermore, ownership of the apartment means re-
sponsibility for maintenance and renovations of the house, which makes 
privatisation a less tempting option financially, especially if the house is in 
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need of renovation. To ease the burden, maintenance and repair fees for 
owners were reduced for a transitionary period that ended in 2008. Until 
then, owners paid almost as much as tenants in non-privatised housing 
stock (Kosareva et al. 2000, 156). However, the general impression seems 
to be that apartment owners pay higher fees that may prevent tenants from 
privatising. This view was also expressed by one respondent in the inter-
view data as a reason for not wishing to privatise his apartment.
In addition, maria Plotnikova has found that education plays a deci-
sive role in making the decision to privatise. Plotnikova says that educa-
tion reduces the uncertainty of rising maintenance costs because better 
educated people are less prone to economic uncertainty, particularly the 
risk of losing one’s job, so a potential rise in maintenance costs does not 
overly threaten their budget. On the other hand, household income did 
not appear to have a significant effect on privatisation, which, according to 
Plotnikova, indicates that poor households do not understand the financial 
value of their dwelling and have not taken advantage of the opportunity to 
gain property (Plotnikova 2004, 21–22).   
As a consequence of privatisation, the coexistence of privatised and 
state or municipally owned apartments in one building has become com-
mon. This is partly due to the communal apartments, which are usually 
located in old buildings in the centre of the city. The problem with empty-
ing the apartments and turning them into single-family dwellings is that, 
for the price of one room, it is difficult to afford to buy a whole apartment 
in the centre. There can also be psychological reasons that deter people 
from moving out of a kommunalka. People who are still living in com-
munal apartments are mostly older people who are accustomed to living 
in the centre. They are unwilling to move to the outskirts of the city, which 
provides a very different living environment, both architecturally and psy-
chologically. The historic centre of St. Petersburg holds certain prestige 
and people are proud to live there. Even in the Soviet era the city centre 
was the most highly valued living area, particularly compared to the new 
districts far from the centre, which meant long commutes and where serv-
ices were not as easily accessible (morton 1980, 255–256). Secondly, having 
been used to the presence and close proximity of neighbours, living in a 
separate apartment can create a sense of loneliness (Humphrey 2005, 47). 
The coexistence of privatised and state owned apartments has implications 
for management as well: management of mixed-ownership buildings can 
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be problematic, as tenants and homeowners are in unequal positions and 
have differing interests regarding management and maintenance.
In the first years of privatisation some people lost their dwellings as a 
result of fraud, due to which privatisation was unofficially renamed in the 
1990s as prikhvatizatsiia, a combination of the word privatizatsiia (privati-
sation) and khvatat’ (to grab). The fear of housing fraud and crime related 
to privatisation may have been one reason why people did not privatise 
their apartments. One respondent who lived in a non-privatised apartment 
told a story about a man who had privatised his apartment in the first years 
of privatisation and was killed the next day, apparently (according to the 
respondent) in order to take over his apartment. The respondent observed 
that privatisation can make an apartment subject to “criminal actions”. 
Although it may sound like an exaggeration, his view is not without sub-
stance based on the information of prior studies. Fraud has often occurred 
in the form of housing exchange, a common method for improving hous-
ing conditions in the Soviet era. The scheme was usually along the fol-
lowing lines: a person gave the registration of their current address to the 
person with whom they were supposed to exchange the apartment. Having 
given up their old dwelling, it turned out that the address to which the per-
son was supposed to move was bogus – a non-existant address or a dilapi-
dated apartment in uninhabitable condition. The unfortunate individual 
could end up homeless if they did not have any support networks on which 
to rely. The legislation was later changed so that moving the registration 
from one address to another had to be done at the same time, which made 
defrauding more complicated (Höjdestrand 2005, 52–58). 
However, takeovers of apartments happen even today, which is why the 
Public Chamber has produced a leaflet warning citizens. In Russia these 
takeovers are known as reiderstvo or reid, after the English word raid. The 
fraud may falsify documents that entitle someone to an apartment, includ-
ing a marriage certificate (with the real apartment owner) and a document 
of the fraudulent party’s inheritance of the apartment. The Public Chamber 
warns citizens about registering people to their apartment and about signing 
any papers with unclear content. It also advises keeping registration docu-
ments and domestic passports in a safe place and warns of the possible phys-
ical threat that the raider might impose (Obshchestvennaia palata 2006).
Residents of communal apartments have been the target of fraud, as 
communal apartments are often located in prestigious, architecturally val-
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uable old buildings with a central location that makes them commercially 
interesting to speculators. Harsh measures, even murder, have been used 
to take over apartments. In a typical case an elderly apartment owner was 
promised that she would be taken care of for the rest of her life as part of 
a deal to sell her apartment. After the apartment was sold she died very 
quickly, rather conveniently for the other party in the deal (Glock 2007, 
207–208). Defrauders can even be related to the apartment owner, some-
one who takes good care of the elderly apartment owner until the moment 
the apartment ownership switches to the relative (Kvartirnyi riad, 3 April 
2008). The practice of a relative taking care of an elderly apartment owner 
in exchange for registration and, thus, the right to inherit the apartment, 
was used to improve housing conditions back in the Soviet era (see Salmi 
2006b, 198). If both parties fulfil their part and fraud does not occur, this 
can of course be a convenient arrangement for all concerned parties.
The way in which the transition from a socialist economy to a mar-
ket economy should have been realised has been widely discussed (see 
e.g. Sutela 2004, 194). This also applies to the privatisation of housing. 
whether the implementation of privatisation reform should have taken 
place free of charge has also been questioned. Obviously the principle is 
humane, enabling anyone to become the master of their own dwelling. In 
addition, it has enabled the residents of communal apartments to obtain a 
separate apartment, albeit far from the city centre. On the other hand, not 
all the new proprietors have sufficient financial resources to maintain their 
property, as their property may consist solely of their apartment. This dif-
fers from western countries, where purchasing a home requires certain re-
sources, usually financed partially through a house loan and partially with 
savings. In Russia, therefore, homeownership does not indicate a certain 
social position or wealth, as is usually the case in western countries. The 
group of ‘poor homeowners’ poses a challenge for housing maintenance, 
particularly in homeowners’ associations that should be able to finance 
maintenance and repairs on their own. 
whether the privatisation period should have been extended until the 
year 2010 is an even more disputed question. marina Akimova, a hous-
ing activist and chair of St. Petersburg’s association of cooperatives and 
homeowners’ associations, said in a newspaper interview that the free pri-
vatisation has been a “huge mistake”, because people have not been prop-
erly taught about being homeowners and taking care of their property. 
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Furthermore, because of the extensive privatisation, the share of social 
(state) housing stock is too small (Dailystroi 27 December 2006). when 
Akimova was interviewed for this book in January 2008, she felt that the 
share of privatised housing was already too large, especially as many of the 
homeowners are poor and needy. In her opinion there was no point in con-
tinuing the privatisation right, as only people without any other financial 
assets have not yet privatised. If these people become homeowners they 
will not be able to afford the maintenance and repair costs and will end up 
being dependent on others (Akimova interview conducted on 29 January 
2008). It seems likely that those people who are willing to privatise have 
already done so, as the right to privatisation has existed for over 15 years.
In the Soviet Union rents and housing payments were heavily subsi-
dised by the state, so residents paid only a nominal share of the real costs. 
The rental rate was fixed in 1928 and remained constant throughout the 
Soviet era. Rent, combined with housing service payments, accounted for 
approximately 2.5 percent of a factory or office worker’s salary (Berezin 
et al. 1996, 85.) However, in the late 1980s there was “a move away form 
universalism to selectivity” in free housing (Andrusz 1992, 145) as it be-
came evident that the state could not provide enough free housing for its 
citizens. As rents and housing payments were raised in the 1990s to corre-
spond with actual costs, housing allowances became necessary. The hous-
ing allowance programme was launched in 1994 and implemented by local 
governments. It was the first means-tested programme in Russia, designed 
to function as a social safety net for low-income families that had difficulty 
paying increased housing costs (Struyk et al. 2003, 19.)  In the first years 
after the programme was implemented, participation in it was low, as there 
was little knowledge about the programme’s existence (Struyk et al. 1997, 
1815). In the early 2000s approximately 8.2 percent of households were re-
ceiving housing subsidies (Struyk et al. 2003, 8).
The programme aimed to make privatisation a more tempting op-
tion for tenants by raising rents for municipally owned housing. After the 
rent increases, housing privatisation was supposed to make privatisation 
more profitable than renting, given that poor homeowners were entitled 
to subsidies (Struyk et al. 1997, 1791). The housing allowance programme 
is implemented at the local level and there are great variations between 
regions. Because of economic conditions and political reasons (such as 
avoiding public discontent) many local governments have not raised the 
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prices for housing and utility services or the limit that entitles a household 
to a housing allowance to the levels set by the federal government. Because 
of regional differences, the housing allowance programme has so far not 
fulfilled its intended function as a social safety net (Struyk et al. 2003, 7–10, 
20.) A more recent study has found that coverage of the housing allowance 
programme is low, meaning that few households that are eligible for allow-
ances actually take part in the programme. On the other hand, targeting is 
high; in other words, those people that do take part are those that the pro-
gramme is meant to serve. Local economic conditions affect the city’s level 
of funding for the allowance programme (Struyk et al. 2006, 216–217). 
Non-payment of housing costs is quite common in Russia due to the 
low risk of eviction. A Levada-Center survey notes that non-payment is 
quite frequent but that the situation has improved in recent years. In April 
2007 eight percent of the respondents said they made their housing pay-
ments “sometimes on time, sometimes not” and only one percent admit-
ted to paying late. In September 2000, 12 percent paid late and 13 percent 
were sometimes late. In December 2004 four percent paid late and nine 
percent were sometimes late (Levada-Tsentr 2007, 171). It is possible that 
non-payment has become less common in the past few years as the stand-
ard of living has risen, although this may change as a result of the recent 
economic decline. The new Housing Code may have also affected the situ-
ation by making tenant eviction easier and more common. Still, according 
to the law, in case of eviction based on non-payment, the tenant in mu-
nicipal housing must be offered a similar dwelling (Zhilishchnyi kodeks, 
Article 90). Evicting a resident is possible only if that person repeatedly 
uses the apartment in an unsuitable manner or violates neighbours’ rights 
and legal interests, and the situation is not fixed after a warning. The leg-
islation seemingly refers to a tenant rather than a homeowner, as eviction 
is possible on the demand of the property’s owner (ibid., Article 35). It is 
noteworthy that a member of a cooperative can be expelled based on a 
decision by other members and evicted in the case of non-payment of their 
share of the apartment (ibid., 130, 133), whereas the expulsion or eviction 
of a homeowner or a member of a homeowners’ association is not covered 
in the Code.
One reason why eviction is rare is the shortage of state housing in St. 
Petersburg. A tenant can only be evicted without being offered another 
dwelling in exchange if they have used the dwelling in an unsuitable man-
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ner or have violated neighbours’ rights and legal interests (Zhilishchnyi 
kodeks, Article 91). Currently the city has nowhere to place the non-payers. 
Foreclosing properties is legally complicated and even if it was easier, ten-
ants usually do not have any property to be foreclosed, so the measures to 
prevent free-riding are quite dire (Konserg 2 August 2005).
Because housing payments have been raised to, or close to the level of 
real expenses, non-payment has become a more serious problem, as more 
money is involved now than before. According to a Levada-Center survey 
in April 2007, 68 percent of respondents said that 100 percent payment of 
housing and communal services was too much for them. Fifteen percent 
of respondents said it was high but tolerable and only two percent saw it 
as acceptable and not difficult to pay (Levada-Tsentr, ZhKH). Despite this, 
evictions seem to be increasing. In the autumn of 2005 it was reported very 
visibly in the media that the new Housing Code was being put into prac-
tice in terms of eviction. Two long-term non-paying families were evicted 
from their apartments to communal apartments and televisions and other 
home appliances were reportedly taken into possession by authorities due 
to non-payment (see e.g. moi Raion 28 may 2005). This showed that non-
payment can really lead to eviction. However, the authorities have made as-
surances that pensioners will not be evicted; the most at-risk demographic 
are working people who possess two- or three-room apartments. Evicting 
poor pensioners would probably raise strong objections. The authorities 
are at pains to show that the evictions are fair by not evicting the poorest 
tenants. Eviction is generally opposed by many people, probably because 
it has been so rare and because the Soviet state guaranteed apartments for 
all workers. According to the Levada-Center survey in April 2005, 51 per-
cent of respondents disapproved of the eviction of systematic non-payers 
of housing and communal services, while 39 percent approved and 10 per-
cent could not decide (Levada-Tsentr, Reforma ZhKh).
3.2. the New Housing Code
The new housing reform, which started in 2005, is the most profound 
change in the housing sector thus far in the post-Soviet era. The new 
housing legislation consists of 27 laws, including the new Housing Code 
that came into force in march 2005 and replaced the old and outmod-
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ed Housing Code from 1983 as well as many other laws of the 1990s. The 
Housing Code is a continuation of the reforms of the 1990s. It is the next 
step following the privatisation of housing stock, that is, the privatisation 
of housing management and the maintenance sector. The aim of the leg-
islation is to create an effective, efficient housing market. within this aim, 
citizens are encouraged to take the role of active consumers in the market 
by strengthening the consumer’s position and expanding the variety of 
choice in the market. In brief, the main task of the new housing legislation 
is twofold: to offer affordable owner-occupied housing for the middle-class 
and social housing for those who cannot afford anything else. 
Besides the Housing Code, several projects for improving the housing 
situation in Russia, both on national and local levels, have been imple-
mented in the 2000s. Along with education, health and agriculture, hous-
ing has been made a “national priority”, meaning that an extensive federal 
programme is being implemented to develop housing. The programme 
aims to increase housing construction and house loaning. The quality of 
housing and communal infrastructure is also to be improved, while af-
fordable housing and communal services are to be ensured for citizens. 
Another national project for improving housing conditions in the 2005–
2010 period is called “Affordable and comfortable housing for Russian citi-
zens” (Dostupnoe i komfortnoe zhil’e grazhdanam Rossii). The programme 
is implemented at the local level through local government legislation. In 
St. Petersburg programmes have been implemented within the project to 
(1) provide housing for the young, (2) develop mortgage lending and (3) 
provide housing for education, health care and social work. These pro-
grammes show that housing is a top political priority. “Affordable hous-
ing” (dostupnoe zhil’e) has become a kind of slogan for the housing re-
form, often repeated in context of the reform. Housing affordability is very 
important, as the state no longer provides housing for average citizens. 
Emphasising the fact that ordinary citizens can afford housing in the new 
market economy is also psychologically important, to make people feel as 
though they are included in the new system. 
The social housing system has been profoundly reformed by turning 
towards means testing, away from the Soviet principle of universality that 
entitled all citizens to state-owned housing. In the past, apartments were 
distributed according to the shortage of living space; now social housing is 
accessible only for those who cannot afford anything else (see Zhilishchnyi 
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kodeks, Article 49). This is a significant change in the housing policy, as 
only the poor are now entitled to social housing. The limit that entitles 
people to queue for social housing is defined by local governments who fol-
low the recommendations of the ministry of Regional Development. The 
limits are defined locally because income levels differ across the country. 
The process for evaluating eligibility is complicated as the family’s prop-
erty is also considered (Rossiiskaia gazeta 11 march 2005.) Those who can-
not afford to buy an apartment and are not ‘poor enough’ to be entitled to 
social housing are eligible for housing subsidies. This group of people is 
expected to be quite large so expenditure on housing subsidies expenses 
will probably grow substantially. Surprisingly, there were no mass protests 
when the new Housing Code came into force, unlike when the pensioners’ 
benefit system (sistema l’got) was reformed (Politicheskii zhurnal 1 march 
2005) and most pensioners’ free benefits were changed into subsidies (the 
so-called monetizatsiia reform). However, although mass-scale demonstra-
tions have not been organised, organisations have been formed to protect 
the interests of certain groups. This is discussed in more detail under the 
“Housing movements and associations in Russia” section.
According to media reports, the quality of housing and communal 
services such as water supply, garbage disposal and the distribution of elec-
tricity and gas continue to be poor despite substantial increases in tariffs 
for housing and communal services. It has been claimed that in general, 
Russians are not used to demanding better quality and do not realise their 
rights as consumers in the market (Kvartirnyi riad 2, September 2004), so 
local administrations should control the quality of housing and commu-
nal services (Rossiiskaia gazeta, 2 June 2004). Requirements concerning 
quality are defined in the legislation but in practice they are not fulfilled. 
Newspapers report cases in which tariffs have been raised above the legally 
set limit (Novye izvestiia 1 march 2005). As mentioned, it is not unusual for 
residents not to pay their housing costs, which is one reason for raising the 
tariffs (Mir i dom, 26 October 2004), although non-payment can also be a 
result of high tariffs when people cannot afford to pay them. 
The housing reform aims to increase the importance of house loans 
as a tool for developing the owner-occupied housing sector. Interest rates 
and taxes have been very high in Russia, meaning that taking out a home 
loan has been quite uncommon; in 2005 only the wealthiest 10 percent of 
Russians could afford to do so (Rossiiskaia gazeta, 14 January 2005). Before 
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the reform, short payment terms for loans also prevented loan applications 
and the high risks of loaning made people suspicious toward banks and 
market mechanisms in general. The general economic uncertainty and the 
risk of losing one’s job have not encouraged house loans either (Rway, 2 
October 2004.) As Burawoy and Verdery (1999, 2) note, time spans in the 
constantly changing post-socialist society have been short, which makes it 
hard to make long-term financial plans and investments. 
Since the implementation of the reform, loan repayment terms have 
been extended and interest rates lowered. Housing loan stock nearly tri-
pled in 2006 but it still totalled just over 10 billion euros. Although home 
loans have become more popular, housing construction has not increased 
to the same degree and, consequently, apartment prices have gone up. In 
2006 prices for new apartments grew 40 percent and over 60 percent for old 
apartments but development evened out in 2007. Even though rising apart-
ment prices mean that many Russians cannot afford an apartment even if 
they do obtain a home loan (BOFIT Weekly 16/2007), 2.4 times more home 
loans were issued in St. Petersburg in 2007 than in 2006. Compared with 
the new apartment prices, the current value of home loans could finance 
about one-quarter of the total demand on the market. The recent economic 
crisis has greatly affected the situation, however. The growth rate of home 
loans has slowed and the unstable market situation has led to rising inter-
est rates and stricter criteria imposed on borrowers (HSE 2008, 2). 
Table 6. Construction of residential buildings in Russia
Year 1995 2000 2006 2007
millions 
m² %
millions 
m² %
millions 
m² %
millions 
m² %
Total 41.0 100 30.3 100 50.6 100 61.0 100
State 9.1 22.0 3.5 11.6 3.2 6.3 3.3 5.4
municipal 4.0 10.0 2.8 9.2 2.9 5.7 3.0 4.8
Private 14.8 36.0 19.3 63.9 39.6 78.2 50.4 82.7
mixed 13.0 32.0 4.2 13.9 4.0 8.0 3.2 5.2
mixed: not specified in the source
Source: Rossiiskii statisticheskii ezhegodnik 2008, Table 17.13.
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Housing stock has deteriorated in many parts of Russia (UNECE 2004), 
so new construction, along with repairs of existing housing, is needed ur-
gently. This applies especially to St. Petersburg, as an old city with housing 
stock that is in particularly bad shape. However, public sector construction 
has continued to diminish throughout the post-Soviet era, as shown in 
Table 6 above. Private sector construction, for its part, has risen consider-
ably and is responsible for most of the new construction. The average area 
of a new apartment has also grown from 60.8 square metres in 1992 to 84.6 
square metres in 2007 (Rossiiskii statisticheskii ezhegodnik 2008). Private 
construction in St. Petersburg has increased in recent years, growing 11 
percent from 2006 to 2007, although residential construction slowed down 
in the second half of the year (HSE 2008, 2). Construction across Russia in 
2008 did not grow compared to the previous year and in 2009 it is expect-
ed to decrease by 15 percent (Vedomosti 9 December 2008) or even more. 
In any case, it is clear that the economic recession that started in 2008 
has had a great effect on housing construction. Another aspect of the new 
construction is that it is sometimes carried out by destroying historically 
valuable architecture. St. Petersburg is an old city and its housing stock is 
so deteriorated in some places that demolition is the easiest option, albeit a 
controversial one considering the architectural value of the buildings. 
Fraud in housing privatisation has already been described. In recent 
years, apartment buyers have been defrauded by constructors. It is custom-
ary in Russia to buy a new apartment through so-called shared participa-
tion construction (dolevoe stroitel’stvo). This means that apartments are 
sold before their construction is finished and apartment buyers become 
investors in the construction by paying the apartment’s price. Obviously, 
there are risks in this procedure and some apartment buyers have ended 
up losing their savings without acquiring the apartment. In some cases 
construction of the house has been left unfinished or substantially delayed 
due to bankruptcy or lack of resources of the company. In other cases the 
constructor has simply disappeared after the apartment has been paid for, 
taking the money with them. Newspapers have reported cases of apart-
ments being sold twice, or even three or four times to different buyers (AiF 
Peterburg, 21 February 2007; Ekspert 27 march 2006). 
To prevent such fraud and to protect investors, the responsibility of 
the constructor has increased in the new Housing Code. The state has es-
tablished a working group in the State Duma to solve the problem and 
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cheated apartment buyers may end up getting their apartments through 
a court order. St. Petersburg’s vice-governor, Aleksandr Vakhmistrov, has 
announced that a special fund will be established to pay financial compen-
sation for the 100–150 people who cannot obtain the apartment they paid 
for, as it is too difficult to track down the complicated purchasing process 
(Kvartplata.info). Housing reform also strengthens the consumer’s posi-
tion in the market by offering tax reductions to homeowners and securing 
the position of house loaners and participants in housing cooperative pro-
grammes. A law concerning credit histories and control of credit ratings 
(O kreditnykh istoriiakh) came into force in June 2005; before that, credit 
histories were not controlled in Russia. 
The housing reform is also a part of the process of building a new 
Russian middle class. The term ‘middle class’ was not used in the Soviet 
Union, as social classes were officially abolished; distinctions that did exist 
were based more on power than property ownership (Bertaux et al. 2004, 
5–6). Vladimir Shlapentokh described the Soviet people as consisting of 
two groups, the “superiors and subordinates” (1989, 217), that is, the small 
privileged nomenklatura (the party elite) and the working class, to which 
the majority of the people belonged. Of course, this division into two groups 
is very rough; a closer look shows that there were distinctions within the 
groups, determined by access to goods. Besides these two groups, there 
was also the group of outcasts, the marginalised or repressed citizens who 
were sentenced to exile or to prison camps in Siberia and the like (Bertaux 
et al. 2004, 6). In economic terms, the middle class could perhaps be de-
scribed as professionals with better access to goods than the proletariat. 
They had better living conditions, better apartments and perhaps a dacha 
(summer house).
In post-Soviet times, promoting the middle-class has been important 
as a strategy for ‘marketing’ the reform to the people, to show that reducing 
state housing subsidies was justified as people were better off than they had 
been before and could manage without the state’s support (Harloe 1996, 
12). The essence of the middle class in post-socialist Russia has been ac-
tively debated in the academic field, as it is something that had not really 
existed before. The newspapers seem to regard owner-occupied housing 
stock as an important prerequisite for development of the middle-class, as 
home ownership is seen as a sign of a stable society and a properly func-
tioning market economy (see Praim-TASS 20 January 2005). For some peo-
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ple homeownership can be a way to gain wealth and improve their social 
position if they privatise a valuable apartment. On the other hand, social 
stratification also increases as some people become property owners while 
others remain as tenants. Due to the practice of free privatisation, home-
owners do not form a uniform social or cultural group; they can be from 
very low-income brackets or very affluent. Although the media often con-
nects home ownership with the middle class, this alone is not a sufficient 
criterion by which to define the middle class.
Becoming used to the role of an active consumer, as was expected by 
the housing reform, does not happen overnight. Accordingly, people are 
not necessarily aware of their rights and are not used to demanding them 
when dealing with companies or authorities. According to Shomina, citi-
zens do not understand their role as active creators, but instead see them-
selves as mere users (2004, 17). This is often referred to in Russia as the 
‘Soviet’ mentality, which corresponds to what is known as ‘tenant’ mental-
ity elsewhere in the world. This way of thinking is not restricted to housing 
but the results of a Levada-Center study on democracy from December 
2006 suggest that the general view of the state as a paternalistic force still 
prevails. In the study, 25 percent of respondents felt that the state should 
provide the “rules of the game” to citizens and monitor their realisation. 
Nineteen percent had responded in this way in 2001. The majority, 63 per-
cent, supported the other alternative, that the state should take care of its 
citizens and provide an adequate level of subsistence. In 2001 the equiva-
lent percentage had been 73. This shows that attitudes are changing slowly 
and that most people still support a paternalistic state. In the study, elderly 
people in remote areas expressed more conservative views, while young 
people had more liberal attitudes (Levada-Tsentr, “Demokratiia” v Rossii.)
People seem to perceive the reform quite differently from its official 
agenda. According to a Levada-Center survey in April 2007, 66 percent of 
respondents thought that, in practice, “housing and communal sector re-
form” meant increasing prices for housing and communal services, while 
only 25 percent thought that it would lead to an improvement in the qual-
ity of those services (Levada-Tsentr 2007, 172). This shows that people’s 
experience of the reform was not very positive. Their opinions were based 
not only on expectations but on experience after two years since the reform 
started to be implemented. This survey does not show the reform to have 
been very successful.
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3.3. Housing Management Reform
Perhaps the most important and profound change in the new Housing 
Code is the privatisation of housing management and maintenance. The 
current housing reform requires homeowners to take responsibility for the 
management and maintenance of the common areas of their building. The 
privatisation of housing meant that tenants became owners of their apart-
ments but it did not make them care for the common areas, which re-
mained neglected and in poor condition in most cases. The new Housing 
Code states unambiguously that homeowners have joint responsibility for 
the management and maintenance of common areas. 
Homeowners can choose one of three alternatives for management of 
the building: (1) direct administration by the homeowners without form-
ing an association, (2) administration through a homeowners’ association 
(tovarishchestvo sobstvennikov zhil’ia, TSZh) or housing cooperative or 
(3) authorising a company to do the management (Zhilishchnyi kodeks, 
Article 161). Homeowners in all multi-family buildings must decide, in 
a common meeting of the homeowners, on the form of management of 
the building. It is also possible for a homeowners’ association to hire a 
management company, resulting in a mixed form of management that 
falls between the second and third options. Only homeowners, not ten-
ants, may participate in selecting the management type. If homeowners of 
a particular building did not make a decision regarding the management 
by 1 January 2007, the local authorities were to appoint a company for the 
task based on price competition before 1 may 2008 (according to changes 
to the law on 22 December 2006). However, it seems that the deadline has 
not been followed. The New Eurasia Foundation’s statistics show that in 
2007 only 42 percent of homeowners in multi-family buildings had chosen 
a type of management (Fond Novaia Evraziia 2007). The deadline has ob-
ligated homeowners to decide very quickly and the topic has been widely 
discussed and reported in the media. However, according to experts, the 
media does not always present an accurate picture of the situation and 
false assumptions are sometimes published, which serves to misguide resi-
dents rather than provide useful information.
In the direct management option, contracts regarding maintenance 
and repairs of common property are made in a common meeting of home-
owners (a majority vote is required) and homeowners act as one party in 
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the contract. For water, electricity and gas supply and heating, each home-
owner makes a contract separately in their own name rather than as one 
entity. However, with the written consent of all or a majority of homeown-
ers, one person can be authorised to make contracts on behalf of others 
(Zhilishchnyi kodeks, Article 164).
If a management company is chosen, the contract between the home-
owners and the company should include a list of the common property 
that the company will manage. The contract should state the services and 
work scheduled for maintenance and repairs of the house, as well as a 
list of communal services arranged by the management company. Prices 
for the services and their payment must also be provided in writing. The 
method of control by which the management company fulfils its duties 
should also be agreed on in the contract. The contract must be identical for 
all homeowners in a multi-family building. The contract can be made for 
a minimum of one year and a maximum of five years at a time but in the 
absence of separate notification from either of the parties, the contract will 
continue for another period. The company is responsible for presenting a 
report of its work for the homeowners once a year (Zhilishchnyi kodeks, 
Article 162). 
The third option, a homeowners’ association, is the subject of this study 
and is therefore introduced in detail. where the example for Russian 
homeowners’ associations actually comes from is not explicitly explained 
in any document found during the course of this research. The model does 
not necessarily originate from any specific country, as homeowners’ as-
sociations are widespread in Europe and the United States. Homeowners’ 
associations and condominiums have been established in many post-so-
cialist countries as part of the privatisation of the housing management 
sector (see Clapham & Kintrea 1996). Russia is following the development 
of these countries. For example, Estonia, Russia’s neighbour and a former 
republic of the Soviet Union, made its homeowners responsible for housing 
management in 2003. In addition, the housing cooperative system that has 
existed in Russia and the Soviet Union for decades, albeit to a very small 
degree, also resembles a homeowners’ association. However, it is not possi-
ble to closely compare western homeowners’ associations with their coun-
terparts in Russia because of the differing economic, cultural and political 
backgrounds. In Russia the new management system has been implement-
ed on the legacy of the Soviet housing system. Furthermore, homeowners’ 
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associations in Russia are initiated by authority-driven reform and not by 
the homeowners’ direct initiative. On the other hand, homeowners’ asso-
ciations in Russia require active participation from their members, more 
than western homeowners’ associations usually do. This aspect also brings 
Russian homeowners’ associations closer to civil society, compared to their 
western counterparts. 
The Law on Housing Privatisation in 1991 created the first basis for 
homeowners’ associations by stating that “owners of privatised dwellings 
in state or municipal housing stock are co-owners or users of technical 
equipment of the house and places of common use” (Article 3). Building 
repairs were said to be the homeowners’ duty and homeowners could 
form an association (or partnership) (tovarishchestvo) or some other union 
(ob’’edinenie) for this purpose (Article 22). Thus, the possibility of form-
ing a homeowners’ association was stated in legislation for the first time, 
albeit vaguely. Furthermore, Article 24 declared that the contribution that 
each apartment owner must make towards the maintenance and renova-
tion costs of the infrastructure, areas in common use and courtyard of 
the house would be proportionate to the size of their apartment. This was 
the first step in giving homeowners’ joint responsibility for common prop-
erty. However, the privatisation law did not privatise the common areas; it 
stated the homeowners’ financial responsibility but not ownership of the 
common areas.
The Law on Fundamentals of the Federal Housing Policy (Ob osnovakh 
federal’noi zhilishchnoi politiki), which came into force in 1992, defined 
the main housing concepts, including condominium and homeowners’ 
associations (Article 1), and stated citizens’ rights to housing (Article 2). 
It also stated parts of the common property and the fact that it is in the 
joint shared ownership (v obshchei dolevoi sobstvennosti) of the homeown-
ers (Article 8). The conditions for paying housing and communal services 
as well as subsidies for the poor were also stated in the law (Article 15). 
The law thereby laid foundations for later reforms and set a legal basis for 
homeowners’ associations, as well as for a programme of rent increases 
and housing allowances (UNECE 2004, 27). This law acted as the frame-
work for Russia’s housing policy until 2005, when the Housing Code came 
into force. 
A predecessor to the Law on Homeowners’ Associations was 
the President’s Order on the Ratification of the Temporary Act on 
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Condominiums18 in 1993. It stated that a condominium is an association 
of homeowners in a real property complex, including residential and non-
residential premises. The order contained the basic idea of a homeowners’ 
association: that it is related to the use and maintenance of common prop-
erty. The main organs of the association, the board and homeowners’ com-
mon meeting, are also mentioned but their tasks are not as clearly defined 
as in later legislative acts. 
The first Law on Homeowners’ Associations (O tovarishchestvakh sob-
stvennikov zhil’ia), which came into force in 1996, stated that homeowners 
are owners of the common property (Article 8). The components of com-
mon property are also specifically defined to include the staircases between 
apartments, lifts, lift-wells, corridors, roofs, technical floors and basements, 
land within the decided borders, mechanical, electrical, plumbing or other 
equipment and other objects used for maintenance of the condominium’s 
common property complex (Article 7). This definition appears in almost 
exactly the same form in the Housing Code of 2005, with the addition of 
attics (Zhilishchnyi kodeks, Article 36). In the 2005 law the term ‘condo-
minium’ has been replaced with the term ‘homeowners’ association’. The 
difference is that a condominium comprises not only dwellings but also 
the land itself, whereas a homeowners’ association refers only to dwellings. 
Despite the change, many Russians still refer to homeowners’ associations 
as condominiums. Homeowners’ rights regarding common property, 
their responsibilities concerning maintenance and renovations and their 
payments are listed in the 1996 law (O tovarishchestvakh sobstvennikov 
zhil’ia, Articles 8–9, 15–18).
In 2005 the new Housing Code (Zhilishchnyi kodeks) replaced the 
Law on Homeowners’ Associations, although its main content concern-
ing homeowners’ associations was the same as the 1996 law. A homeown-
ers’ association is defined as a “non-profit organisation, an association of 
owners of facilities in a multi-family building, [established] for common 
management of the common property in a multi-family building, main-
tenance and exploitation of the complex, administration and use of the 
18 The document uses the term tovarishchestvo domovladel’tsev instead of to-
varishchestvo sobstvennikov zhil’ia. Domovladelets is literally a home posses-
sor or holder, but tovarishchestvo domovladel’tsev refers to the same kind of 
homeowners’ association as the later legislation.
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common property in a multi-family building within the boundaries stated 
in the legislation” (Zhilishchnyi kodeks, Article 135). The association is 
required to be legally registered and it has the status of a legal entity, which 
strengthens its legal position and enables it to enter contracts with other 
legal entities, such as housing service companies. 
A homeowners’ association can be established in a multi-family build-
ing at a common meeting of the homeowners. The votes of over fifty per-
cent of all owners of the building are required. Voting power is defined by 
apartment area, meaning that the owner of a larger apartment has more 
votes than the owner of a small apartment. In the case of a newly built 
house that is under construction, the future owners can establish the asso-
ciation. In St. Petersburg homeowners’ associations seem to be common in 
newly built houses. The association’s rights and responsibilities, stated in 
the legislation, include the right of the association to make contracts con-
cerning its administration, renovations and maintenance. Among other 
things, the association makes a cost estimate each year on the full renova-
tion of the building, when needed, and defines the amount of payments for 
members. It can rent its facilities, make financial transactions and demand 
its receivables in court, in case a homeowner neglects their payments on 
common property (Zhilishchnyi kodeks, Articles 48, 135–137, 139.)
The association is responsible for maintaining the technical condition 
of the common property and for taking ‘measures’ in case a third party pre-
vents a homeowner from using the common property, although the type of 
measures are not specified. The association is to ensure that homeowners 
fulfil their financial responsibility regarding maintenance and renovation 
of the common property, according to their share, which is defined by the 
size of their apartment. Agreements should be made with those homeown-
ers who are not members of the association concerning maintenance and 
renovation of the common property (ibid, Article 138).
Decision-making takes place in common meetings of the homeown-
ers. The annual budget, the amount of compulsory housing payments 
and rental of the common property are decided by the common meeting, 
which also deals with complaints concerning the board of the association 
and elects the chairperson who will lead the board. In order for the meet-
ing to be legally valid, over 50 percent of the association’s members must 
be present. Two-thirds of all the association’s votes are required to make 
decisions about fundamental matters of the association, such as its liqui-
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dation or reorganisation (as a housing cooperative), taking a bank loan, 
using the association’s profits and renting its facilities. Decisions regarding 
other matters require over half of the votes of those who are present in the 
meeting (Zhilishchnyi kodeks, Articles 144–146). Nevertheless, decision-
making in a homeowners’ association is possible without holding a meet-
ing, through remote voting (zaochnoe golosovanie). This entails mailing 
the questions to homeowners in written form, to which they may either 
respond ‘for’, ‘against’ or ‘abstain from answering’. The voting forms must 
be returned before the announced date in order to be taken into account in 
decision-making (ibid., Article 47).
The board is the executive organ of the association and its main task 
is to validate the decisions made by the common meeting. It may also 
decide about matters that are not covered by the common meeting. The 
board consists of homeowners chosen by the common meeting, is led by 
a chairperson and is chosen for a period of no longer than two years. The 
board’s meetings are legitimate when over half of its members are present. 
The board handles the association’s accounting and ensures that the as-
sociation follows the law and that members make the compulsory housing 
payments on time. In case of non-payment the association can demand 
payments through the courts. The board can either carry out the manage-
ment independently or make a contract with a management company. The 
board is the organ that hires and fires service staff for the building and 
forms contracts with external companies regarding the use and renova-
tions of the common property. The board is also responsible for announc-
ing common meetings (Zhilishchnyi kodeks, Articles 137, 147–148).
The board is controlled by the audit committee, members of which are 
not members of the board and are also chosen by the common meeting. 
The audit committee is chosen for a maximum of two years and is led by 
a chair. It ensures that obligatory payments are made by members at least 
once a year. It also presents the annual cost estimates to the common meet-
ing as well as the income statement (as the board does) and the statement 
of financial actions and obligatory payments and deposits. The audit com-
mittee is controlled by the common meeting (ibid., Articles 147–150). 
In addition to the Housing Code, homeowners’ associations are regu-
lated by their articles of association. The contents of articles of association 
are not specified in the Housing Code, although the articles of association 
for a cooperative are (ibid., Article 113). This gives homeowners’ associa-
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tions slightly more freedom than cooperatives. Local authorities, volun-
tary organisations and the like provide examples of articles of association, 
which contain mostly the same regulations as the Housing Code, such as 
the rights and responsibilities of the association and its members, the as-
sociation’s duties, etc., but a homeowners’ association may also write its 
own version.
In terms of its administrative structure, a housing cooperative (zhilish-
chnyi/ zhilishchno-stroitel’nyi kooperativ, ZhSK) resembles a homeowners’ 
association. As described in Chapter 2, housing cooperatives first appeared 
in Soviet Russia in the 1920s. In present-day cooperatives an apartment 
is obtained on hire purchase and its members participate financially in 
the construction or repair and maintenance of the house (Zhilishchnyi 
kodeks, Article 110). The cooperative’s administration consists of a com-
mon meeting (so-called conference), a board and a chairperson and it is 
controlled by an audit committee (Zhilishchnyi kodeks, Articles 115–120). 
In a building in which all residents have fully paid for their apartments, the 
cooperative can be changed into a homeowners’ association (Article 122). 
Transformation of cooperatives into homeowners’ associations or condo-
miniums has been undertaken in other former socialist countries, such as 
Czechoslovakia and Poland, since 1992 as part of the privatisation process 
(Clapham 1995, 687). It was originally mandatory to change a cooperative 
into a homeowners’ association but this requirement was later removed (O 
vvedenii v deistvie Zhilishchnogo kodeksa, Article 14). It is also possible 
to change a homeowners’ association into a cooperative (Article 140) but 
there does not seem to be any reason to do this.
3.3.1. Comparison of the three Management Alternatives 
How the three forms of management work in practice and which alterna-
tive should be chosen depends largely on the house in question. Certain fac-
tors advocate each alternative, which  will be analysed here, relying largely 
on maria Plotnikova’s study (2007) as well as on the material provided by 
the Institute of Collective Action19 (Institut Kollektivnoe Deistvie, IKD) 
19 IKD is a small NGO consisting of sociologists and activists that provides in-
formation on housing reform and housing movement activities on its website.
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and expert interviews with Vladimir Gaidei from the Housing Committee 
and marina Akimova from the St. Petersburg’s Associations of TSZh and 
ZhSK. 
According to Plotnikova, the direct management option, in which each 
household makes separate contracts with housing and communal service 
providers (water, heating, electricity), is the most suitable one for small 
buildings because a larger housing unit is more difficult to control without 
a management authority (Plotnikova 2007). Neighbours are not responsi-
ble for each others’ housing payment debts, as is the case in the two other 
management alternatives, where the contract is made for the whole build-
ing as one entity. In the other two options, if free-riding occurs then the 
overdue amounts rest on the shoulders of all the other neighbours. The 
entire building is at risk of being disconnected from the housing service in 
question because it is technically impossible to disconnect just one house-
hold. Doing so involves an illegal procedure but it is used occasionally (see 
moi raion 9 September 2005). The free-rider may in fact be a company 
that owns premises in the house, not necessarily a resident (Konserg, 12 
November 2007). more often, however, the association goes into debt in-
stead of deducting the free-riders’ share from other residents. From the 
point of view of free-riding, a management company is an easier solution 
for residents, as the company makes the payments rather than the home-
owners directly, and the management company is responsible for making 
the non-payers pay. This saves the homeowners (or the chairperson) the 
trouble of pressuring and convincing the free-riders to pay, but the end 
result is still the same in that others are responsible for the non-payer’s 
share. Avoiding the free-rider problem is an important point that supports 
the direct management alternative.
To fight the free-rider problem and to make the system fairer, meters 
(schetchiki) that calculate water or heat consumption have been installed 
since the 1990s. The idea is to make residents aware of their expenditure 
of resources and to encourage energy-saving. However, due to the techni-
calities of Russian infrastructure, where one pipe runs through the whole 
house, the meters had been installed at the building level, not taking into 
account variations of use between the apartments. Therefore, the system 
has failed to decrease free-riding (Bychkova & Popova, forthcoming, 16–
17). Nowadays, however, meters are installed in the apartments of new 
buildings, so each household only pays for what it consumes.
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The Institute of Collective Action, IKD, is a voluntary organisation 
and, as such, could be expected to encourage citizens to form homeown-
ers’ associations, which are non-profit organisations. This is not the case, 
however. Instead, the IKD recommends the direct management option, 
in which households operate as individual entities. Direct management 
allows individual households to buy management services from several 
companies or to make a contract with a certain company (IKD). A more 
convenient option is to negotiate a contract for an entire building, as this 
saves households having to make individual contracts. The most serious 
defect of this alternative is that there is no legal entity, such as a TSZh, that 
would make it possible to collect a fund for future renovations. In order to 
solve this problem the IKD suggests either entrusting the collected money 
to the accountant’s home (it is still customary in Russia to keep savings 
at home instead of a bank account), in a personal bank account or in the 
bank account of a maintenance firm. All these alternatives are risky, so the 
IKD suggests establishing a separate organisation for fund-raising (IKD). 
Because of these difficulties, direct administration is practically non-exist-
ent in St. Petersburg (Gaidei interview 28 January 2008). 
However, the direct management option does not exclude the possibili-
ty of cooperation between residents. A committee can be formed to discuss 
maintenance, choose a company together and negotiate charges (Clément 
2007). The residents have the advantage of negotiating directly with the 
housing and communal service providers, without a housing manage-
ment company as an intermediary. This gives residents the opportunity 
to more closely monitor the service providers. Also, according to marina 
Akimova, the service providers’ contracts are not as strict with individual 
households as they are with homeowners’ associations. Therefore, direct 
management is popular elsewhere in Russia, although the authorities do 
not recommend it for larger buildings.
TSZh has the advantage of not having to pay for a management compa-
ny (if they do not choose to hire one) and it is possible to change the asso-
ciation’s administration (the board) if necessary. Furthermore, the money 
the members pay is used only for their benefit, and not for the management 
of any other association or building. The IKD sees the management com-
pany alternative as the worst one of the three but if residents do choose 
it they should ensure that the agreement is in their interest and looks af-
ter the quality of the services. If the agreement is made by the authorities 
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(after 1 January 2007, the deadline for residents’ decisions), homeowners 
cannot contribute to the agreement or make changes to it. management 
companies are expensive, taking 25–30 percent of residents’ housing pay-
ments. In addition, companies can be unreliable because the existing leg-
islation does not require them to be licensed or to have adequate capital 
to compensate customers’ losses in case of the company’s bankruptcy. As 
Vladimir Gaidei from the Housing Committee notes, not only residents 
need to be educated about housing management; management companies’ 
staff lack knowledge and also need to be trained. Dissolving a contract 
with a management company is complicated if the company does not want 
to end it, in which case the negotiation takes place in court. The authorities 
have been accused of being corrupt in their choice of companies, rather 
than choosing on the basis on price competition as should have been done 
(IKD). In addition, when a company is chosen by an association, chang-
es to the contract can only be made through the homeowners’ common 
meeting. That is, an individual household cannot make changes without 
the others in its building (Gaidei interview 28 January 2008).
If residents decide to establish a homeowners’ association, the association 
must be transparent in terms of informing residents about its decisions, as 
stressed by the movement against Arbitrariness in Housing Associations20 
in IKD’s brochure. The movement also encourages residents to actively 
bring up initiatives, suggestions and complaints to the board and to pre-
vent the board from misusing its position. According to the movement, 
residents should demand high quality housing maintenance and not settle 
for bad service. If the association follows the legislation, the accounting 
will be done regularly and the budget will be accessible for homeowners, 
who can see where their money goes. Thus, a homeowners’ association is a 
transparent form of management, at least de jure. Furthermore, from the 
point of view of democratic administration and self-governance, it is im-
portant that the association is not run solely by a chairperson who makes 
all decisions in an autocratic manner. when one person leads the associa-
tion, the risk of fraud is higher. Therefore, the rights and responsibilities 
of the chair should be clearly stated in the articles of association (Itogi 4 
October 2005). If the residents are not active, at least the board should be 
20 One of the many local housing NGOs based in moscow, the movement ap-
peals to the government to correct faults in the housing legislation.
96
HOmEOwNERS’ ASSOCIATIONS IN RUSSIA AFTER THE 2005 HOUSING REFORm
active in decision-making. Annual checks by the audit committee are also 
crucial from the point of view of transparency and justice. This is the how 
the homeowners’ association should work. The next chapter will review 
how TSZhs in St. Petersburg actually work in practice.
Ultimately, the form of management that should be chosen depends 
largely on the location, condition and social structure of the house, which 
often go hand-in-hand. Newly built houses are in fairly good condition, de-
spite the possible construction flaws. The socioeconomic structure is usu-
ally consistent as well, as homeowners have bought their apartments and 
not privatised their old ones for free. A TSZh has a good chance of working 
in such a building, as large-scale, expensive renovations are not immedi-
ately necessary and the homeowners are financially solvent. A TSZh might 
also be a good option for a building in a valuable location in the centre, 
because it may register the land around the house to the residents’ property 
and then exploit it commercially. On the other hand, houses in the centre 
of St. Petersburg are often old and in need of capital repairs (kapital’nyi re-
mont), and their residents cannot necessarily afford the expenses. In such 
cases, or if the house is located in the outskirts of the city where the land is 
less valuable, residents’ direct administration may work better. 
The easiest way to manage a very large house with only a few active resi-
dents is through a management company, which may also be a good idea if 
the residents appear unwilling to take part in decision-making. mobilising 
residents to participate can be difficult, especially in large buildings with 
hundreds of apartments, and letting a company handle the management 
may be more convenient. On the other hand, a homeowners’ association 
might work well as long as there are at least some active residents. Still, 
making democratic decision-making work in a very large building can be 
challenging if interest in participation is low. Overall, housing manage-
ment is easier in a socially consistent building in which residents’ income, 
financial resources and interests are fairly similar because this makes it 
easier for a homeowner’s association to find consensus and make deci-
sions. If the homeowners fail to choose the type of management before the 
deadline, the municipal authorities have the power to appoint a manage-
ment company based on “competition” (Clément 2008b). In such cases, 
according to Clément, the authorities choose a company that they are con-
nected with so that the authorities benefit from the deal (ibid.). This is a 
questionable practice from the homeowners’ point of view.
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A homeowners’ association is often established during the construction 
phase of a new building on the constructor’s initiative (although the future 
owners’ consent is necessary, of course). Prior to the new Housing Code, 
authorities, at least those in moscow, encouraged constructors to establish 
associations. Constructors were given the right to the construction free of 
charge on the condition that a TSZh was established and that the TSZh was 
managed by a private company (which can be the same company as the 
constructor) (Konserg 9 January 2006). when a homeowners’ association 
is established in an existing house, instances of misuse have occurred, such 
as it not being favoured by enough residents or residents not even taking 
part in the common meeting to decide on the establishment (Gaidei’s in-
terview 28 January 2008).
3.3.2. Practical Situation and Challenges facing 
Homeowners’ Associations
Local governments have considerable power in the housing reform, as the 
reform is implemented at the local level. The distribution of housing sub-
sidies is decided at the local level by the federal subjects of Russia, one of 
which is the city of St. Petersburg. Homeowners are entitled to subsidies, 
as are tenants and members of housing cooperatives (Zhilishchnyi kodeks, 
Article 159). Secondly, local authorities are responsible for informing and 
educating residents about the housing reform. However, local authorities 
had minimal interest in supporting the formation of TSZh in the 1990s, 
as local governments were unwilling to take responsibility for the associa-
tions’ management (IUE 2003, 103). At the time private construction com-
panies took the initiative in establishing homeowners’ associations (ibid., 
114). Before the new Housing Code, forming a homeowners’ association 
in a mixed multi-family building was difficult; the local administration, 
as the owner of the municipal flats, was usually unwilling to join a private 
owners’ association (UNECE 2004, 82). 
Nowadays, however, St. Petersburg has been very active in promoting 
the establishment of homeowners’ associations compared to other cities 
in Russia. St. Petersburg’s Housing Committee has actively distributed in-
formation on homeowners’ associations to the municipal authorities and 
the state as well as private housing management companies. The Housing 
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Committee has also won several awards, given to the best management 
organs in the housing and communal sector in Russia, which indicates 
the committee’s level of activity. Besides the authorities, social organisa-
tions and private agencies also provide practical information about hous-
ing management to city dwellers. However, district-level and other city au-
thorities are not always as willing to cooperate with the associations as the 
Housing Committee. 
Despite the amount of information provided to residents, it has been 
claimed that “information about the reform is lacking” (Clément 2008, 76) 
and there seems to be a lot of ignorance on the subject. many Russians 
seem to rely on information provided by a friend or acquaintance rather 
than read the Housing Code or find out the facts for themselves. Some 
people reject private companies in general, and will therefore not accept 
the services of a private management company. Some experts, like marina 
Akimova, believe that the task of choosing the type of housing manage-
ment is too great for residents, as it would require more information about 
management than a typical homeowner has or is willing to acquire.
The House Committee’s campaigning has resulted in a large number 
of homeowners’ associations in St. Petersburg. Data from the New Eurasia 
Foundation shows a striking difference between St. Petersburg and rest of 
the country. In 2007, 42 percent of multi-family buildings across Russia 
had chosen their type of management, following the Housing Code’s regu-
lation, with only 2.6 percent being managed by homeowners’ associations 
or housing cooperatives. Just over half of the remaining buildings were 
managed by management companies and the rest were directly managed. 
The situation is different in St. Petersburg: 35 percent had chosen their type 
of management, 54 percent of which were managed by homeowners’ asso-
ciations and 45 percent by management companies – only one house was 
directly managed by the homeowners (Fond Novaia Evraziia, 2007). Those 
multi-family buildings that have not chosen a management type continue 
to be municipally managed. As the data shows, management reform has 
not proceeded as quickly as planned, with less than half of buildings hav-
ing chosen a type of management by 2007. 
According to Oleg Vikhtiuk, a Housing Committee official, growth in 
St. Petersburg since 2005 has been exponential. From 1996 to 2004 less 
than 100 associations were established, while the number in the first quar-
ter of 2005 alone was 973. In the spring of 2006 associations covered al-
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ready over 25 percent of the city’s housing stock. The Housing Committee 
provides figures that are slightly different from those of the New Eurasia 
Foundation, which could be due to different methods of compiling sta-
tistics and/or a change in the situation between 2006 and 2007. The asso-
ciations’ share varies considerably among the city’s 18 districts. In remote 
districts, outside of the actual city of St. Petersburg, homeowners’ associa-
tions accounted for only a few percent of the housing stock in spring of 
2006. These include the municipal town of Kolpino, the Kurortnyi dis-
trict, which comprises several municipal towns (Zelenogorsk, Sestroretsk, 
Repino etc.), the Petrodvortsovyi district, also known as Peterhof, and the 
island of Kronstadt. In other districts homeowners’ associations’ share var-
ied from 10 percent of the housing stock in Petrogradskii to 48 percent in 
Frunzenskii (St. Petersburg’s Housing Committee statistics). Homeowners’ 
associations are the most common in the suburban districts, which are 
subject to large-scale new construction. 
Recently there has been an increase in popularity in terms of manage-
ment alternatives. In 2007 homeowners’ associations were not established 
to the same degree in St. Petersburg and the private management com-
panies’ share increased instead. According to Gaidei from the Housing 
Committee, this is due to a lack of clarity in the association’s registration. 
Gaidei says that some associations have been established illegally, without 
the 50 percent support of homeowners or without a proper common meet-
ing in which all homeowners would have taken part. The documents of 
the common meeting have sometimes been insufficient and the authorities 
have liquidated the TSZh as a consequence. As a result, private manage-
ment companies have been chosen instead. This is partly also because some 
municipal management companies have become privatised and turned 
into private companies. 
According to marina Akimova, some city authorities have strongly 
pushed for the establishment of homeowners’ associations. Associations 
have been established on the city’s initiative in buildings in which the city 
owns a large percentage of the apartments and, accordingly, had consid-
erable leverage in decision-making. most of the residents did not have a 
clear picture of the association before its establishment, which has led to 
problems in management. Housing newspaper Kvartirnyi riad (17 January 
2008) reports huge, city-initiated TSZhs in which there might be even 181 
apartment houses in one association. These ‘homeowners’ associations’ 
100
HOmEOwNERS’ ASSOCIATIONS IN RUSSIA AFTER THE 2005 HOUSING REFORm
have been formed in Orenburg, Saratov, Staryi Oskol and other cities in 
Russia. Residents find it difficult to express their opinions in these asso-
ciations and to find a consensus in decision-making, as residents in dif-
ferent buildings often have differing interests. It is also complicated for 
one building to withdraw from the association, as the decision to do so 
must be made in a common meeting, at which it may be difficult to obtain 
the necessary majority. The city has established these associations in order 
to bring them under the management of the municipal housing company 
(Kvartirnyi riad 17 January 2008). These associations resemble what Cook 
and Vinogradova call “marionette” organisations – structures that are 
supposed to be social organisations but are created by state or government 
officials and conducted by them so that ordinary people do not play a role 
(2006, 34–35). 
The need to fulfil the Housing Code’s obligation to choose the manage-
ment type when the deadline was approaching has resulted in a peculiar 
situation. Construction companies have registered artificial homeowners’ 
associations, which in reality do not function as associations; there is no 
board, no bank account, etc. (UNECE 2004, 84). These giant, artificial 
homeowners’ associations are clearly against the original idea of home-
owners’ associations as self-governing, resident-managed organisations in 
which residents make decisions concerning their property. when a munic-
ipal housing company manages dozens of houses that have been brought 
together in one association, the situation is not very different from the old 
form of municipal management before the housing reform. Neither has the 
change necessarily been for the better from the residents’ point of view. 
The fact that pressure to establish homeowners’ associations comes from 
above, constitutes a challenge for practical management. Homeowners are 
required to organise the management of their house; that is, self-organi-
sation is not voluntary and does not stem from the residents’ initiative but 
is mandatory and expected by the authorities. Self-government, imposed 
by another party instead of the subject itself, makes a problematic starting 
point for management (Alapuro forthcoming, 20). In homeowners’ asso-
ciations that are conducted from above, homeowners are not necessarily 
inspired to participate in joint decision-making. The users may adapt the 
rules into practice differently than was intended by the authority.
Unlike other countries, membership in homeowners’ associations is 
voluntary for apartment owners in Russia. According to the Housing Code, 
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homeowners have a right to become members of the association, but they 
are not obliged to do so (Zhilishchnyi kodeks, Article 143). TSZh’s member-
ship used to be mandatory: the Law on Homeowners’ Associations, which 
preceded the current Housing Code, stated that all homeowners must be-
come members of the association at the moment that the association is reg-
istered (Articles 32, 49). These articles were declared illegitimate in 199821 
when the RF Constitutional Court decided that mandatory membership 
was against the Russian Constitution (IUE 2003, 99). Article 40 of the 
Constitution states: “1. Everyone has the right to an association, including 
the right to establish professional unions to protect their interests. Freedom 
of action for social associations is guaranteed. 2. No one can be forced to 
become a member or to take part in any association” (Konstitutsiia RF).
Russia is therefore the only country in the world in which membership 
of a homeowners’ association is voluntary. Homeowners’ associations are 
mandatory in privately owned multi-family buildings in many western 
and Eastern European and Asian countries (Germany, Poland, Hungary, 
Uzbekistan, etc.). In other Eastern European countries, such as Estonia, 
Romania and Belarus, establishing the association is voluntary but if 
the association exists then membership is obligatory for all homeown-
ers. Voluntary membership may seriously hinder the association’s ability 
to work effectively if a large proportion of owners decide to stay outside 
(IUE 2003, 99). It can also result in debts for the association as there may 
not be enough members paying the housing costs (Rossiiskaia gazeta, 2 
June 2004). Voluntary membership can also lead to the free-rider problem, 
where some residents do not pay for housing services but still benefit from 
them. Legally, the homeowners who decide not to join the association have 
to make a contract with the association to pay the maintenance charges 
(Zhilishchnyi kodeks, Article 138). However, newspapers have reported 
that, in practice, neighbours might end up paying the share of non-mem-
bers (Itogi 4 October 2005). 
A Levada-Center’s survey, conducted in 2006 to evaluate democratic 
values in Russia, shows that a relatively large share of people do not feel 
responsible for what is going on in their neighbourhood or street (48 per-
cent felt very little or no responsibility, while 27 percent felt “quite a small 
amount of responsibility”) and a large proportion feel they cannot affect 
21 Decree 10 of the RF Constitutional Court, 3 April 1998.
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what is going on in their neighbourhood or street (57 percent said that 
they have very little or no effect and 31 percent said that they have only a 
minor effect) (Levada-Tsentr, Problemy demokratii). Regional differences 
are not noted in the study so it is impossible to tell whether people in some 
regions feel differently than those in others. This suggests that there may 
be obstacles related to joint responsibility and cooperation in homeown-
ers’ associations. On one hand, these results are not directly applicable to 
homeowners’ associations, as TSZhs can be established by the residents 
and residents are in charge there. On the other hand, homeowners’ asso-
ciations are based on a reform that obligates homeowners to organise, and 
therefore the organisation may seem distant for the residents. A homeown-
ers’ association is one step closer to private and domestic life and one’s 
immediate surroundings, so people can be expected to feel a little more 
responsible at that level. 
3.4. Housing in St. Petersburg
Because local governments have been given a key role in implementing the 
reforms, it is worth mentioning St. Petersburg’s housing administration. 
The city administration consists of a government led by a governor and 
vice-governors, about 40 city committees and 18 district administrations 
(raiony) that are divided further into municipalities (mikroraiony). Besides 
the national housing policy, housing is regulated at the local level by St. 
Petersburg’s Legislative Assembly (Zakonodatel’noe sobranie, ZAKS). St. 
Petersburg, like other local governments, has its own housing policy. St. 
Petersburg’s housing policy defines its residents’ rights to housing, includ-
ing eligibility for social housing and regulations on maintenance of the 
housing stock. For TSZhs it is especially relevant that the city offers sub-
sidies for TSZhs’ maintenance and full renovation (kapital’nyi remont) of 
the house (O zhilishchnoi politike Sankt-Peterburga, Article 5). However, 
newspapers have reported that, to the residents’ disappointment, practi-
cal fulfilment of capital repairs has been very slow due to insufficient re-
sources. 
Several committees administrating the city of St. Petersburg handle 
housing matters in one way or another and are in touch with citizens or 
homeowners’ associations. The Housing Committee (Zhilishchnyi komitet) 
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is the main organ for executing the city’s housing policy but perhaps even 
more influential is the Committee for the Administration of City Property 
(Komitet po upravleniiu gorodskim imushchestvom, KUGI), as it is in charge 
of the management and privatisation of the state’s property. KUGI is also 
responsible for renting city property and acquiring property into the city’s 
possession. KUGI is a large and powerful organisation that is divided into 
13 departments and has 20 district-level agencies (raionnye agentstva). 
Besides being St. Petersburg’s executive organ, KUGI is also a territorial 
agency of Russia’s State Property Committee. Subordinate to KUGI is the 
City Board of Real Estate Inventory and Evaluation (Upravlenie inventari-
zatsii i otsenki nedvizhimosti, GU GUION), which makes the technical 
inventory and estimates the value of the city’s real property and housing 
stock. Under KUGI’s coordination is also the St. Petersburg Property Fund 
(OAO Fond imushchestva Sankt-Peterburga), which handles the buying 
and selling of property for the city, and the Committee for land resources 
and land development (Komitet po zemel’nym resursam i zemleustroistvu 
Sankt-Peterburga, KZR), which is in charge of the city’s real estate cadas-
tre. The body that registers real property objects is the Federal registration 
service in the St. Petersburg and Leningrad area (Upravlenie Federal’noi 
registratsionnoi sluzhby po Sankt-Peterburgu i Leningradskoi oblasti, 
UFRS). Related to KUGI is KGA, the Committee on City Planning and 
Architecture (Komitet po gradostroitel’stvu i arkhitekture), which regu-
lates the construction of new mansard roofs to old buildings, for example. 
Of these bodies, homeowners’ associations mostly deal with the Housing 
Committee and KUGI, especially in cases of unclear property rights of 
premises in the house, and KZR when registering the land plot to the as-
sociation’s property.
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Figure 1. St. Petersburg’s administration
In practice, however, residents deal mostly with the local and munici-
pal authorities. St. Petersburg, a city of 4.5 million inhabitants, is divided 
into 18 districts (raiony), each of which has a population of approximately 
200,000 people. These districts are further divided into 111 municipalities 
(munitsipal’nye okrugi), operating on the mikroraion (neighbourhood) lev-
el. municipalities are local self-government units that are administered by 
municipal councils (munitsipal’nye obrazovaniia). Citizens and homeown-
ers’ associations may approach these local authorities for information about 
housing management, for example. Some municipal councils publish their 
own information leaflets, providing practical information on housing is-
sues, such as how to act when a neighbour causes water damage. After the 
Housing Code came into force, copies of the law, as well as commented ver-
sions of it, have been widely available, sold inexpensively in bookstores and 
in street kiosks and metro stations. Housing at the district level is admin-
istrated by the district housing agencies (Raionnye zhilishchnye agentstva), 
that is, GUZhA (gosudarstvennoe uchrezhdenie Zhilishchnoe agentstvo ad-
ministrativnogo raiona), which take care of issues such as housing main-
tenance payments. municipal housing management companies are called 
Zhilkomservis and two or three of these companies operate in each district 
(Zhilishchnyi komitet website). maintenance of municipal houses is han-
Figure 1. St. Petersburg’s administration 
City Government 
Committees (incl. Housing Committee, KUGI, KZR, KGA) 
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dled by municipal housing agencies known as ZhEK/ZhES (Zhilishchno-
ekspluatatsionnaia kontora/sluzhba). ZhES were created already in 1956 
and are the municipal housing organ closest to the resident, to which resi-
dents can turn in case of a problem such as a break in water supply, heating 
etc. (Ofitsial’nyi portal Administratsii Sankt-Peterburga).
St. Petersburg’s housing stock is characterised by a large number of old 
buildings, often containing communal apartments. According to Nikolai 
Kornev (2005, 77), in the city’s central districts, such as Tsentral’nyi, 
Petrogradskii, Admiralteiskii and Vasileostrovskii, over 90 percent of 
the multi-family buildings were built before 1917 and only a quarter of 
the houses were fully renovated during the Soviet era. In 2008, over 1500 
houses in St. Petersburg have been estimated as being in “emergency” (ava-
riinyi) condition (Konserg 18 July 2008). In the Soviet era, urban devel-
opment focused on constructing new districts on the outskirts, with less 
attention being paid to repairs and development in the centre (makhrova 
and molodikova 2007, 101). 
The communal apartments are also typically located in old buildings 
in the centre of the city. Although kommunalki are often located in archi-
tecturally valuable houses, they are also the most dilapidated housing of 
the city (Glock 2007, 207). Today St. Petersburg still has more communal 
apartments than any other area or city in the country. According to the 
2002 census, 10.6 percent of the city’s population lived in communal apart-
ments in 2002, while the corresponding number in urban areas across the 
whole country was two percent (Vserossiiskaia perepis’ naseleniia 2002 
goda). Apart from the old housing stock, new construction in the city is 
typically of large multi-storey housing complexes with hundreds of apart-
ments. The popularity of communal apartments and enormous housing 
complexes pose challenges for residents’ self-management of housing. 
Residents’ participation and converging interests are important in order 
for residents’ cooperation to work. This can be difficult to achieve if the 
ownership structure is mixed and if there are hundreds of apartments in 
the building.
St. Petersburg’s Housing Committee launched a programme in 2008 
called “Settlement of communal apartments in St. Petersburg” aimed at 
emptying communal apartments and turning them into single-family 
apartments by 2016. There are several ways to realise this policy. One of 
them is for a resident to sell their room to someone and receive a subsidy 
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from the city, enabling them to buy a studio apartment, although “not a 
new” one (Zhilishchnyi komitet website). Alternatively, the resident may 
apply for municipal housing. The second option is that the resident buys 
the other room/s in the apartment, thus gaining ownership of the whole 
apartment. The resident receives a subsidy for this based on how long they 
have queued for an apartment from the city. If they have waited for less 
than five years, they pay 60 percent of the price. If the resident has some 
kind of recognition from the city or state (for example, as a world war II 
veteran), as many pensioners do, they pay 40 percent, regardless of how 
long they have been waiting. If the resident has waited for 15 years or 
more, they pay 30 percent. A third option is that the city buys apartments 
in the house together with an investor. The body responsible for execut-
ing emptying the communal apartments, as well as for handling hous-
ing exchanges and housing privatisation under the Housing Committee, 
is called Gorzhilobmen, which has district affiliates called Raizhilobmeny 
(Zhilishchnyi komitet website). 
Kornev claims that even though communal apartments are being emp-
tied and turned into separate apartments and office premises, there is still 
demand for renting a kommunalka room among those who cannot afford 
anything else. Communal apartments are no longer as densely inhabited 
as they used to be, as many residents have moved out, leaving more living 
space to their neighbours. Kommunalka is hardly the most desirable type 
of housing but it is still better than an obshchezhitie, hostel, which is usu-
ally regarded as the most unwanted type of housing (Kornev 2005, 77–78). 
Although obshchezhitiia are intended primarily for students and workers, 
for temporary habitation, some have families living in them. According to 
the 2002 census, 4.1 percent of St. Petersburg’s population lived in hostels 
at the time, which corresponds to the country’s average. If the housing 
conditions of communal apartments and hostels are assumed to be un-
satisfactory, this means that over 14 percent of the city’s population live in 
unsatisfactory housing conditions (Rosstat 2004). This number does not 
even include people living in dilapidated ‘emergency’ (avariinyi) housing 
conditions, the residents of which are supposed to be rehoused because the 
houses are on the verge of collapsing. Another group that urgently needs 
housing is military retirees, who received temporary housing during their 
service but have been without housing since. 
The quickly deteriorating housing stock and its infrastructure pose a 
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challenge for urban housing management and maintenance throughout 
the country. The housing stock in Russia is partly very old and partly 
poorly constructed within a tight time schedule and minimum expenses, 
as noted in the previous chapter. Especially in St. Petersburg, a consider-
able part of the housing stock is dilapidated and in need of urgent repairs 
(UNECE 2004, 34). Fifty-one percent of the city’s housing stock consists 
of the infamous khrushchevki and brezhnevki, which are often in poor 
condition (Glock 2007, 208). According to a deputy in a St. Petersburg 
municipal council, the districts (responsible for maintenance of the infra-
structure) do not have enough resources to carry out renovations, so the 
pipes, basements and infrastructure remain in bad condition. In 2006 and 
2007 St. Petersburg’s Housing Committee initiated a programme to re-
pair 478 houses in emergency condition (Zhilishchnyi komitet website). 
The shortage of available land plots has driven the authorities to use ques-
tionable measures for acquiring land (Clément 2007). For example, it has 
been claimed that the city has declared buildings in the centre to be in 
‘emergency’ condition and unfit for habitation even when they were not, 
in order to acquire the buildings for business purposes. most of the dilapi-
dated housing is in the centre and when it is demolished the residents are 
relocated far away to the suburbs, while the city profits from selling the 
land and luxurious ‘elite’ housing is built in place of the old building (Moi 
raion, 19 may 2006).
The poor condition of housing stock further complicates the manage-
ment of homeowners’ associations. Repairs are seldom financed with bank 
loans so they are either paid for by the homeowners themselves, which 
is rarely possible, or, more likely, with the help of local authorities, who 
subsidise or finance the repairs completely. In a 2003 piece of legislation 
St. Petersburg’s administration promised to finance capital repairs for all 
houses in need of renovation, where a TSZh was established (O finansirov-
anii kapital’nogo remonta). The aim of this law was to encourage the es-
tablishment of TSZhs, realising that most associations cannot conduct the 
renovations at their own expense. However, renovations do not happen au-
tomatically, as the city’s resources are limited, and a homeowners’ associa-
tion has to actively push itself to the city’s ‘address programme’ (adresnaia 
programma) on capital repairs. According to the Housing Committee’s 
chairman, Unis Lukmanov, if the association shows that it takes the reno-
vation seriously, such as by having steel doors and intercom systems in-
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stalled in the building to prevent outsiders from entering, thereby aiming 
to improve the condition of the house, it has a better chance of obtaining 
the renovation (Delovoi Peterburg, 10 may 2005). According to a Levada-
Center survey in march of 2007, only 10 percent of St. Petersburg’s dwell-
ers were satisfied with the city’s housing and communal management, 
compared to 86 percent who were dissatisfied. Among respondents from 
different parts of the country, 21 percent were satisfied with the manage-
ment and 74 percent were dissatisfied (Levada-Tsentr 20 march 2007). A 
level of satisfaction lower than the national average could also be due to St. 
Petersburg’s vast old housing stock, which is more challenging to manage 
and maintain. 
3.5. Housing Movements and Associations
The many problems in the current housing situation and the profound 
changes brought about by the reform of the housing sector have been de-
scribed above. Housing is an essential element of people’s lives and it is 
therefore not surprising that the defects and changes have provoked civic 
activity. In the field of social movements in Russia, housing movements 
are particularly active. During perestroika and after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, when voluntary organising first became possible, there was 
a proliferation of social organisations. Although civic activity has other-
wise been modest in Russia lately, and the ability of associations to act has 
been restricted, social organisations focused on housing questions have 
been popular. The housing sector’s development has been strongly empha-
sised in national politics in recent times, which may have also furthered 
the emergence of housing movements and associations. 
According to Karine Clément, collective mobilisation has been un-
dertaken primarily because things cannot be solved at the individual 
level through the traditional channel of appealing to networks of friends. 
Secondly, mobilisation is a result of people’s frustration and disappoint-
ment that the public authorities have failed to take care of things, as the 
usual letter-writing and complaining to local authorities has not led to im-
provements (Clément 2008, 76). Dirty staircases and courtyards in poor 
condition draw people’s attention as they are in the immediate vicinity of 
their homes. Housing is an area in which movements and organisations 
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are actively formed and is seen by experts and activists as one of the most, 
if not the most important form of civic activism in Russia today. Housing 
organisations do not typically receive foreign funding (although there are 
exceptions) and in that sense they are a more domestic phenomenon than 
many other social organisations in Russia. This could also be the reason 
why housing movements in general have gained so much media attention 
in Russia – they are seen as more genuinely Russian than foreign-funded 
organisations. Small residential organisations are common, as the thresh-
old for participation at the neighbourhood level is low. In addition, it is 
natural to pay attention to defects in one’s immediate surroundings first, 
before mobilising for a more ‘global’ or general matter.
Tearing down the Soviet housing system and implementing a new re-
form has created several problems, some of which existed in the socialist 
era and others that emerged under the new system. Housing movements, 
like social movements in general, are formed to demand and defend citi-
zen’s rights. They are often small organisations, operating at a micro-level 
of a few households, neighbourhoods or towns. According to Clément it is 
typical for Russia that mobilisation takes place at a micro-level and rests on 
the shoulders of individuals, who first organise so-called initiative groups 
(initsiativnye gruppy)22 to advocate a certain cause. This core group of ac-
tivists may in time grow into a larger organisation (Clément 2008, 73–76). 
The term ‘initiative group’ is commonly used by the activists themselves. 
Initiative groups and active individuals also play a key role in homeown-
ers’ associations. The establishment of a homeowners’ association in an 
old building can result from the activity of one homeowner, who forms an 
initiative group around them. Initiative groups are also used to raise an 
initiative within the association. Initiative groups are informal, grassroots 
types of organisations. Some activists prefer to act in initiative groups in-
stead of more formal organisations, as informal structures are less depend-
ent on funding (Henry 2006b, 113).
The first social, housing-oriented organisations were formed at the 
end of 1980s, when the perestroika policy made civic organising possible. 
22 Initiative group is a term that is probably derived from the Soviet era. The 
term was used in the Initiative Group for Defence of the Human Rights in 
USSR (Initsiativnaia gruppa v zashchitu prav cheloveka v SSSR), a dissident 
organisation led by Andrei Sakharov.  
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Committees of social self-governance (komitety obshchestvennogo samou-
pravleniia, KOS) were organised at the neighbourhood level to defend resi-
dents’ rights (Shomina 1995, 83). KOS sometimes cooperated with munici-
pal councils but they seem to have faded out by the end of the 1990s and 
have likely been replaced with other similar structures in the 2000s, such as 
the so-called local self-government units (territorial’noe obshchestvennoe 
samoupravlenie, TOS). TOS can be formed at the level of a village, a neigh-
bourhood (mikroraion), a residential quarter, a street, a group of buildings 
or a single building. According to the Law on Local Self-government in 
St. Petersburg (O mestnom samoupravlenii v Sankt-Peterburge), TOS are 
created to discuss questions of local importance and to represent and pro-
tect residents’ interests (Article 26), enabling them to focus on a very wide 
range of questions. If a TOS is formed at a single-building level, it is very 
likely to concentrate on housing. Various self-governing structures can be 
defined as TOS, such as house committees and staircase councils, exam-
ined in the next sub-chapter.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, when reform of the housing sec-
tor began and the state’s role as a social security provider started to be 
reduced, housing organisations began to proliferate as a reaction to it, with 
the intention of protecting new homeowners and tenants. They strived for 
more than just housing policy, improvement of housing conditions and 
housing maintenance, etc. Cooperatives organised in the moscow Union 
of Cooperatives (Moskovskii soiuz ZhSK i ZhK) united over 800 coopera-
tives, while the need to improve housing conditions was pushed by the 
All Russian Fund for Cooperation to Liquidate Communal Apartments 
(Vserossiiskii Fond sodeistviia likvidatsii kommunal’nyh kvartir). As 
homeownership became more common, the Union of Homeowners of 
municipal, Cooperative and Enterprise Housing Stock (Soiuz sobstven-
nikov kvartir munitsipal’nogo, kooperativnogo i vedomstvennogo zhilogo 
fonda) was established on the basis of the moscow Union of Cooperatives 
in 1994, for homeowners who had privatised their apartments in different 
types of housing. Its members included 125 buildings, with over 100,000 
people living in them (Shomina 1995, 83–85). The Union seems to have 
existed until 2001 but is no longer active, judging by Internet references. It 
is possible that the Union has ceased to exist as cooperatives have become 
less common and the number of homeowners’ associations has increased.
Some organisations object to the current self-management reform, ar-
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guing that the state is just pushing its responsibilities onto the shoulders of 
citizens without providing adequate support and information. The reform 
is so fundamental that it would be surprising if there was no objection. 
Demonstrations of hundreds, even thousands of people have been organ-
ised, although they are often prohibited or prevented from taking place by 
local authorities. Although protests against rising housing payments have 
not been as numerous and visible as pensioners’ protests when the social 
benefit system (monetizatsiia) was reformed, protesting seems to be con-
stantly spreading and growing (Clément 2008b). Activism against housing 
reform is often openly political, as it opposes the prevailing political order. 
One organisation and its local affiliates in different parts of Russia that has 
been especially active is SKS (Soiuz koordinatsionnykh sovetov), the Union 
of Coordinating Councils. It aims to change or revise the new Housing and 
Labour Codes that “violate citizens’ civil rights” by liquidating social ben-
efits (IKD website). Another structure that campaigns against homeown-
ers’ associations is the Russian Communist workers’ Party’s (RKRP) St. 
Petersburg’s subdivision. It has slogans like “TSZh – death to your hous-
ing!” and claims that homeowners cannot take care of the houses that are 
in poor condition and that the state has created homeowners’ associations 
to avoid its responsibilities. The organisation spreads leaflets and has or-
ganised meetings and demonstrations against housing reform, but without 
large-scale support.
movements and organisations that aim to correct or improve a cer-
tain defect have sprung up in the post-Soviet era. workers’ hostel (obsh-
chezhitiia) movements are trying to draw attention towards hostels that 
have been totally ignored in the new Housing Code. One problem is that 
the hostels’ residents have not had the option to privatise their homes, 
unlike other residents in municipal housing. There is also the problem 
of potential eviction in case a hostel is transferred from the municipality 
to ownership of a private company that decides to increase rents or turn 
the hostel into a hotel (Clément 2007). In St. Petersburg, the Union for 
Hostels’ Residents (Koordinatsionnii sovet obshchezhitii Sankt-Peterburga i 
Leningradskoi oblasti) is quite an active organisation, aimed at improving 
residents’ position and living conditions. According to the union’s website, 
the state Duma is currently working on legislation to liquidate workers’ 
hostels, as they are generally seen as the most undesirable form of housing 
(Obshchaga.spb.ru). 
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Residents have also objected to the so-called ‘high density construc-
tion’ (uplotnitel’naia zastroika) of new residential, ‘elite’ or shopping centre 
housing in the place of existing housing, which has destroyed parks and 
children’s playgrounds in the process. Residents’ objections have some-
times been responded to with physical force. For example, in moscow, men 
working for a property developer attacked neighbourhood activists with 
baseball bats (Clément 2007c.) A movement called ‘Zhivoi gorod’ (the Live 
City) objects to new construction in St. Petersburg that threatens to distort 
the city’s historical image. Their website lists architecturally valuable hous-
es that have been demolished or have been under the threat of demolition 
since 2003. These houses are replaced with new construction; ‘elite’ hous-
ing or hotels, for example, or are subject to complementary construction 
typically in the form of a mansard-roof. The movement is also campaign-
ing to have Gazprom’s skyscraper, which is planned to be built near the city 
centre, transferred closer to the suburbs, where it would be better suited 
architecturally. The movement is organising conferences, demonstrations 
and actions to protest the new construction and to protect existing archi-
tecture. So-called subbotniki (voluntary cleaning-up days) have been or-
ganised to draw attention to and to improve the condition of parks and 
gardens that are subject to new construction (Zhivoi gorod’s website).
Housing organisations are mainly grassroots, informal formations of 
residents intended to improve their housing conditions. In contrast to the 
above-mentioned associations and movements, which are quite fragment-
ed and small, there is one movement that is more organised and ‘profes-
sionalised’. The ‘cheated investors’ (obmanutye dol’shchiki), people who 
have lost their investments in the shared participation construction, have 
formed an association called the Association to Help Affected Investors 
(Assotsiatsiia pomoshchi postradavshim investoram). The association was 
established in December 2005 and itaims to help cheated housing investors 
by approaching state authorities, cooperating with judicial administration 
to replace lost investments and drawing attention to the problem. The as-
sociation arranges meetings, press conferences and demonstrations. It 
publishes news on the subject on its website, along with a ‘black list’ of un-
reliable construction companies, and it also maintains a discussion forum. 
Local agencies of the association have been formed in different parts of 
the country (Assotsiatsiia pomoshchi postradavshim investoram website). 
Estimates of the number of cheated investors vary considerably among 
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different sources, in any case throughout Russia there are thousands of 
cheated investors, according to one estimate even 200-250 000 people have 
been affected by the scams. The number has been estimated to continue 
to grow as the construction sector has faced serious difficulties during the 
financial crisis (Novaia Gazeta 20 march 2009). 
The movement is well organised and active and has attracted quite a lot 
of media and political attention. This attention is also due to the fact that 
the fraud typically affects the middle class rather than the poorest part 
of the population, who live in workers’ hostels or communal apartments. 
Increasing and strengthening the middle class has been one of the reform’s 
aims, so problems related to that group raise particular political concern. 
The movement has also taken radical measures: hunger strikes, occupy-
ing “government offices or unfinished properties and tent camps – includ-
ing one in front of the white House” (Clément 2007). A hunger strike in 
the spring of 2007 even resulted in death of one of the desperate strikers 
(Clément 2007b). These people, having lost their homes or savings, have 
nothing left to lose and are willing to take drastic action. Recently divi-
sions within the movement have taken place: part of the movement sup-
ports the United Russia that strives, through legislative changes, to ensure 
that the cheated investors are refunded, while the other part supports an 
opposition party called Just Russia and their legislative initiatives to solve 
the problem (Clément 2007).
In addition to the protest and defence movements and residential 
housing management organisations, there are organisations that aim to 
educate residents, offering information and legal advice. The New Eurasia 
Foundation (Fond Novaia Evraziia), is a nongovernmental organisation 
established in moscow in 2004, “improves the lives of Russian citizens” 
by implementing social development programmes and focusing on hous-
ing. It has an extensive programme called “Housing Self-Governance: 
Institutionalising Housing Self-management”, aimed at assisting local au-
thorities to implement the housing reform, promote competition in the 
housing service market and develop housing education. As part of the pro-
gramme, a ‘Homeowners support project’ is being undertaken in coopera-
tion with the Institute of Urban Economics. Funded by USAID, it aims to 
raise awareness and train housing management professionals and activists 
by cooperating with local authorities and management companies (New 
Eurasia Foundation website, Annual Report 2007). Part of the New Eurasia 
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programme has been the establishment of a network of ‘Schools of housing 
education’ (Shkoly zhilishchnogo prosveshcheniia) that operates in 11 cities 
across Russia (but not in St. Petersburg) with the aim of informing and 
educating residents about the reform. At the national level, The Institute of 
Collective Action (Institut Kollektivnoe Deistvie, IKD), mentioned earlier 
in this chapter, is a significant player. It is a social organisation focused on 
housing reform and consumer rights that consists of sociologists and activ-
ists, including Karine Clément, who study housing movements in Russia. 
IKD has a vast amount of informative material for citizens and it publishes 
news about housing reform and housing movements’ demonstrations and 
other actions on its website. 
St. Petersburg’s best known and most influential voluntary housing or-
ganisation, the St. Petersburg Association of homeowners’ associations and 
cooperatives, was founded as early as 1995. According to its own announce-
ment, the association has over 700 ZhSK and TSZh as its members. The as-
sociation’s task is to educate and provide information for housing associa-
tions and individuals. It produces information leaflets, offers legal consul-
tation and organises meetings and seminars for its members. According to 
the association, the issues most often inquired about concern accounting 
and legal matters. The association has close contacts with St. Petersburg’s 
Housing Committee and the association’s chairperson, marina Akimova, 
has become a respected expert who is regularly interviewed in the media, 
consulted by authorities and invited to housing seminars and conferences, 
not only in St. Petersburg but around the country. The association is con-
tacted by organisations and residents from other cities in Russia and it has 
contacts with similar Estonian, German and Swedish associations.
Other roof and information-providing organisations in St. Petersburg 
include a Union of House Committees23 (Soiuz domovykh komitetov SPb), 
founded in 2001, which provides consultation and information on prac-
tical matters for house committee management. An organisation called 
‘The Civic project’ (Grazhdanskii proekt) works in cooperation with St. 
Petersburg’s municipal councils, monitoring residents’ housing reform 
issues and offering consultation with authorities. Housing management 
and maintenance companies are also organised in at least one association 
23 House committee: an informal housing management organ, see next sub-
chapter.
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(Assotsiatsiia upravliaiushchikh i ekspluatatsionnykh organizatsii v zhilish-
chnoi sfere Sankt-Peterburga). It consists of 17 companies and its goal is to 
share know-how and to develop a uniform management practice among 
its members. This kind of association is a valuable source of support, as 
there are so many companies with varying levels of expertise operating in 
the market.
Homeowners’ associations also have at least one district-level roof 
organisation in St. Petersburg. District-level associations are necessary, 
considering that St. Petersburg is a city of over four million inhabitants, 
with most districts housing several hundreds of thousands of people. The 
Association of TSZh in St. Petersburg’s Central District (Assotsiatsiia 
TSZh tsentral’nogo raiona Sankt-Peterburga) was formed in November 
2006. According to the association’s website, it currently has 49 TSZhs as 
its members and is expecting to gain more. Its task is similar to that of oth-
er housing associations: to provide information on housing and housing 
management matters to its members and to improve housing conditions in 
the area (Association’s website). 
A different kind of housing organisation is Nochlezhka (Shelter), an ac-
tive and established homeless people’s association that has existed since 
1990. In addition to actual housing associations, there are associations 
that focus primarily on other issues but cover housing matters as well. 
Russia’s Consumer Union (Soiuz potrebitelei RF) aims to teach citizens 
to protect their rights, for example by providing information about how 
to complain about poor housing and communal services (Shomina 2007, 
45). The movement of civic initiatives, (Dvizhenie grazhdanskikh initsiativ, 
DGI), which is connected to the Regional Party of Communists (RPK) and 
focuses on housing questions, transport difficulties in the city and eco-
logical questions, seems to be active and well organised. Other political 
parties, such as Yabloko, a social liberal party, have been educating people 
about the housing reform and in 2005 there was a district-level project to 
promote the establishment of homeowners’ associations in St. Petersburg. 
This shows the current social and political relevance of housing.
Some housing associations and movements have been presented here 
that are active and visible in the media and on the Internet. Only the most 
significant of the current movements are mentioned here and the variety of 
actors operating in the housing field becomes evident through the examples 
above. A characteristic of all the NGOs is that many activists are members 
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in several organisations, meaning that the core of activism is thick and 
organisations cooperate with each other, yet the actual number of activists 
is quite small. From the point of view of housing management reform and 
homeowners’ associations, it is noteworthy that although civic activism 
has recently directed itself towards housing problems, self-government of 
housing is treated somewhat differently. According to one housing activ-
ist in Nizhnii Novgorod,24 the difficulty is that NGOs in Russia tend to 
focus on issues such as HIV and youth issues, and housing management is 
not regarded as a traditional social question issue. Instead, housing man-
agement is seen as a professional field in which non-professionals should 
not become involved. This can decrease social organisations’ interest in 
promoting the self-government of housing and can prevent people from 
participating in homeowners’ associations. 
3.6. House Committees and Other Informal Housing 
Management Organisations
In addition to homeowners’ associations, house committees (domovye 
komitety/domkomy) are another significant kind of self-management or-
ganisation for residents. As described in Chapter 2, house committees ex-
isted in Soviet Russia as far back as the 1920s, but post-Soviet house com-
mittees are quite different and more closely resemble homeowners’ asso-
ciations. In the post-Soviet era house committees represent residents’ in-
terests, as was the case in the 1910s, before they were turned into local level 
housing administration and control organs (see Shomina 2004, 10). Now 
domkomy are again formed on the initiative of residents. In some houses 
a homeowners’ association has later been established on the foundation 
of the house committee. Thus, although homeowners’ associations are a 
new type of housing management in Russia, they do not enter the hous-
ing field out of nowhere; there is a history of self-government in housing 
in the country.  
House committees have been formed on residents’ initiative in order 
to improve housing conditions. It is often claimed that people’s opinion 
24 Interviewed in the Homeowners’ Support Project by the New Eurasia Founda-
tion.
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of their apartments in the Soviet era was “my home is my castle”, regard-
ing only their actual apartment as their home and disregarding the com-
mon areas of the house (Shomina 1999, 1). This was not publicly accepted 
behaviour, as concentrating on home and private life was condemned as 
bourgeoisie thinking (Reid 2006, 150). As public housing maintenance did 
not work very effectively and residents did not care for the condition of 
their staircases, for example, this resulted in the poor condition of com-
mon areas. On the other hand, the tradition of regular subbotniki, volun-
tary work days, when the residents cleaned up the courtyard together, was 
very strong in the Soviet era. However, building entrances and staircases in 
Russia have typically been in bad shape, with broken lamps and mailboxes, 
non-functional lifts, etc. This is not simply a result of residents’ careless-
ness; it shows defects in the (municipal) housing maintenance. In coopera-
tive houses (which are usually privately maintained) staircases have been 
in better condition (Shomina 1999, 1). The driving force for residential or-
ganising has thus been to improve the tidiness and comfort of their house, 
its staircases and courtyards, so that the staircase would be perceived as an 
entrance to their home and not as a continuation of the street and public 
area.
Another reason for residential organising has been the need to increase 
security. In the 1990s the crime rate increased (Gilinskiy 1997) and peo-
ple started to feel less safe than they had before (Serebrennikova 1999). 
This created a need to close off the staircases, not just from burglars but 
also from homeless people seeking shelter and warmth. ‘Staircase coun-
cils’ (sovet pod’’ezda) were the ‘first step’, an informal form of organised 
cooperation among neighbours. Staircase councils are loose formations, 
closer to residential cooperation than official organisations, directed at 
improving security matters and good relationships between neighbours 
rather than actual housing maintenance or management. Still, staircase 
councils may be the first step towards residents’ involvement in local self-
governance (mestnoe samoupravlenie) (Shomina 1999, 9–10). 
Staircase councils or house councils (sovet doma, if the organisation 
represents the whole house) may develop further into house committees 
(Kvartirnyi riad 14 April 2005; 23 September 2004; 24 February 2005). 
House committees are similar to staircase councils but more organised 
and management-oriented. Although a house committee does not handle 
the management of the building/s itself, it may cooperate with the district 
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housing agency (GUZhA) in making plans for maintenance and repairs. 
Participating in repairs and keeping entrances, staircases and yards tidy 
is usually a domkom’s most visible task. A house committee also has ac-
cess to GUZhA’s accounting and expenses used for maintenance of the 
house. The ability to control the quality and expenses of management and 
maintenance has been regarded as very important as housing payment fees 
continue to rise (Kvartirnyi riad, 24 February 2005).
A house committee is not a legal entity, and therefore has less legal lev-
erage than a homeowners’ association, but it also has fewer responsibilities; 
a homeowners’ association must organise management and maintenance 
through a company or by hiring service and administrative staff and must 
choose an audit committee for the association. In the case of a house com-
mittee, the GUZhA runs the management duties. A house committee is 
also easier to organise because it does not have to be registered in the state 
registry. The legal structure of a house committee consists of a chairperson, 
secretary and representatives of each staircase and the committee informs 
the residents of its work at least once a year in a meeting (Rasporiazhenie 
O domovykh komitetakh 2003).
Another advantage of a house committee is that tenants can partici-
pate in them, unlike in homeowners’ associations, which are exclusively 
for homeowners. The house committee is a form of civic participation 
that encourages residents to look after their house, common property and 
environment. New regulations concerning house committees have come 
into force locally in the 2000s, for example in moscow (in 2004) and St. 
Petersburg (in 2000 and 2003). In moscow the number of housing com-
mittees has increased fivefold in only a few years, reaching 5350 in October 
2005 (Kvartirnyi riad, 17 November 2005). It is possible that, along with 
implementation of housing management reform, house committees de-
crease as the need for them lessens and they are replaced with homeown-
ers’ associations and housing management companies. However, in case 
the third management option mentioned in the Housing Code, direct 
management, is chosen, a house committee can be useful as there is no 
other management organ operating in the house.
However, a domkom does not have jurisdiction to hire service staff 
and it cannot finance necessary repairs apart from collecting money from 
residents on a voluntary basis. The local housing agency may ignore resi-
dents’ wishes for maintenance improvements although, according to St. 
119
3. HOUSING AFTER THE SOVIET UNION
Petersburg’s regulations, they should cooperate. In short, it seems that 
house committees can improve and beautify the area and maintain tidiness 
in the staircases, but they have little power on more weighty issues such as 
deciding on and arranging renovations (see Kvartirnyi riad, 17 November 
2005). It seems that the leverage held by house committees varies depend-
ing on how they are regarded by the local housing agency. Despite the de-
ficiencies of house committees, they are important organisations for ena-
bling residential participation in housing management and maintenance. 
A house committee is less formal than a homeowners’ association, which 
makes it easier to organise and may also lower the threshold for participat-
ing in common decision-making. 
3.7. Conclusions
The intention of reforming the housing sector in post-Soviet Russia was 
similar to the trend across Eastern Europe: to create a new housing market 
that did not exist in the Soviet Union. The initial circumstances have been 
similar in all the former socialist countries – state control over ownership 
and management of housing on the one hand and a shortage of resources 
and poor condition of housing stock on the other – but the countries have 
chosen quite different paths to reform their systems (Clapham & Kintrea 
1996). The privatisation of housing has enabled people to become owners 
of their apartments and the share of housing owned by private citizens has 
grown from 26 percent in 1990 to 76 percent in 2006. Privatisation has in-
creased social stratification, as most of the previous tenants have become 
homeowners. while the media has emphasised the role that home-owner-
ship plays in creating a new middle class in Russia, the ability to privatise 
one’s apartment for free has created a large group of homeowners whose 
property consists solely of their apartment and who lack adequate finan-
cial resources for its upkeep. The inadequate resources of this group consti-
tutes a problem for the recent reform of privatising housing management, 
which is the next step, after privatisation of the housing stock, in develop-
ing a market-oriented housing sector. 
The new reform has made homeowners responsible for management 
and maintenance of the common property in multi-family buildings. This 
is a fundamental change from the previous system, in which management 
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and maintenance was handled by the public sector. The three alternatives 
for realising this task – homeowners’ association, management company 
and direct management by the residents – all have their positive and nega-
tive sides. which one is the most suitable depends on the location and 
condition of the house and its residents’ social composition. According 
to prior evaluations and in the opinion of activists, TSZh works best in a 
building that has enough active and financially solvent residents partici-
pating. TSZh allows homeowners to influence the management, unlike in 
the management company alternative and, as a form of democratic self-
government, TSZh has the potential to foster civic engagement. However, 
private management comes with certain challenges, such as free-riding, as 
effective methods to prevent it are lacking. Secondly, the poor condition of 
the housing stock, especially in the centre of St. Petersburg, where there is 
a large amount of old housing stock, makes repairs and maintenance ex-
pensive. This is a financial burden, especially for poorer homeowners who 
do not have the resources needed for major repairs.
The city of St. Petersburg has been active in promoting the establish-
ment of TSZhs, resulting in homeowners’ associations being more com-
mon in the city than elsewhere in the country. In recent years the chang-
ing housing situation and the serious defects in housing have led to the 
creation of a number of housing movements and organisations in Russia. 
One of the problems that these movements have focused on is fraud in 
housing construction and sales, which has resulted in ‘cheated investors’ 
losing their dwellings and/or savings. Besides protecting residents’ rights, 
some social organisations aim to spread much-needed information related 
to housing reform and to educate residents. As the new housing reform 
expects activity from the residents, it is crucially important that the resi-
dents understand their role in the reform and are aware of their rights 
and responsibilities in the housing market. Educating residents is a chal-
lenging task, as it is for residents to understand the information, especially 
those who are used to the public authorities taking care of housing. The 
importance of housing development has also been politically recognised 
and housing is currently one of Russia’s national priority projects. 
However, although social organisations regard housing as an important 
issue, housing management is usually not considered to be a social ques-
tion, which may decrease social organisations’ interest in it. Some activists 
claim that housing management is a field of professionals in which non-
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professionals, that is, ordinary citizens, should not get involved. This is a 
factor that can seriously hinder residents’ participation in homeowners’ 
associations if they do not understand that their contribution is vital for 
the organisation to function. It is noteworthy that although housing has 
been publicly managed in Russia before, homeowners’ associations have 
not emerged into the housing sector out of nowhere. Housing cooperatives 
(ZhSK), introduced in Chapter 2, and house committees (domkomy) are 
the predecessors of TSZhs. They are forms of self-management for resi-
dents, aiming to improve housing conditions (domkomy) or have a similar 
administrative structure (ZhSK) to that of homeowners’ associations. In 
this chapter I have presented the situation in the housing sector in post-
Soviet Russia, introducing the legislative reforms and their practical im-
plementation. This is the framework and context in which homeowners’ 
associations operate. In the next two chapters I examine how homeowners’ 
associations succeed in practice and how they handle the problems, such 
as free-riding, that have come up in this chapter.
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4. Homeowners’ Associations’ Management and 
Social Relations
The previous chapter described the prevailing housing situation in Russia 
and the aims and challenges of the current housing reform, that is, the 
framework of homeowners’ associations in the housing sector. Attention 
now turns to an analysis of how this housing management system works 
in practice, based on the interview data. Analysis of the data is divided 
into two chapters. In this chapter I focus on residents’ relationships and in-
ternal dynamics of the association, examining the joint decision-making, 
free-riding, conflicts and cooperation between members. Chapter 5 anal-
yses the relationships of homeowners’ associations with other actors. The 
data is examined with the help of the common-pool resource regime ap-
proach and the concept of social capital. 
4.1. Data and Research Approach 
my aim in studying the homeowners’ associations is twofold: first, I ex-
amine how effectively a homeowners’ association works as a self-govern-
ing management organisation; how homeowners’ associations really work, 
compared to the official legislation. This is analysed by using the common-
pool resource regime approach. The key question is how homeowners suc-
ceed in managing the common property collectively in the associations. 
Secondly, the associations’ democratic potential is studied using the con-
cept of social capital. The extent to which associations work democratically 
and whether the association reinforces social capital between neighbours 
is examined. According to Putnam, associations produce social capital and 
thereby contribute to building a more democratic society (Putnam et al. 
1993, 173). whether elements of social capital – trust, generalised reciproc-
ity and social networks – can foster democratic governance, facilitate de-
cision-making and prevent free-riding in homeowners’ associations is ex-
amined through the data.
The so-called design principles of a common-pool resource regime, as 
defined by Elinor Ostrom, are used to help examine the associations’ ef-
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fectiveness. Ostrom was awarded the Nobel memorial Prize in Economic 
Sciences in 2009, which she shared with Oliver E. williamson, for her 
research on the commons. Ostrom first presented the design principles 
in Governing the Commons (see Ostrom 1990, 90) and has rephrased the 
principles in her later works (2000; 2005) but the basic idea remains the 
same. many scholars have since applied these design principles to em-
pirical studies on natural and man-made common-pool resource systems 
(Ostrom 2005, 259–260). These rules are intended to be guidelines to help 
overcome the collective-action problems that could otherwise occur, such 
as free-riding. I use the design principles as a tool to examine how self-
governance works in homeowners’ associations and the extent to which 
they really are the democratic associations they should be according to 
the legislation. Those principles that concern the internal dynamics and 
decision-making of associations are used in this chapter. 
One of the design principles advises that a CPR regime should have 
clear boundary rules. In one sense this concerns personal relationships, 
a clear definition of who is in and who is out, who is a member of the re-
gime and who is not. It is important that users can determine the group’s 
membership, that is, group boundaries, to encourage trust and reciprocity 
(Ostrom 2000, 149). In homeowners’ associations this principle is com-
plicated by the fact that membership of the association is voluntary and 
that there are tenants who use common resources but who are not mem-
bers of the association. Clear boundaries are important in order to pre-
vent collective-action problems such as free-riding (Ostrom 2005, 260). In 
a homeowners’ association the use of common property and resources is 
difficult to restrict with boundaries, to be made available only to members. 
Common property is therefore a common good, characterised by difficulty 
of exclusion.
Another principle, which Ostrom refers to as collective-choice arrange-
ments, is that most individuals affected by the rules of the regime may 
participate in their creation and modification (Ostrom 2000, 150). This is 
an important precondition for decision-making to be democratic. If the 
Housing Code is followed the democracy principle is fulfilled in the asso-
ciations, as decisions are made jointly by the homeowners in the common 
meetings. In order for rules to be effective, a design principle proposes that 
monitoring adherence to the rules is done by the users, or by people ac-
countable to the users (Ostrom 2000, 151). According to the legislation the 
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association’s administration, the common meeting and the board consist 
of the members, who are liable to one another. Therefore, this principle 
should hold true in the associations.
Breaking the rules should, according to the design principles, be met 
with graduated sanctions (Ostrom 2000, 151). But such a response seems 
to be lacking from the housing legislation. Expelling or evicting a home-
owner because of non-payment is not explicitly mentioned in the Housing 
Code, although evicting a tenant is. Suing for debts is possible but given the 
general distrust of the justice system in Russia (Volkov 2002, 46–47), this 
rule may not be effective enough. Conflict-resolution mechanisms require 
that access to local arenas to resolve a conflict between users or between 
the users and officials should be possible without delay (Ostrom 2000, 152). 
In conflicts within the homeowners’ association this arena is the decision-
making body, that is, the common meeting of the homeowners.
The data for this study was collected between 2005 and 2008. Some 
preliminary interviews were conducted in February and April of 2005 in 
St. Petersburg and moscow before the actual fieldwork period. These in-
terviews were held with experts in the field or people who otherwise had 
first-hand information of the subject. The author also attended a one-day 
conference about the housing reform and its consequences, which was 
open to St. Petersburg residents. The actual recorded interview data con-
sists of interviews with a total 40 respondents conducted in St. Petersburg 
between September and December of 2005, may of 2006 and January of 
2008. Some respondents were re-interviewed in January 2008 in order to 
find out how the situation had changed during the previous year and a 
half. Eighteen chairpersons and managers and eight residents in 17 associ-
ations25 were interviewed, in addition to 11 so-called experts, whose work 
focuses, in different ways, on housing reform. For a detailed list of the in-
terviews, see Appendix 1. Respondents (association leaders and residents) 
were promised anonymity, with a few exceptions. A couple of associations 
have special characteristics that make them and the respondents easily 
recognisable. In these cases the respondents were made aware of this pos-
sibility and they consented to it. Experts, as a rule, spoke under their own 
names but those that wished to speak anonymously were allowed to do so. 
25 One association had both a chairperson and a manager, both of whom were 
interviewed.
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Experts included local politicians, municipal authorities, NGO activists, a 
journalist and a lawyer, all of whom were active in housing reform. 
Of the 18 association leaders, nine were non-resident managers hired by 
the homeowners or appointed by a management company and the other 
nine were chairpersons, chosen by the homeowners. However, the differ-
ence between a manager and a chairperson should not be unduly stressed 
because in practice the difference was not always clearly defined. In TSZh 
Kirovskii, for example, the chairperson of a nearby TSZh was asked to 
become the manager by the residents, although he was not originally a 
manager by profession. Some of the leaders had previous experience in 
construction or municipal housing management but some had no relevant 
management experience. Twelve of the 18 leaders were men and six were 
women. In this sense TSZhs were more professional than the grassroots, 
informal organisations that previous studies have found to be led by wom-
en (see Henry 2006b; Salmenniemi 2008). This could be because housing 
is seen as a field that requires professional knowledge, compared to organi-
sations focused on social problems, to which women usually direct their 
organisational activities, such as drug abuse or children’s rights. The age 
of the associations’ leaders varied between 36 and 70 years with the mean 
age being 54. This indicates that homeowners’ association leaders tend to 
be middle-aged or retired.
The location of the associations is illustrated in the map of St. Petersburg 
shown in Figure 2. The homeowners’ associations in the data accurately 
represent the variety of houses with TSZhs in St. Petersburg: there are 
both old and new buildings, small and large multi-family buildings, aver-
age standard (‘economy-class’) as well as so-called elite26 housing, from 
different districts of St. Petersburg. Nine of St. Petersburg’s 18 districts are 
represented in the data. The municipal towns that are part of St. Petersburg 
(Kolpino, Peterhof, Kronstadt and municipal towns in the Kurortnyi dis-
trict) were not included, as there are not many homeowners’ associations in 
those districts and they are located outside the actual city of St. Petersburg. 
As noted in Chapter 3, the number of homeowners’ associations varied by 
district from 10 percent of the housing stock in Petrogradskii to 48 percent 
26 ‘Elite housing’ is a vague term that is often used in the Russian housing mar-
ket. It has been used here to refer to housing of distinctly higher-than-average 
quality in a good location.
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in Frunzenskii (St. Petersburg’s Housing Committee’s statistics). In gen-
eral, homeowners’ associations are more common in suburban districts, 
where there is a lot of newly built housing and where the association has 
been established by the constructor.  
All associations in the suburbs were located in new houses, most of 
which were built in the 2000s, with the exception of three houses built in 
the 1990s. The suburban building complexes were large, with the number 
of apartments ranging from just over 200 to nearly 700. The buildings lo-
cated in the centre of the city were old, constructed between the 18th cen-
tury and the 1950s. The houses in the centre were also smaller, with the 
number of apartments ranging from eight to just over 80. Accordingly, 
there is a sharp contrast between old and new housing and between the 
suburbs and the centre of the city. All the three elite houses were new, lo-
cated in central districts of the city and small, with the largest of them hav-
ing 21 apartments. All of the elite associations were led by a hired manager, 
authorised by a chairperson, and homeowners played only a small role in 
the management, apparently by their own choice. 
Figure 2. Homeowners’ associations in the data, by district
127
4. HOmEOwNERS’ ASSOCIATIONS’ mANAGEmENT AND SOCIAL RELATIONS
whether the association was located in a new or old house was deci-
sive for the association’s dynamics; in newly built houses the association 
was established on the constructor’s initiative in the construction phase. 
In the older buildings the idea to establish the association came from the 
residents. The socio-economic structure of residents is quite heterogenic 
in old buildings, which affects the management. All the old houses had 
non-privatised communal apartments in them, except for TSZh Centre 3, 
in which all four communal apartments were privatised. Nowadays com-
munal apartments have a specific residential composition, as most of them 
have been emptied and kommunalka has become a marginalised type of 
housing. By and large, communal apartments are now occupied either by 
aged people who have lived all their lives in the apartment or by students 
and migrants, for whom it is a temporary dwelling. In addition, kommu-
nalka has become the housing type of excluded groups, such as drunks, 
drug addicts and the mentally ill (Utekhin, 19 November 2008). This atypi-
cal social structure may have an effect on the management of a homeown-
ers’ association. 
The old buildings had a mixture of very poor and relatively wealthy peo-
ple living under the same roof. The poor residents had lived in the house 
for years, since the Soviet era, and taken advantage of the opportunity to 
privatise their apartment for free, while the ‘rich’ ones had only recently 
purchased and moved into their apartments. In the newly constructed 
buildings (excluding the ‘elite’ ones) in the suburbs, the residents can be 
described as middle or lower middle class rather than the poorest seg-
ment of the population (except, partly, in TSZh Frunzenskii).27 most of the 
new houses consisted exclusively of privately owned apartments, although 
some new houses also had municipal apartments in them. Homeowners’ 
associations had been established in all buildings between 1996 and 2005, 
before the new Housing Code came into force in march 2005. An excep-
tion was TSZh Centre 3, which was registered only in the summer of 2005, 
but the process of establishment had been started much earlier.
In order to preserve anonymity and to make the associations more 
easily distinguishable, they are named after the administrative district in 
27 Description of the residents’ socio-economic structure is based on the author’s 
own estimation of the look and location of the houses and the respondents’ 
description of the residential composition.
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which they are located rather than by their real names. In a city of 4.5 
million inhabitants and 18 districts, this labelling is vague enough to en-
sure anonymity. However, as St. Petersburg’s core, the Admiralteiskii and 
Tsentral’nyi districts, is a relatively small area, the associations located in 
the area have been named simply as ‘Centre’. A description of the associa-
tions’ main characteristics is provided in Appendix 2.
The chosen homeowners’ associations were picked randomly from an 
online list of all St. Petersburg’s homeowners’ associations. Some associa-
tions were contacted because their name had come up in a newspaper ar-
ticle or had been suggested by an acquaintance who had heard about the 
association in the media. These associations were contacted because they 
were expected to be willing to give interviews. This turned out to be an 
important factor, as many associations’ chairpersons and residents were 
not eager to talk to outsiders. most associations were, however, contacted 
without any prior knowledge about them.
Before the interview, most of the respondents were contacted by tel-
ephone and given a verbal presentation of the purpose of the research and 
the use of the interview. In case the respondent wanted to, she was present-
ed a written description of the research before the interview; this was more 
common among the experts. The respondents were promised anonymity, 
with the exceptions mentioned above, and those experts who shared their 
views on the housing situation and homeowners’ associations in general. 
The interviews were conducted at various locations. Chairpersons and 
experts were usually interviewed in their workplace, which was generally 
in an office (although some larger associations usually had separate of-
fice premises in the building). Some of the interviews took place in the 
residents’ apartments but respondents were usually not eager to allow the 
researchers into their homes, so alternative locations were used, such as 
office premises of the house, nearby parks and cafés. All interviews were 
recorded with the respondent’s permission. The interviews lasted between 
20 minutes and nearly two hours, with the typical duration being a little 
over an hour. After recording the interview, the tapes were transcribed by 
a native Russian speaker.28 
28 Thanks to maria Rojnova, Sylvi Nikitenkov and Olga Kalacheva for transcrib-
ing the interviews.
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A semi-structured theme interview method was used to collect the in-
terviews. In other words, the framework and central themes to be discussed 
were decided beforehand but no strict set of questions was used. Important 
themes that came up during the interviews were discussed in more depth. 
The interviews were used as a source of information and therefore ana-
lysed simply by reading the transcribed interviews, sorting out the central 
themes and focusing on them by making notes and listing important de-
tails. In addition to interviews, the author attended a homeowners’ com-
mon meeting in TSZh Petrogradskii 1 with Dilorom Akhmedzhanova, a 
research assistant. Permission to observe common meetings in other as-
sociations was also requested, unsuccessfully. In support of the study data, 
interview data was made available from the New Eurasia Foundation’s 
‘Homeowners’ Support Project’, which reviewed expert opinions on hous-
ing reform in Tver’, Perm and Nizhnii Novgorod. The data includes three 
group interviews and a one-on-one expert interview, all of which were 
conducted in the spring of 2008. This data broadens the perspective on the 
current situation with homeowners’ associations and housing reform from 
St. Petersburg to elsewhere in Russia. Newspaper articles concerning the 
housing reform and homeowners’ associations since autumn of 2004 were 
used as an additional source of information, especially in Chapter 3, but 
also as support for analysis of the interview data. 
4.2. Establishment of the Association
Homeowners’ main motivation for organising a homeowners’ association 
in old houses was their dissatisfaction with public sector management and 
maintenance. Therefore, the idea behind these homeowners’ associations 
was the same as in many other housing movements and associations, as 
examined in Chapter 3, that is, to improve housing conditions. The old 
houses in the data had for many years been in need of and, in some cases, 
in line for repairs in the municipal housing services. A house committee 
(a less formal residents’ management organisation) had been organised in 
TSZh Petrogradskii 1 before homeowners’ associations existed in order to 
improve the management and maintenance of the house in 1994. Later, in 
2002, a homeowners’ association was established on the basis of the house 
committee. Prior to the establishment of the association (the house com-
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mittee had less leverage to improve the situation) the maintenance was so 
inadequate that the residents had sometimes cleaned the staircase floor 
and the lift themselves. A private cleaning service was not used because 
some residents refused to pay for it. Voluntary work was therefore done 
to compensate for the insufficient cleaning and the residents had also laid 
a new linoleum floor on the staircase at their own expense. In all the old 
houses the residents were appalled by the situation and tired of complain-
ing to municipal authorities in vain and they wanted to move to a private 
housing maintenance service by establishing the association. They wanted 
to raise their standard of living by improving their housing conditions: re-
pairing the house, making the surroundings more comfortable by planting 
flowers or at least by cleaning up dirty staircases. 
For many decades attention was not paid to the current repairs of the house 
and the infrastructure became unfit for use. That woke us up in 2002 to es-
tablish a condominium, to establish a TSZh and to self-organise questions on 
repairs and maintenance of the house. (Resp. 22, vice-chair, TSZh Centre 3, 
old house)
we had water damage one Christmas and waited for three years for the re-
pairs because the entire kitchen and corridor were damaged. The water burst 
out because the pipes were very old and the water supply barely reached the 
fifth floor, let alone the sixth, and using gas equipment was very tricky, even 
though I had always sent [complaint] letters to the city and the district and to 
this … housing services agency … I wrote to every address that I’m paying for 
these services but I’m not getting anything in return. (Resp. 26, homeowner, 
TSZh Centre 3)
Protecting common property was another important reason for the 
establishment of associations, such as in the case of TSZh Centre 1 in 
response to the city’s plan to construct a mansard roof to the building 
against residents’ wishes. This inspired the residents to form an association 
to protect their house against outsiders. In TSZh Centre 3 there were small 
warehouses in the courtyard of the house, self-constructed by non-resident 
outsiders. These warehouses were taken down by the residents when the 
homeowners’ association was established. Centrally located houses in par-
ticular suffered from continuous visits by thieves and burglars and home-
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less people seeking shelter at the entrance and the staircase. Security was 
increased and the courtyard and staircases had intercom systems installed 
when the association was established in order to keep out unwanted visi-
tors. In such ways, homeowners’ associations undertake similar activities 
to a house committee. 
The problem was that we had drug addicts at the entrance all the time. we 
even gave a notice to the police and this comrade was put in jail, then he 
spread the word [about the place] and we continuously had a bunch of drug 
addicts sitting at our entrance. (Resp. 2, homeowner, TSZh Petrogradskii 1, 
centre, old house)
A similar case led to the establishment of another association, as de-
scribed by the recently hired manager:
maybe you know how all this started?
- Started … the reason for the establishment of the TSZh? Yes, I know – it was 
both from the residents’ and from the chair’s side. It was for you know what 
– you see the location of this house yourselves, that is, next to the Peter and 
Paul Fortress; celebrations, fireworks, what else there is. That means a lot of 
people, a lot of beer, and they simply used the courtyard as their toilet. People 
have said that when you opened the staircase entrance door there’s just … piss, 
excuse the expression, running to the entrance way. And then they started to 
think that something had to be done about that, to somehow fight against it. 
At first they closed the courtyard. To close the courtyard, the land had to be 
private, in common ownership – and from that it went on little by little, and 
that’s how the story went, how they decided to get into this. (Resp. 29, man-
ager, TSZh Petrogradskii 3, old house, centre)
Thus, the residents networked in response to an outside threat, inva-
sion or disturbance. A push from the outside caused residents to gather 
together, to protect their common property. Increased security measures, 
video surveillance or guards in the courtyard or entrance, after the estab-
lishment of the association made the residents feel more secure. 
But now, of course, there are no problems. If we walk there and someone 
is walking behind us in the courtyard, the guards see our reaction to that 
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person and they see right away that something’s wrong. So there shouldn’t 
be any problems on this matter. well, of course, it’s peaceful here. And with 
the salaries [of the service staff], and the housing payments … we don’t have 
any problems, everything’s good. (Resp. 23, homeowner, TSZh Centre 3, old 
house)
It can be difficult to achieve a level of agreement among homeowners 
that is sufficient  to establish an association in an old house. This becomes 
evident in the interviews with residents and chairpersons, a view that is 
shared by a lawyer specialising in housing. In one old building the estab-
lishment of an association was initiated by some of the homeowners. This 
is an important point as it makes the association a self-initiated structure, 
unlike a TSZh established by a constructor. As noted before, all the asso-
ciations in the data were established before the 2005 Housing Code, so es-
tablishment was not legally required. Unlike in newly built houses, where 
the apartment buyers agreed to the association when purchasing their 
home, it was not easy in the old houses to obtain the consent necessary for 
the establishment. The establishment process required a lot of persuasion 
from the initiators, who went door-to-door to convince the other residents. 
According to some respondents, the objectors did not understand the idea 
of the association, nor were they interested in taking care of housing them-
selves. The initiators were irritated by such objections, which they regarded 
as stubbornness.
One more problem is that the whole house is impossible to gather together 
ever, no matter how much we went to people, how much we would talk to 
them, how much we would convince them. The mentality of a person … not 
even the communal apartments’ residents but other people who don’t realise, 
they’re not normal people of course, they don’t understand what self-govern-
ance is, what it means to have the ability to decide, to choose, and to improve 
your circumstances for the price of your initiative. There’s no initiative here, 
they think that initiative means money, but it’s not just with money that you 
can benefit there … (Resp. 2, homeowner, TSZh Petrogradskii 1, centre, old 
house)
However, the opposition was not just caused by stubbornness and sus-
picion towards a new type of management. The objectors were usually the 
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poorer homeowners, who were concerned about the rising housing costs 
that the association would bring, as the house would no longer be pub-
licly managed and maintained. what worried the residents was that they 
would become responsible not only for their own housing payments but 
also for those of their neighbours. A very important question concerns 
the financing of capital repairs. A TSZh is legally responsible for financing 
the renovation but it cannot afford to finance it independently, as taking 
a bank loan for capital repairs is not practised. Thus, the associations rely 
on the city’s subsidies to finance repairs, but there can be long waiting 
times involved. Some homeowners may therefore oppose the establish-
ment, fearing they cannot afford the repairs. This was the case in TSZh 
Centre 3, where the consent of poorer pensioners was finally gained when 
other homeowners decided to exempt them from common property main-
tenance and repair payments. It should be noted that the Housing Code 
states that poor homeowners are entitled to subsidies for payments related 
to housing and communal services (water supply, heating, electricity, etc.) 
(Article 159). As the association’s decision liberated the poorer residents 
from maintenance and repair payments, they only had to pay what was left 
after subsidies of the monthly housing and communal service charges. 
Here in the centre, where TSZh have been established, people who couldn’t 
afford to participate in the maintenance of the house were evicted. So we put 
in the articles of association that people in these categories will be officially 
exempt from paying the expenses of the common property for the rest of their 
lives as long as they live in this house. 
- How did the rest of the people take this?
- They voted for it.
- That is, they voted for it because they think that these people really cannot 
pay or because they thought that association had to be established quickly?
- The association had to be established quickly, first of all. It was understood 
that they could not participate. It was understood that at that age they need 
support. As the state cannot support them, the state cannot take their share. 
So we, as neighbours who live next door, who have grown together here, we 
should take this burden upon ourselves. That was the motto. The fact that we 
live in the house is thanks to the people that are now old, who at the time of 
the siege stayed in this city. And thanks to the fact that they lived in the city 
and bared the difficulties of the siege, the city was protected, the city was de-
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fended … that is, they also bore their contribution for the house at the time of 
the war so that we could live here now. And because we have the ability, be-
cause we work, we can finance them and ourselves. So that decision was made 
collectively, written in the rules of the association. The rules of the association 
were put into action and that way we obtained the approval [of the old people]. 
(Resp. 22, vice-chair, TSZh Centre 3, old house)
members of the association in this case modified the association’s rules 
to better suit their use in order to enable the establishment of the TSZh. 
However, there was another reason for exempting payments from the poor 
homeowners, besides pure kindness towards their neighbours. The home-
owners needed the association to be established and were acting on the 
basis of reciprocity. Generalised reciprocity refers to a continued exchange 
that is imbalanced, but “involves mutual expectations that a benefit grant-
ed now should be repaid in the future” (Putnam et al. 1993, 172). Here the 
poor homeowners were morally obliged to respect and take care of the 
common property. A favour was done, without expecting anything imme-
diately in return but knowing that the favour would be returned in some 
way at some point. Or, as the chairperson put it, although it may sound 
far-fetched to an outsider, the homeowners felt indebted to the pensioners 
for protecting the city and the building at the time of the Leningrad siege. 
In return for exempting the pensioners from the payments, they expected 
them to take good care of the common property. Thus, something was ex-
pected but it was based on unspoken agreement and, in monetary terms, 
was not equal to the repair expenses. 
They don’t participate financially. But they participate, so to speak, in another 
way. All in all, you participate in all the actions, participate in maintaining the 
things that we do, don’t break it, don’t write on the walls, don’t litter. Follow 
the order, don’t smoke in the entrance ways. why? Because comfort should 
be achieved together. And achieving comfort does not happen so that one day 
the lift is repaired and after half a day unsatisfied communal apartments’ resi-
dents break it. what we do should be maintained. -- we are always trying to 
solve financial questions only among those people who are capable of financ-
ing it, because inviting people who can participate in financing something 
and people who can’t, to the same meeting would be to offend and hurt them. 
(Resp. 22, vice-chair, TSZh Centre 3, old house)
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This is not, however, a case of pure generalised reciprocity. The deci-
sion to exempt the poor homeowners was forced, as there was no other 
way to achieve establishment of the association. The relationship between 
the poor and wealthy homeowners is not truly reciprocal, as it is not based 
on equal relationships, rather the poor homeowners are dependent on the 
wealthier ones. Despite not being generalised reciprocity, this arrangement 
causes the association to work better, so the effect is the same as with gen-
eralised reciprocity in that it makes the community more efficient than 
does distrust (Putnam 2000, 21). Even though this contract may not be an 
example of reciprocity, it shows solidarity between the better-off home-
owners’ and the poorer ones. In TSZh Centre 3 the homeowners were able 
to compromise, showing potential for cooperation and efficient decision-
making. According to Putnam, social networks and reciprocity “facilitate 
cooperation for mutual benefit” (ibid.). Similar reciprocal deals were not 
made in other associations. However, in TSZh Petrogradskii 1 one re-
spondent (Resp. 2), a homeowner and member of the board, suggested a 
similar arrangement in her interview. She felt that the poorer members 
could, instead of paying the housing expenses, participate by performing 
janitorial or cleaning duties, as evicting them would be impossible.
Some residents rejected the association’s idea because they were not 
overly concerned about the condition of the common areas. This theme 
is examined in more detail in the context of free-riding and participation 
and the ‘Soviet mentality’. Some residents had a generally negative attitude 
towards the idea of an association and were not even interested in hearing 
about it. This also indicates a low level of trust in neighbours and/or a new 
management system. This is a poor starting point for fostering democracy 
and efficient decision-making, as some residents refuse to cooperate alto-
gether. Thus, the situation was very difficult for those residents that wanted 
improvement and it took a lot of effort to bring the reluctant homeowners 
across to their side. 
… it was very difficult, many people were saying, ‘But why would I need a 
concierge?’ Particularly those who did drugs, they didn’t need a concierge, -- a 
lot of people like that. It took a very long time, it was very difficult, it’s … just 
the meetings, conversations, we went to the apartments, we explained. (Resp. 
2, homeowner, TSZh Petrogradskii 1, centre, old house)
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In the new buildings the decision about establishment was more 
straightforward: it was made in the construction phase by the construction 
company and was agreed by all apartment buyers. Constructors have been 
encouraged by the authorities to establish homeowners’ associations as 
they have been given the right to construction free of charge provided that 
a homeowners’ association is established in the house (Konserg 9 January 
2006). It is customary in newly built houses that the constructor then ap-
points a manager from a private company to lead the management, instead 
of or in addition to a chairperson. It is common that, after some time, 
the residents take over the management and replace the manager or the 
management company. In this case it is simpler for residents to start the 
management of the association, as most of the paperwork and bureaucracy 
has already been taken care of by a professional.
4.3. Membership and Social Structure of the Association
membership of the association, that is, who is included and who is not, is 
essentially important for homeowners’ associations. The boundaries need 
to be clear so that the members know who they should cooperate with, as 
noted by one of Ostrom’s design principles (2000, 149). Boundaries may 
help prevent free-riding in CPR regimes, by making it clear who can and 
cannot use the resources (Ostrom 2005, 260–261). However, free-riding in 
homeowners’ associations is a more complicated question. membership as 
such is not a controversial question, as a person who owns an apartment in 
the house is entitled to be a member. However, norms of cooperation can 
become blurred due to the membership’s voluntary nature and the pres-
ence of tenants, as non-members cannot be excluded from using the com-
mon property.
Voluntary membership can affect the association’s internal dynam-
ics. According to the Housing Code (Article 138) the association should 
make an agreement regarding repairs and maintenance with the non-
members, that is, non-members are liable to pay for the services they use. 
Thus, they have the same responsibilities as members but not the rights, 
as they cannot take part in decision-making. In some of the old houses 
(TSZh Petrogradskii 1, initially also TSZh Centre 3) establishment of the 
association divided neighbours into two groups, as some supported the 
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association and others did not. This division makes democratic govern-
ance difficult, as mutual understanding is hard to accomplish. According 
to newspaper sources as well as the data, the ones who object are often resi-
dents who do not have considerable financial resources, who have lived in 
the house for years as tenants and recently privatised their dwellings. They 
are afraid that the new, affluent owners who have recently bought their 
apartments will simply drive their own interests in the association and 
may even try to evict the poor ones (Peterburgskii chas pik, 19 April 2006). 
This jeopardises the poorer owners’ position in the house. This is one rea-
son why homeowners’ associations do not tend to work particularly well 
in socially mixed buildings. The difficulty caused by the varied residential 
social structure was outlined by the chairman of TSZh Petrogradskii 1 as 
follows: 
If a new house is built and where the area for sale is 1500 square metres, a 
fairly consistent social structure should be expected. In a newly built house in 
a newly established TSZh, it’s a whole different story. But in the old housing 
stock you find all this, like here, in the opposite, there is a communal apart-
ment … he [a resident] is sitting in jail for selling drugs. And one floor up lives 
an alcoholic, who barely walks, lives the final years of his life, so what? I’m not 
going to set myself the task of re-educating him; this task would be doomed 
to fail, why should I do that? Let him live his final years the way it turns out. 
(Resp. 1, chair, TSZh Petrogradskii 1, old house)
A homeowners’ association may also require registration from its mem-
bers (the association itself must be legally registered) and/or a membership 
fee. High fees exclude poor owners. The associations covered in this study 
did not have registration or membership fees, yet there were some tenants 
who could not become members of the association. In case of a rented 
apartment, the apartment owner, which in the old houses’ non-privatised 
communal apartments is the city, is the (potential) member of the associa-
tion. Yet the tenants’ position is complicated, as the homeowners (at least 
those in TSh Petrogradskii 1) expected them to participate in the housing 
payments anyway, such as the concierge’s salary, which was paid directly 
to the concierges. most of the communal apartments’ residents did not 
make the payments, either due to indifference or lack of money, which 
irritated the homeowners. This free-rider problem is discussed in greater 
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depth later. The chairman viewed the situation as extremely unjust, openly 
despising the residents of communal apartments, regarding them as a nui-
sance and “parasites”.
There already exists a clearly defined group of people to whom it’s no use go-
ing. Let them live like parasites then, I don’t care, I just … they live on my 
account, because I make payments for them. There is a group of people who 
make payments but the others don’t pay anything. But I, how to say it, I fulfil 
the goal that leads to improving the standard of living and security, they live 
on my account. They also get the profit, but on my account. --
There are different phases of development, forms of existence, there are forms 
of existence of the parasites, you know? There are the creators, users and de-
stroyers. There are users, there is that kind of group, they were born that way 
and will die that way … in life they never create anything, they just use what 
others have created, to hell with them, let them be. I will support them but my 
most important task is to keep them from bugging me, if they’re going to bug 
me, I will, through the court, I will sue them, that’s it, because the law is on 
my side.
There’s a group of people who are users, to hell with them … for me they’re al-
ready dead, you know, for me they don’t exist any more … I don’t need them, I 
don’t pay attention to them. (Resp. 1, chair, TSZh Petrogradskii 1, old house)
The chairman’s harsh attitude was a result of frustration at the non-
payers who refused to take part in financing improvements to the house. 
They would not listen to his or his supporters’ explanations when they 
went door-to-door collecting money for the expenses. The division into 
two groups between those who supported the association and those who 
did not also applied to housing payments: one group paid the housing 
payments, while another group did not. The heterogeneous social struc-
ture crucially affects the dynamics of the association. Residents’ varying 
financial resources led to disagreement in management and maintenance 
decisions. Poor residents would rather have the house maintained with as 
little money as possible, without paying too much for beautification and 
landscaping of the common areas. Here the differences in financial re-
sources and socio-economic positions prevented social interaction from 
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taking place. As residential cooperation has a longer history in this build-
ing, dating back to the house committee in 1994, the association could be 
expected to be quite strong. However, networking took place only between 
people of the same socio-economic group. Social capital was not produced 
between the two groups that seemed incapable of understanding one an-
other. The chair was not a bridging force between the two sides; on the 
contrary, he was strictly on the side of the ‘rich’ owners, whose interests 
he represented.
In TSZh Frunzenskii in the suburbs, the problem was a large quantity 
of small studio apartments, to which people were settled from the cen-
tre, from communal apartments or collapsing houses that were slated for 
demolition. In fact, one-quarter of the apartments belonged to so-called 
l’gotniki, people living on social security benefits.29 These people were poor 
and objected to the extra beautification that the other residents wanted 
the building to have. The reluctance towards improvements does not, of 
course, always depend solely on the residents’ wealth, but a lack of money 
is certainly a decisive factor for the poor ones. In sum, the problem is not 
the absence of clear boundaries regarding membership but the financially 
and socially diverse residential structure and residents’ differing interests. 
Finding a consensus was especially difficult in TSZh Petrogradskii 1. The 
poorer homeowners and the more affluent ones socialised in their own 
groups, and bonding social capital was created when the TSZh’s initiators 
joined together. However, bridging social capital between the two groups, 
which would cross the boundaries of income and social class, did not 
emerge.
4.4. Non-Payment and Other Disagreements
Non-payment is one of the most serious problems that associations face. 
The problem is significant in monetary terms, as the associations were mil-
lions of roubles (tens of thousands of euros) in debt due to non-payment. 
Non-payment is quite common in Russia, as noted in the previous chapter, 
and all of the associations covered in the data had some non-paying resi-
29 L’gotniki can be pensioners, war veterans, invalids or other sectors of society 
and they are legally liable to pay only 50 percent of their housing costs.
140
HOmEOwNERS’ ASSOCIATIONS IN RUSSIA AFTER THE 2005 HOUSING REFORm
dents. The same kind of result was found in the survey conducted by the St. 
Petersburg’s Association of TSZhs and ZhSKs in October 2007. According 
to the chairpersons and managers of the survey, non-payers accounted for 
4.3 percent of residents in the associations in St. Petersburg. One-fifth of 
those cases had been taken to court, with verdicts delivered for 36 per-
cent of these cases and 26 percent pending verdicts. The survey does not 
describe the situation regarding the remaining 39 percent of cases, which 
were perhaps still in the process of pressing charges.
Apart from deliberate free-riding, there is non-payment caused by an 
inability to pay. It is largely the free privatisation policy that entitled a ten-
ant to claim ownership of their previously state-owned apartment free 
of charge. This principle has ensured all residents equal rights to acquire 
housing and it has been effective in rapidly creating a large owner-occu-
pied housing stock30 But free privatisation has also created a group of poor 
homeowners whose property might consist solely of their apartment with-
out any assets to pay for its maintenance. These people cannot afford re-
pairs to their own apartment, let alone to common property. maintenance 
charges have risen steeply in recent years in order to correspond to real ex-
penses. According to the Housing Code, homeowners are entitled to sub-
sidies on housing payments but information about how well the subsidy 
system works in practice is lacking. None of the respondents mentioned 
this option in the interviews, which may indicate a lack of awareness of 
the system. However, housing costs in homeowners’ associations are not 
necessarily higher than in municipally managed houses. According to the 
interviewed chairs, costs can even be lower, especially if residents are pay-
ing according to the meters (schetchiki) that calculate energy consumption 
in the apartment.
Secondly, there are the ‘real’ free-riders, who deliberately refuse to make 
payments for the maintenance of common areas. Some only partially free-
ride, making regular maintenance payments, for example, but refusing to 
pay for certain repairs on the grounds that they are unnecessary. In the 
chairpersons’ opinion, deliberate free-riding is more common than non-
payment due to a lack of money. The chairpersons often underlined that 
30 According to the Federal State Statistics Service, almost 80 percent of the 
housing stock was private in 2006, (Federal’naya sluzhba gosudarstvennoi sta-
tistiki).  
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people who had symbols of affluence, such as expensive cars, complained 
of having no money for maintenance payments while little old ladies were 
paying diligently. Some people justified non-payment by saying they did 
not have the money, while some were openly indifferent towards the condi-
tion of the common property and its maintenance. 
- How do they explain that? Just by saying that it’s expensive?
- Yes, they say: ‘Let these rich people pay’. They consider rich people those, 
who are owners of the apartments, not communal apartments’ residents. 
There’s even one owner of an apartment who says, ‘why do I need that? I don’t 
need anything’. (Resp. 2, homeowner, TSZh Petrogradskii 1, old house)
Respondents feel that this indifference is inherited from the Soviet era, 
when common areas were owned and maintained by the city. According 
to that way of thinking, the public area begins at the doorstep of one’s 
apartment and does not concern the resident. The ‘Soviet mentality’ is 
a multifaceted phenomenon that will be examined in more detail later. 
Indifference towards common areas seems to be one of the most signifi-
cant factors preventing the associations from working effectively. Little or 
no improvement can be achieved if the condition of the common areas 
does not interest members of the association, as responsibility for the com-
mon property lies on the homeowners’ shoulders.
Our people are like that – what’s in their apartment, that’s all, and what’s 
behind his front door, that’s no longer his. (Resp. 40, manager, TSZh Petro-
gradskii 4, centre, new house)
whatever the reasons for free-riding, the fact remains that non-pay-
ment is common in Russia today. 
what comes to the people who don’t pay, I tell you this: at the moment a poor 
person doesn’t pay and a rich person doesn’t pay… that’s characteristic of our 
time.
(Resp. 10, manager, TSZh Kirovskii, suburbs)
Free-riding had consequences for members’ social relationships, caus-
ing disputes and tension. In the old associations, when the poor or other-
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wise free-riding homeowners could not or would not pay for the housing 
services, others ended up paying the missing amount. The chair of TSZh 
Petrogradskii 1 saw non-payment as a moral problem that other, more ‘civ-
ilised’ neighbours had to solve by paying the free-riders’ share. This kind of 
practice was used in other associations as well, such as the abovementioned 
case in which pensioners were exempted from additional payments. These 
associations therefore offered a kind of social protection for poor residents, 
although reluctantly in this case, without seeing any other solution. Poor 
citizens are entitled to housing subsidies from the municipality, however, 
so the association is not their only provider of ‘social security’. 
A more affluent, more civilised person should take upon himself the burden 
of maintenance … if he wants to win this, if he wants to improve his staircase, 
he has to take upon himself the burden of expenses … maintenance of these 
negligent weak things. Old men living the end of their lives, they’re not capa-
ble of anything, they can’t orientate… civil society doesn’t strengthen, they’re 
like babies, they’re totally helpless, they don’t understand anything, because 
the state used to decide everything for them. They’re not fighters themselves, 
they cannot do this. (Resp. 1, chair, TSZh Petrogradskii 1, old house)
Some chairpersons claimed that lack of time to go to the bank was one 
reason for non-payment. Paying bills in Russia is actually quite complicated 
and time-consuming, as one has to go to the branch of their bank at which 
their account is registered in order to pay. As Ostrom (1990, 98) notes, 
rule-breaking is a real threat to the community when someone breaks the 
rules repeatedly. For homeowners’ associations, long-term non-payment 
can obviously pose a financial threat. Usually the problem of free-riding is 
‘solved’ simply: others pay the share of the free-rider(s). In TSZh Centre 3, 
where establishment of the association required that others agreed to pay 
most of the housing costs for poor pensioners, this was made an official 
rule, while in most associations it was just a practical consequence of non-
payment.
As mentioned in Chapter 3, the nature of the infrastructure in Russia 
makes the free-rider problem difficult to fight. The pipes that provide ener-
gy supply (heating, water and gas) run vertically through the whole multi-
apartment building, which makes free-riding easy, as individual house-
holds cannot be cut off without damaging the entire building (Bychkova 
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& Popova, forthcoming, 17). The house’s infrastructure is therefore a com-
mon good: no one can be excluded from using it, while at the same time 
it is subtractable, so that one’s overuse of the hot water leaves less for their 
neighbour to use. All apartments are therefore provided with heating, wa-
ter, etc., regardless of whether they pay for the services. The alternative is 
for the whole house to be cut from the service as a penalty. This is an illegal 
procedure but, according to newspapers, sometimes still used.
The biggest obstacle in the prevention of free-riding is that there are 
no real sanctions for free-riders in the Housing Code, and the articles of 
association can only act in terms of the legislation, so they do not have 
much leverage to discipline rule-breakers. Sanctions for rule-breakers are 
essential in order to make the rules effective. The importance of gradual 
sanctions is also noted in one of Ostrom’s design principles (Ostrom 2000, 
151). when it comes to controlling non-payment, the associations are on 
their own as there is a lack of binding legislation to prevent it. This is a clear 
defect in the management of homeowners’ associations. 
- But surely you have defined the common payments in the articles of associa-
tion …
- In the articles of association it is there and in the law it is there but there are 
no sanctions. It’s all written there: you’re obliged, you’re obliged, but if you 
don’t conform to that, nothing happens to you, there’s no such thing. It’s writ-
ten that you’re obliged and that’s all, all questions are resolved in the court. If 
you’re not obliged, take it to the court, if you don’t want [to pay], for example. 
Our courts are such that you can litigate for years. (Resp. 12, manager, TSZh 
Centre 2, elite house)
Evicting a resident, even a rent-paying tenant, was legally very com-
plicated in the Soviet era. The new Housing Code has facilitated the pro-
cedure for evicting a tenant, as explained in Chapter 3. However, evicting 
a homeowner on the basis of non-payment remains virtually impossible. 
The apartment of the indebted homeowner cannot be taken into the pos-
session of the association and the association does not have the jurisdiction 
to expel its members. This situation has obliged TSZhs to come up with 
their own solutions to the free-rider problem, although alternative sanc-
tions are usually less effective. A common way to discipline free-riders was 
to restrict their access to services such as parking or the intercom system. 
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One association added a penalty to the debts of non-payers, although the 
chair noted that it did not necessarily work. TSZh Vasileostrovskii 2 de-
prived non-payers of the TSZh’s maintenance services, such as a plumber 
or electrician; only emergency service was provided as long as the debts 
were unpaid. TSZh Centre 2, on its behalf, sanctioned the free-riders by 
reducing the members’ rights.
we were all up in arms against her, so to say, now I don’t know what to do. we 
decided to exclude her as a member of TSZh and deprive her right to a park-
ing space. Really, I don’t know how to do it. we can take away privileges. we 
say that you are deprived of those rights, but if a person is that impudent … 
It’s difficult, difficult in that sense. (Resp. 12, manager, TSZh Centre 2, elite 
house)
The chair of the TSZh Centre 1 even cut off the water supply for one 
homeowner, despite it being illegal to do so, because she had not paid her 
housing expenses for a year even though she had the resources to pay.31 
According to the chair, the court process was very tiring and he did not 
even believe it would work. 
I fought by cutting off the water supply. It didn’t help, she put up with it and 
was ready to tolerate it for longer. She wrote complaints [to the authorities] 
that they are cutting off water, they don’t have a right to do so. Really, they 
don’t have the right to cut off water. Inspection came and said, ‘You’re obliged 
to provide water’. – ‘Okay, but is she obliged to pay for the water?’  ‘Yes.’ ‘well, 
you tell her that.’ ‘No, you have to turn to the court.’ And I turned to the court. 
And as a result it has taken three or four months already. So many documents 
are required, all kinds of tax documents, and I’ve paid a lawyer. It’s such a 
headache, I regret that I got into it. And she will be pleased as nothing will 
happen. (Resp. 7, chair, TSZh Centre 1, old house)
In case of continuous non-payment, a seriously indebted resident can 
be sued in the court system (Zhilishchnyi kodeks, Article 137). However, 
respondents say that the legal process takes a lot of time and effort and, 
31 The way in which the service was cut off was not discussed. In theory it should 
not be possible to cut off individual households from centralised energy supply.
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therefore, this option was rarely used, especially if the debt is not very large. 
This finding is supported by a survey by the St. Petersburg’s Association of 
TSZhs and ZhSKs, which showed that only 20 percent of the non-payment 
cases had been taken to court. In addition to the difficulty of the process, 
another reason could also be that the chair, whose responsibility it was to 
get the resident to pay, wanted to avoid conflict in order to preserve peace 
in the house. Secondly, the chair probably also wanted to protect her own 
position, which could be endangered if many residents turned against her. 
Pressuring the free-rider could indeed pose a threat to the chairperson 
herself. In one association the audit committee wanted to fire the chair on 
the grounds of faults in accounting, which the chair felt were only minor. 
According to the chair, the real reason was that he was pressuring non-pay-
ers, who were members of the audit committee, to pay. The conflict ended 
with the chair voluntarily giving up his position. This shows that financial 
and management matters are not always separate from social factors but in 
fact intertwined with the social relations among members. Smooth social 
relations are important for effective cooperation-based management.
Residents with minor debts are often persuaded by the chair or, in larg-
er associations, by a secretary, who calls or visits the free-rider to convince 
them to pay. In a couple of associations, court orders for debt collection 
were delivered to the most indebted residents (TSZh Vyborgskii 1). In one 
case the mere receipt of the summons, the threat of legal proceedings, had 
frightened some people into paying. 
I picked the 18 most remorseless non-payers and started to work on every one 
individually. Those who wouldn’t understand me got a court summons … we 
hired a lawyer. Some of them came immediately, instead of going to court, to 
settle, to pay the debt, including the legal expenses he owed. No problem, all 
the people started to pay (Resp. 10, manager, TSZh Kirovskii, suburbs)
Some houses posted lists of the indebted residents in boards on stair-
case walls, evidently to create social pressure to pay. One peculiar factor 
that may have encouraged some people to pay was mentioned in interviews 
conducted in January 2008. There seemed to be a common belief that if a 
person had huge housing payment debts, they would not be granted a visa 
to travel abroad. Despite the implausibility of this rumour – foreign em-
bassies would hardly have this kind of information about visa applicants, 
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nor would they care for it – it may have some effect, as international travel 
is increasingly popular among Russians, as it used to be very difficult in 
the Soviet era.
we hang court judgments to the information boards in every staircase, so that 
people will see. And some people get it and they’ll pay. And for the ones who 
don’t we will continue to demand the debts.
- Do you think that it may be embarrassing for some non-payers? That they 
will pay then?
- You know, yes, yes. we are counting on that, that they see the court de-
cision and someone will really be ashamed and some people are afraid that 
they won’t be allowed to go abroad. And at the moment, many people want to 
travel abroad for a holiday, some may even work there, have a joint company 
or something. (Resp. 38, manager, TSZh Vasileostrovskii 1, suburbs)
On the other hand, one chair noted that the amount of debt was stable 
and did not increase over time, as some paid their debts while some new 
non-payers emerged. Some indebted residents made payments every once 
in a while, making sure their debt did not grow too high. In this sense 
free-riding may sound like a relatively insignificant problem. Despite the 
occasional payments, however, the debts in some associations grew large 
enough to create financial problems.
-Are there residents who don’t pay the maintenance charges? 
- There are residents who don’t pay the maintenance charge and the debt is 
large. But it doesn’t grow like a snowball. It’s approximately on one level and 
stays there. One person joins the number of the indebted and one leaves it. It 
happens that a person has an apartment here but actually lives in another city. 
Then he arrives, pays and goes back there … So, we have a continuous one 
month or a month and a half ’s debt of maintenance charges, that kind of long-
time debt. (Resp. 30, chair, TSZh Vyborgskii 2, suburbs)
One continual source of problems for management is absentee owners. 
In new houses, the owner of the apartment might not actually live there, 
instead they rent out the apartment or have bought it for a relative, for 
example. Renting from a private person is still quite rare. According to 
a Levada-Center survey in march 2007, only four percent of respondents 
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in St. Petersburg lived in a privately rented apartment, whereas 29 per-
cent lived in municipally owned non-privatised apartments and 64 percent 
in their own, privatised apartment (Levada-Tsentr, 20 march 2007). This 
could explain why tenants in new houses were not mentioned by the re-
spondents as a financial or other kind of a problem. 
According to marina Akimova, most non-payers are actually absentee 
owners. A person may not live in the apartment they own and may not be 
registered there, or only one may be registered even though an entire fam-
ily lives there. Registration regulations are not as strict as they used to be 
in the Soviet era. The number of registered people does not always equate 
to the actual number of residents, which causes issues for management 
and maintenance payments. As some maintenance firms offer their serv-
ices, such as garbage disposal, based on the number of persons registered, 
it may not be sufficient for the association. Alternatively, the association 
may receive subsidies from the city according to the number of registered 
residents. In addition, many free-riding cases result from a person be-
lieving that they do not have to pay because they do not use the services. 
According to Ekaterina Sidorchenko, deputy of a municipal council in St. 
Petersburg, this causes a lot of disputes inside the association, such as a 
resident believing they do not have to pay for water, for example, if they do 
not currently occupy the apartment.
He says: ‘I don’t live here, why do I have to pay?’ I explained to the person that 
he pays for the maintenance of the common property of the house, and that’s 
why if you don’t live here it doesn’t mean that the lift doesn’t have to work. 
-- And if the lift has to work, it has to be maintained every day. That is, if you 
don’t live here, it doesn’t mean that the property doesn’t need to be cleaned. 
(Resp. 9, chair, TSZh Kalininskii 1, suburbs)
Here, two different logics collide. The homeowner believes that because 
they do not have to pay because they do not live in the house, while the 
housing payment regulations say that they are responsible for paying be-
cause they own the apartment. This is a question of individual’s rights and 
responsibilities for the community. Housing services are collective in na-
ture, as they are distributed to the whole community, the whole house. But 
the free-rider denies their responsibility by not paying and thereby harms 
the other residents, who have to pay the non-payer’s share. According to 
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the deputy of a municipal council, people often stop paying when they go 
to spend the summer in their dachas (summer houses), and yet another 
problem is the owners of premises of non-residential use, who often do 
not pay for repairs. The non-residential premises, such as basements, are 
often damp and in bad condition, which makes repairs even more crucial. 
Besides the non-paying owners, companies renting premises in the build-
ing can neglect their rent. It is common for an association to receive extra 
income by allowing a company to hang an advertisement to the side of the 
house, but problems have occurred in cases when the company has not 
paid for the advertisement.
The system by which homeowners are responsible for each others’ debts 
does not provide an incentive to pay. One neighbour’s non-payment may 
encourage others to stop paying as well. According to the chair of TSZh 
Centre 1, the number of non-payers in his association grew constantly as 
neighbours followed each others’ example. He claimed that there was very 
little he could do about it, as suing was complicated.
 
- And [the non-payment] has spread particularly because people saw others’ 
example or they’re not satisfied …?
- They’ve seen an example and the idea develops but they’re continuing to pay. 
Then sooner or later something happens, there’s a problem with communal 
services and a person calls to the housing services agency but they say to him, 
‘But you have a TSZh’. He explains that a TSZh is not in private maintenance 
yet, that you serve us. They say, ‘well, you have a large debt’. And he says, ‘No, 
I don’t, I’m paying’. ‘well, then, not you, but your neighbour has a big debt.’ 
Naturally, after that, he will stop paying too. But on the television they are 
frightening us all the time – we’ll evict, evict. (Resp. 7, chair, TSZh Centre 1, 
old house)
There is a psychological barrier that prevents eviction because of the 
idea that housing should be based on need rather than financial solvency, 
a concept inherited from the Soviet era. However, the current system, in 
which there are no effective norms and sanctions for free-riding, is not 
working. The absence of sanctions in legislation prevents homeowners’ as-
sociations from working properly and homeowners’ associations have to 
devise their own, alternative solutions to restrict free-riding. The problem 
of free-riding can severely complicate the association’s work, particularly 
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if there are a large number of free-riding members. Social capital, social 
pressure and feelings of responsibility are not effective enough to prevent 
free-riding if concrete sanctions are lacking. 
while fighting the problem of non-payment has primarily fallen on the 
chair’s shoulders, other conflicts and problems of the association were dis-
cussed in the common meeting of the homeowners. One of the CPR design 
principles also notes that conflicts should be resolved locally, in a low-cost 
arena. Besides non-payment, another widely disputed issue was parking, 
which has become a chronic problem in the city of St. Petersburg due to a 
lack of parking spaces. As the standard of living has risen in the 2000s, the 
number of cars has also increased in the city. Residential buildings often 
lack proper parking lots and the cars are just simply parked in the court-
yard, although some newly built houses have underground parking lots. 
In some associations it is possible to purchase an underground parking 
place along with the apartment. The lack of parking spaces is a particular 
problem in large houses with hundreds of apartments. There is usually less 
than one parking space per household, while more affluent households of-
ten have more than one car. Some homeowners were parking on the lawns, 
on plantations and flowers or in front of the staircase doors, thereby mak-
ing it difficult to enter, which irritated other neighbours. One respondent 
described the situation as follows:
Cars were left wherever, lawns were trampled, it was complicated to enter cer-
tain staircases. For a mother with a pram, with a child, it was practically im-
possible [to enter] with a pram. That’s why barriers to lawns were made, lawns 
started to be mown and cleaned, - in general, all services are being fixed. 
(Resp. 10, manager, TSZh Kirovskii, suburbs)
Because of the lack of parking spaces, many associations (though not 
all) started to charge for parking, particularly if there were guards in the 
courtyard, as usually was the case. Thus, parking was transformed from a 
common good to a club good. The non-regulated parking lot was a non-ex-
cludable and subtractable common good, meaning that anyone could park 
there, but the more cars that were parked, the less space was left for oth-
ers. As a paid, club good, outsiders could be excluded from parking there 
and it was non-subtractable because paying ensured that a free space was 
available for every member. Paid parking was also a good source of income 
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for the association. There was also the problem of outsiders parking in the 
association’s courtyard, which the associations tried to prevent or to turn 
to their advantage by charging more in such cases. For TSZh Frunzenskii 
the parking lot turned out to be a blessing. The amount of l’gotniki, peo-
ple living on social security benefits, was decisive in the association, as 
mentioned earlier. The association used the parking money to cover the 
deficit that the l’gotniki had caused; the association even managed to set 
up a meeting room, a gym and a children’s playroom in the house with 
the parking money. These premises, in turn, became further sources of 
income, as charges were levied for their use, again with higher charges for 
outsiders than for residents. The services were also club goods, excludable 
and available only for those who paid for them.
Another cause of disputes was the use of common property. In old 
houses residents often use common property such as attics and basements 
for their personal use when the spaces are not used by anyone. A public 
good was thus turned into a private one. This happened especially prior to 
the establishment of the association, when common property was a sort of 
no man’s land and not properly maintained. One such case was in TSZh 
Petrogradskii 1, where a homeowner had adopted the attic for her own 
personal use without permission from the authorities and without nego-
tiating with the other residents. Other residents felt the situation could no 
longer be changed as the offending resident had been using the attic for 
many years.
Associations have also experienced other problems typical to multi-
family buildings. Deteriorating water pipes have caused water damage, 
which sometimes led to conflicts between neighbours if the damage ex-
tended to several apartments. Insufficient soundproofing caused disputes 
concerning noise (examples include apartment repairs and noisy pets). 
These disputes were usually solved between residents without taking the 
matter into court. Sometimes the disputes were taken to the chair, who 
acted as a mediator to try and find a solution. These problems are not 
unique to homeowners’ associations in Russia, however, but the relative 
frequency of water damage points to the poor condition of the housing 
infrastructure, which is a common problem in Russia.
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4.5. Decision-Making
Decisions are made by the homeowners in the members’ common meet-
ings. Part of the democratic governance involves the ability of members 
of the association to participate in making and modifying the rules. This 
is also one of the design principles of a CPR regime (Ostrom 2000, 150). 
Besides the homeowners’ association’s rules stated in the Housing Code, 
every association has its own set of rules, the articles of association, which 
offer the possibility of more independent self-governance. It allows the as-
sociation to shape the rules to the purposes and special characteristics of 
that association. It was mentioned above in relation to TSZh Centre 3 how 
rules of the association were modified so that poorer owners were exempt-
ed from certain payments. 
Tenants, as non-members of the association, cannot participate in deci-
sion-making, although they do use the resources. In TSZh Petrogradskii 1 
the unequal position of tenants compared to that of homeowners led to a 
conflict between them and the members. There the communal apartments’ 
residents and homeowners had divided into two groups. In general, in all 
associations, the main problem is not that members cannot take part in mak-
ing and modification of the rules, but that the opportunity to participate is 
not great enough, because over 50 percent participation is needed in order for 
the meeting to be legally valid. The following thoughts about the low attend-
ance of a meeting were posted on one TSZh’s website:  
On the 25th of march a Common meeting was held. The hall was, to say the 
least, not full, and because of this the Board is struggling for the decisions of 
that kind of meeting to be accepted as legal.  
why such low attendance? There are many reasons. First, some homeowners 
did not know about the meeting because they are renting their apartments 
and don’t live there themselves. Secondly, information about the meeting was 
not sufficient. Thirdly, the staircase elders32 [starshie po paradnym] could have 
agitated us more actively. And moreover, probably because many people have 
become indifferent. That is, everything that is done in TSZh pleases them 
completely so ‘why go there?’
32 Large associations often choose ‘sub-leaders’ by the staircases, for example, 
besides the chair of the whole association, to facilitate the management.
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As a rule, common meetings are held once a year, although some as-
sociations have them more often and some have given them up altogether 
and only used voting to make decisions. In a small association common 
meetings may take place in the chairperson’s home or in the hallway of the 
house. For large associations the task of gathering hundreds of homeown-
ers into one place is not easy and they have to rent a school hall or other 
large space for the meeting. If there are not enough participants, the as-
sociation usually calls a second meeting and considers its decisions to be 
binding, regardless of how many members take part. Because of the low 
participation, some associations started to use remote voting for decision-
making instead, which involves distributing voting forms to the members 
beforehand and confirming the decisions in the common meetings. This 
solves the problem of low attendance but it might not be the best alterna-
tive in terms of the democratic process. Discussing the matter before vot-
ing, as would happen in the meetings, does not take place if the members 
vote beforehand. The manager of TSZh Vasileostrovskii 2 explicated this 
problem and used remote voting just once, to get members’ opinions on 
privatising the land plot. The manager valued democratic decision-making 
and said they tried to discuss (obshchats’ia) everything with the people.
There are various reasons why people do not attend meetings. Sometimes 
low participation is due to an absence of problems. when things are going 
well and there are no great difficulties threatening the association, people 
tend to get lazy and their interest drops. This was a common explanation 
given by the chairpersons, two of whom used the metaphor “you don’t go 
to the doctor if you’re not sick”. This is probably a future challenge for a 
growing number of associations when the situation in the housing sec-
tor stabilises and the homeowners’ association becomes a more established 
type of management.
Now we have a serious problem in our house. It seems that people are living so 
well now that they are too lazy to even tick a voting form, because they don’t 
have any problems … For us it’s a serious problem, because people don’t have 
any demands, but according to the legislation … whether we want it or not... 
not only we have to have a meeting every year, for approval of the accounts, 
but every two years we have to have approval of the accounts and primary 
elections, and people … they’re satisfied, they don’t go to the meetings. But the 
problem is that … for example, we are operated by Sperbank’s department of 
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our district … they treat the documents very carefully … legal documents of 
legal persons, for homeowners’ association, that is, the periods of validity, and 
when the period of validity is passed, they demand … ‘Record of the meeting, 
please … either on prolongation or on new election’ … But our meetings … 
one year we didn’t get the quorum, people didn’t come, another year we voted 
using the voting forms … and for that you have to go from door to door, but 
people are lazy, you know, just lazy. when we had problems, everybody was 
walking with slogans, posters …
- with placards even?
- Yes, we went out to say that we’ll overthrow the constructor, we won’t pay 
for the constructor, he doesn’t do anything for us … But now everything’s fine 
and that’s also a problem. (Resp. 32, woman, chair of a TSZh and organiser of 
training courses for TSZh leaders)
Another problem with the meetings is that the people who arrive are 
not necessarily orientated towards democratic decision-making. They 
might advocate their own interests, which do not concern other members 
and may therefore create general disorder and confusion. This indicates in-
experience in democratic decision-making and the possibility of a chaotic 
situation may discourage other residents from participating. According 
to the Housing Committee’s information brochure, surveys reveal that 10 
percent of the participants in common meetings are against the whole idea 
of management of the house, 25 percent are dissatisfied with the leader, 
nearly 60 percent do not really understand what is suggested to them at 
meetings, 5–10 percent do not understand any of what was discussed and 
five percent attended purely out of curiosity. According to the Housing 
Committee, some people try to use the meetings to bring up their political 
views.
Last year they had a meeting but now there is only the voting. Because at the 
meeting, you know, one arrives drunk, another who arrives is a fool, the third 
who comes understands nothing, the fourth just comes to shout. And it just 
creates a madhouse. And if an important decision has to be made … well, 
naturally, we have to get consent from the homeowners and residents. And we 
hold a vote, distribute voting forms to everyone and they express who wants 
what. (Resp 28, manager, TSZh Petrogradskii 3, centre, old house)
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we have common meetings following the articles of association once a year. 
But the last common meeting when we got together was last year in the spring. 
And from then on we decided not to gather anymore because in our house 
common meetings turn into political meetings and most of the people who 
arrive … have other goals, to take power, that kind of thing. The meetings are 
not constructively orientated. And therefore we decided to move to the voting, 
so that everyone could express their will on different questions and not turn 
all these things into a fight ... (Resp. 30, chair, TSZh Vyborgskii 2, suburbs)
However, residents are not always passive. when a situation emerges 
that requires action, the homeowners take part in the meetings. An ex-
ample was when the homeowners of newly built houses made an effort to 
remove the manager and start managing the association independently. 
In large associations the administration is organised at different levels. 
In addition to the overall association, decision-making takes place at the 
‘staircase level’. This arrangement resembles the staircase council, an in-
formal self-management structure that existed prior to TSZhs, introduced 
in Chapter 3. Homeowners choose representatives for the board for each 
floor and the chair of the whole association is chosen from among the rep-
resentatives. management initiatives are brought forward by the so-called 
initiative groups that promoted certain improvement, such as concierge 
service, for other residents. Dividing the management by floors facilitates 
management in large houses. In large building complexes with hundreds 
of apartments people may find it easier to participate on a level closer to 
them, by gathering together with their closest neighbours who live on the 
same floor. Thus, in larger associations social networks are not necessarily 
formed at the level of the whole house but rather by floors. The formation 
of initiative groups shows that joint decision-making increases network-
ing, even though the network does not include all members of the associa-
tion. Social capital is thus produced through these small networks.
Easy solutions can sometimes be found for residents’ differing interests 
and possibilities for paying extra services, such as parking or the salaries 
of a concierge or guard. The service was restricted to those who wanted it 
and were able to pay for it. This kind of compromise is not always possible 
of course, such as in the case of repairing the house’s piping system.
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Those kind of additional services are done totally with the consent of every 
person, that is we have to do a survey and if someone doesn’t agree with this, 
or cannot pay for the concierge, for example, that means these expenses are 
automatically transferred to the ones who want [the service]. (Resp. 5, chair, 
TSZh Primorskii, suburbs)
Although the Housing Code states three alternatives for housing man-
agement, mixed forms also exist in practice. A TSZh may hire a manag-
er in addition to choosing a chairperson. when a manager is hired, the 
chairperson usually authorises the manager to handle practical manage-
ment duties, whereas the chairperson is more of a position of trust. The 
chair’s position may therefore be only nominal but it is also possible that 
the management tasks are divided between the chair and manager. Thus, 
the manager may handle only practical matters or, in another case, may 
actually lead the association by being the main decision-maker, instead of 
the residents. In addition to a leader of the association, a chairperson or a 
manager, the association usually has an accountant or several accountants 
handling the association’s finances.
The chair is a key position in many associations. Particularly in asso-
ciations in which other members tend to be passive, the chairperson has 
a lot of decision-making power and in some old buildings was one of the 
association’s initiators. Some researchers have found that a characteristic 
of Russian NGOs was that they were based on social networks and cir-
cled around one person (Salmenniemi 2008, 41). One can also end up 
holding the chair’s position almost by chance. The chairperson of TSZh 
Frunzenskii had come to the meeting at which he was eventually chosen as 
the chair, just because he hand his wife wanted something to do instead of 
going to the dacha. The Housing Committee’s official, Oleg Vikhtiuk, not-
ed that the person who is chosen as the chair is usually the one who “shouts 
the loudest” and promotes himself or herself the most actively. He did not 
see this as a serious problem, as he believed that in time the homeowners 
would change the chair for a better one, if needed. However, according to 
a lawyer who specialises in housing issues, chairpersons are not always 
willing to give up their position, in spite of the homeowners’ decision, and 
can be difficult to remove. He described a case in which the members of 
the association threatened to leave the association (that is, sell their apart-
ments) if the chair would not give up his job. The lawyer then convinced 
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the chair to step aside. According to the lawyer, the chair is rarely changed. 
A replacement may be hard to find as the chair’s position requires a lot 
of time and effort and sufficient knowledge about management, but it is 
not paid because it is a position of trust (although some associations have 
decided to pay the chair). According to Vikhtiuk, there are some cases of 
financial malpractice and embezzlement by chairpersons, which can be 
hard to prove in the court. Although no cases of fraud by chairpersons 
were mentioned in the interviews, this of course does not prove it has not 
happened, as most of the respondents were chairs and were therefore un-
likely to reveal their own misdeeds.
The chair of TSZh Vyborgskii 2 described the chair’s position by say-
ing, “Like everything else in our house it depends on one person”. Karine 
Clément has also found in her study on housing and other type of move-
ments and organisations that “the key role is played by the individual who 
initiates collective action” (Clément 2008, 74). most of the chairs and man-
agers were very keen to activate other residents for the common good and 
for them to participate in the association’s meetings and other activities. 
However, some association leaders (who had encountered more difficul-
ties) had less faith in the collective empowerment of all the residents. TSZh 
Petrogradskii 1’s chair, who referred to some residents of communal apart-
ments as “parasites”, had no hope of all the residents participating. 
The chair is often a strong personality, a trait that may well have led 
that person to seek the position in the first place. Some of the chairs clearly 
realised the power they had, and either wanted to give the impression of 
dedication, or genuinely were dedicated to their work, fulfilling their duties 
even in their spare time. The strong work ethic may have descended from 
the Soviet era, when it was a matter of honour to do one’s work properly.
I’m there any time of the day or night, I come here to make checks at three, 
four o’clock in the morning …
- To check what?
- The condition of things. why are you surprised? That’s my responsibility. I, 
you know, say, ‘The chairperson’s task is not a duty, it’s a way of life’. I’m seri-
ous. (Resp. 10, manager, TSZh Kirovskii, suburbs)
I’m more active … without false modesty, more capable. I don’t stop, I move 
forward … (Resp. 1, chairman, TSZh Petrogradskii 1, centre, old house)
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without exception the respondents saw homeowners’ associations as 
being better than municipal management, and they liked to emphasise 
the differences. According to the manager of TSZh Vasileostrovskii 2, the 
maintenance service is better in smaller units than in municipal manage-
ment, which handles a number of buildings. For one manager private man-
agement meant being always reachable by residents and coming to work no 
later than seven in the morning. For another it meant that residents should 
be greeted on their way to work. In associations that did not have staff on 
emergency duty, the chairperson was practically always on call and was 
contacted, whether he or she liked it or not, whenever there was a technical 
emergency in someone’s home.
I don’t have an end to my working day or anything like that, I’m always at it. 
Because we don’t have an emergency service, if someone gets water damage or 
a light goes off somewhere or something like that, it all comes straight to me. 
In addition, the heating system is completely taken care of by me. (Resp. 30, 
chairman, TSZh Vyborgskii 2, suburbs)
Choosing a chair might also be based on other reasons. As Aurore 
Chaigneau noted in her empirical study on TSZhs in moscow, the person 
who is “available” often gets the chair’s position. According to her data the 
available person was usually the senior resident of the house, the one whose 
apartment was conveniently located in the ground floor, or a handicapped 
person who was always present. (Chaigneau 2006, 165 as cited in Alapuro 
forthcoming, 21). In St. Petersburg’s TSZhs a chair chosen on these criteria 
is often a pensioner, who has enough time for the job. The downside is often 
that this person is not necessarily the most qualified person for the task; 
they might not even know how to use a computer, for example, as was the 
case in TSZh Primorskii. That chair learned to use the computer in their 
spare time. In addition, the chair might lack technical knowledge, which 
might lead to poor decisions and lead to the risk of being defrauded by a 
service company. Vikhtiuk believed that, in time, the situation would im-
prove as a result of the education provided to chairpersons by the Housing 
Committee.
For me, it’s easier, of course, because I have technical and management experi-
ence. Of course, to manage a house, people have to be qualified. well, techni-
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cally, at least… -- I’ve seen that she [another chair] makes the decisions like 
the plumber says. But the manager, he should direct the plumber. He has to be 
listened to but the decision should be made by you yourself and not because 
you were told so. But when it’s not like this, here all the problems start. And 
they cheat you with money and everything, you know. (Resp. 37, chair, TSZh 
Frunzenskii, suburbs)
The chair or manager has a great deal of responsibility and must have 
a great deal of knowledge about management. There might not be anyone 
in the house who can offer guidance about how to lead the association, as 
people generally lack experience and knowledge about housing manage-
ment. Therefore, the responsibility of leading the association largely rests 
on the chairperson. The chair’s task can be very demanding and require 
quite a lot of dedication and effort if it is to be done properly. In particular, 
if the association has hired a management company, the chairperson has 
to be qualified enough to notice if the company tries to cheat homeowners. 
Although several voluntary organisations and municipalities offer educa-
tion and information for chairpersons, the legislation does not require the 
chairperson to have any particular professional qualification. The only re-
quirement is that he or she should be a homeowner in the house. Some 
associations have hired a manager in addition to a chairperson in order to 
avoid the risk of an unprofessional chair. A manager may also be hired for 
practical management duties, while the chair’s task is only a representative 
one. Thus, associations are managed by a variety of leaders that ranges 
from unqualified chairs to professional managers.
- But why do you need a manager [in addition to the chair]?
- If there is a manager and a chair, yes, I agree, that kind of question can arise. 
But the thing is that our chair, he’s retired, he has his own business, but it 
doesn’t take all of his time. And until now [before hiring the manager] they 
got by okay, but he said ‘I’m dead tired’. So many questions, so many problems 
…, a person is old, that’s our case. Another case could be that the chair is 
working, he has his own job, own things to do, and the manager is simply a 
necessity. (Resp. 28, manager, TSZh Petrogradskii 3, centre, old house)
The data suggested that residents were quite well informed about asso-
ciations’ events and actions. Bulletin boards that notified residents about 
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meetings, obligatory payments and TSZh’s expenses were usually hung in 
common areas. Some TSZhs (TSZh Kalininskii 1, Kirovskii, Vyborgskii 
1) even had their own TV channel and/or website to inform residents. The 
websites were more or less up-to-date, one had a discussion in its guest-
book page about parking lots, the design of the website and the possibility 
of changing the chairperson (which was generally opposed, as the current 
chair was popular). The websites mainly worked as an information source, 
providing the board’s contact information, minutes of the common meet-
ing, etc. Curiously, however, there was an announcement on one TSZh’s 
(Kalininskii 1) website congratulating a family on a new-born baby. This 
seemed peculiar for a house with almost 250 apartments in it; it was not 
a small community in which everyone could be expected to know each 
other. This could be an attempt to create a community feeling between the 
neighbours. In 2007 a discussion forum was added to the same website, 
with topics for discussion regarding parking lots and residents’ own no-
tifications, among other things. However, there were no messages, except 
for one administrator’s message urging people to discuss the hot topic of 
insufficient parking. It is possible that the residents either have not discov-
ered this form of communication or that they just use it to acquire infor-
mation, such as contact information for maintenance staff, etc. 
In one association (Vyborgskii 1) the TV channel was set up to facilitate 
decision-making. Because the association was so large, not all members 
could fit in the premises of the association, where the meetings were held. 
Therefore, the meetings were aired live through the television channel to 
the apartments in the building. The homeowners could watch the meet-
ing from their homes and ask questions by telephone if they so wished. 
Secondly, arranging common meetings in that manner prevented them 
from becoming chaotic, as often happens, according to the chair, when 
hundreds of people are present. In this case the association had success-
fully modified the rules concerning decision-making to suit themselves 
better. 
 
-- So that people could listen in comfortable circumstances to all the informa-
tion and not to make a farce of it, as meetings usually become political meet-
ings. Usually there are several sides and everyone starts to shout at each other. 
No solution to problems whatsoever. (Resp. 14, manager, TSZh Vyborgskii 1, 
suburbs)
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maintaining democratic principles seems to be a matter of honour to 
some chairpersons, who pointed out that documents concerning the TSZh 
were available for any homeowners who were interested. “we’re not a com-
pany that hides something, you know, we have open bookkeeping” (man-
ager, Vyborgskii 1). This may indicate a need to make a clear distinction 
from the secretiveness associated with the Soviet era or today’s corrupt 
companies. The chairwoman of TSZh Primorskii also emphasised the im-
portance of transparency, which the previous chair had not practised. 
we always fought with the previous chairperson. He was like a dictator to us: 
‘what I say goes’, so… a legacy of the Roman law; if I think like this, then it is 
like this. But that is not right, in what comes to TSZh there should be trans-
parency, openness. (Resp. 5, chairwoman, TSZh Primorskii, suburbs)
Transparency of management and finances is very important. Residents 
may feel the chair is trying to defraud them if they are not clearly shown 
how the housing payments are used, as experts in Nizhnii Novgorod’s in-
terview explained. According to marina Akimova, openness is one of the 
associations’ main problems.
There are chairpersons that have their own secrets and they don’t want people 
to know [about them]…
- what kind of secrets?
- well … like how he leads the meetings, how he handles the house manage-
ment in general. There are people who don’t want that to be common knowl-
edge. As a matter of fact, one of our problems is openness. For example, I told 
… Ol’ga Sergeevna, she’s our chair … that it seems like [in some associations] 
all [members] are chairs and bookkeepers, or the chair and bookkeeper are 
the same person, or there is one chairperson and all the others are bookkeep-
ers … (marina Akimova)
The low participation in decision-making can lead to a situation in 
which a small group of active people decides on behalf of the whole associ-
ation. The low level of activity from other residents gives the chairperson/
manager a lot of power, which is a potential risk for the association, partic-
ularly if the leader is unqualified or untrustworthy. However, not partici-
pating is the residents’ own choice, as all members have the opportunity to 
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participate in any case. User participation in making and modifying the 
rules collectively is important for a CPR regime and homeowners’ associa-
tions do follow this democratic principle. 
4.6. Participation and the Soviet legacy 
The word ‘Soviet’ is often associated with a variety of negative things, such 
as corruption, scarcity of goods and social inequality, especially by young-
er generations who do not remember or were not even born in the era. On 
the other hand, some people refer to the Soviet times with nostalgia and 
longing for the past, a time when they felt everything was better. In the 
context of housing, the term ‘Soviet’ usually has connotations of poorly 
built housing and poor maintenance. when it comes to people’s behaviour, 
the term is associated with passivity and an inability to take matters into 
one’s own hands. In the interviews for this study it became evident that 
people regard passiveness as being inherited from the Soviet era and they 
blame low participation on the rigid Soviet rigid system in which an indi-
vidual’s opportunities to change his or her housing situation were limited. 
Certainly, living under socialist rule had psychological effects but perhaps 
more importantly it has been or still is a question of institutional, rather 
than psychological obstacles. These two elements are not necessarily so 
easy to tell apart, as people conform to institutional norms and act accord-
ing to the limits provided by them. 
In the Soviet Union housing was owned and managed by the public sec-
tor but unofficially people used the exchange of favours with friends and 
acquaintances (blat) to improve their housing conditions when the official 
system failed to support them. Social networks were used to call a plumber 
privately when municipal maintenance did not react to pleas to repair a 
leaking pipe, for example. Even though people may be accustomed to find-
ing ways to handle everyday individual maintenance problems, they still 
lack knowledge about how to organise housing management collectively. 
The new housing legislation has quickly changed the old order of things, 
leaving many people puzzled because they do not know or understand the 
new rules and regulations or realise their role in the system.  
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- what, in your opinion, is the main problem, particularly regarding the es-
tablishment of the homeowners’ association?
- Insufficient information, in spite of all our efforts. And the psychological un-
readiness of people to take responsibility for the maintenance of their housing 
upon themselves. Unfortunately, not only in St. Petersburg, but also in Russia, 
and not only in Russia but all over the [former] Soviet Union … people were 
alienated for over 70 years from the idea that something belongs to them, that 
they are owners. They just used the dwellings and for everything answered the 
state. Particularly for people who have lived their entire lives in that situation, 
it’s very difficult for them to break the situation and change their attitude. we 
are counting on this attitude changing and we are taking not only rhetorical 
but also practical steps towards it. (Oleg Vikhtiuk, the Housing Committee)
As the quotes above and below show, respondents – both so-called 
experts and residents themselves – see the “psychological unreadiness of 
people” or the “Soviet mentality” as one of the main obstacles to housing 
reform. In addition, lack of knowledge about the reform was seen as a ma-
jor impediment to sufficient participation in decision-making and paying 
for housing services.
It’s a remnant of the Soviet era, of the Soviet world view, when nothing de-
pended on us. (Journalist, Elizaveta Dobkina)
-- The essence of this TSZh hasn’t reached people …. And you know, our Rus-
sian, still the Soviet mentality – here we have the state, something else we’re 
already afraid of, that other thing we don’t want. Like in one TSZh a lady said, 
‘As I have paid to the state, I will keep on paying to the state, I don’t give a 
damn that you have formed a TSZh there’. (Resp. 28, manager, TSZh Petro-
gradskii 3, old house, centre)
- Yes, they don’t pay, even though they are homeowners and people who should 
be interested in paying because this house and all this is high quality. But still 
our citizen of Russia has remained a citizen of the Soviet Union. (Resp. 15, ex-
chair, TSZh Kalininskii 2, suburbs)
Given that the new Housing Code came into force only recently, in 2005, 
many people are still accustomed to the municipal housing authorities be-
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ing in charge of housing management. There was no alternative to public 
housing maintenance in the Soviet era, only minor improvements could 
be made privately, if one could afford them. Furthermore, the exhausting 
state bureaucracy, waiting, queuing and writing complaints to get their 
voices heard made people tired in the Soviet era and may have led them to 
submit easily to the current condition of things, not having the energy to 
change it. The pensioners in TSZh Centre 3 had approved the situation in 
the Soviet era and settled for minor improvements in their housing condi-
tions, not expecting any major repairs to be done.
-- You know, it’s difficult to talk about ideas, because we lived in the Soviet Un-
ion, we lived after a scary destruction… on the one hand we were patriots, on 
the other hand there was the iron curtain. we didn’t go anywhere, we didn’t 
see anything, how ordinary people can live and use all those goods [abroad]. 
Therefore, what could we demand? we wanted it to be clean, for cosmetic re-
pairs to be made and after a year, they did that and six months went by and 
everything collapsed again. Children drew on the walls, there was no master, 
there wasn’t a person who would answer for this. (Resp. 26, homeowner, TSZh 
Centre 3, old house)
Not understanding the idea of the reform and the purpose of a home-
owners’ association is different from the deliberate passivity that is labelled 
as the Soviet mentality. However, these two reactions are connected to each 
other and passivity may cause disinterest towards reform. 
- But in your opinion, the main thing, if I understood you correctly, that in-
hibits the establishment [of TSZhs] at the moment, is the Soviet thinking?
- That’s one, yes, and simply ignorance of laws, of relations … including that 
people don’t know, don’t want to know anything and that pleases them. For 
them it’s as if it makes absolutely no difference what goes on in their house, 
and it seems, in the whole country people live in some kind of micro world. 
-- And for that kind of person the problems of the state and as a whole, TSZh, 
are not interesting to him, it’s redundant in his life. He thinks that a dirty en-
trance way doesn’t matter to him. For a person to do something, motivation is 
needed. -- Correspondingly, if a person doesn’t have this motivation for some 
kind of civic activity, then nothing will happen. Therefore, the main problem is 
ignorance, unwillingness, and also, partly, Soviet thinking. (Resp. 16, lawyer)
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This passivity may have negative consequences in terms of social capi-
tal. It can prevent members from networking and lead to withdrawal from 
collective decision-making. Participation is also a matter of trust, or a lack 
thereof, towards neighbours to handle the management, or towards the 
new type of housing management in general. The new management sys-
tem raised suspicion as, while things may not have been perfect before, 
there was an underlying fear that things could get even worse if the sys-
tem underwent a sudden radical change. This is the reason why pension-
ers initially opposed to the establishment of homeowners’ associations in 
their buildings. Following marc mórje Howard (2003), suspicion towards 
homeowners’ associations could be a result of general distrust towards or-
ganisations and institutions, typical in post-socialist countries. However, 
this view cannot be confirmed by the data, as the respondents did not indi-
cate general suspicion towards post-Soviet organisations. Residents’ fears 
of somehow being cheated in the new system are understandable, even 
reasonable. There are some dishonest construction and management com-
panies operating in the market and ordinary residents lack experience and 
knowledge about housing management. Also, if the house is in bad con-
dition and requires capital repairs, self-management may seem too big a 
task to handle without the authorities. Thus, besides fearing the unknown, 
poorer homeowners were afraid that housing charges would rise as the 
building would become privately maintained and repairs would be made. 
A revealing example is one elderly lady’s reaction to the establishment of 
an association:
At first it seemed to us that all this [a TSZh] is a totally untested thing, that is, 
it didn’t exist anywhere yet, practically. And we were somehow accustomed to 
it [the old order of things], although just tolerably, but we knew that there is 
the housing agency, where we can go if something came up. It could take years 
with them, of course, but still, there was the hope that the state would some 
day take action and start to renovate the house and take care of it. we lived in 
those kind of circumstances; there was water and steam in the basements and 
it seemed to us that to make all that our responsibility, we would sink with it, 
because it was in such a poor condition. That’s why the first reaction was, it 
can be said, a very negative one.
- You mean you were afraid of the possible enormous expenses?
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- Expenses and the fact that we were not even that familiar with the residents, 
with one another. who are they, this initiative group, in what direction do 
they lean, so to speak, what do they want? There was a lot going on at the time 
in the city and in the country… a lot of various fraud companies and all that, 
not to be thrown out, altogether, from your home. That is, there were many 
fears. (Resp. 24, homeowner, TSZh Centre 3, old house)
As Putnam notes, usually the “‘have-nots’ are less trusting than ‘haves’” 
(2000, 139), which could explain why the poor in particular are sceptical 
towards homeowners’ associations. As Putnam points out, their lack of 
trust is probably not paranoia but stems from real experiences of being 
mistreated, which the less privileged tend to have more than others (ibid.). 
According to the interviewed lawyer, poorer residents fear being used by 
the more affluent ones. They were afraid of being swept out of the way 
and evicted by the fortunate residents, who would rather have better-off 
neighbours. This fear is not totally unfounded, as in Petrogradskii 1, for 
example, some of the wealthier homeowners did wish that the communal 
apartments would be emptied and that they would get better-off neigh-
bours instead of the existing ones. 
Some respondents seem to support the idea of Russia’s uniqueness, 
drawing the conclusion that things are particularly difficult to change in 
Russia and what is possible in other countries cannot work in their coun-
try. The idea that “every country has its own destiny” is related to the old, 
popular verse that says, “Russia cannot be understood with mind” and 
“one can only believe in Russia”,33 which was repeated especially in the 
1990s, when the country’s economic situation was unstable. This makes it 
sound like people would settle for their destiny, not believing they had a 
chance to affect things. Respondents clearly found it difficult to have con-
fidence in the future, which is understandable, considering the turbulent 
economic situation and the vast reforms in the post-Soviet era, the conse-
quences of which are still being uncovered.
The Housing Committee official, Oleg Vikhtiuk, and the chair of the St. 
Petersburg’s Association for Cooperatives and Homeowners’ Associations, 
marina Akimova, spoke about the same pattern of behaviour, that people 
33 “Umom Rossii ne poniat’ - v Rossi’iu mozhno tol’ko verit’”, from Fedor Tiutch-
ev’s renowned and often quoted 1866 poem.
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either did not really understand their role or were not interested in the 
decision-making but wanted somebody else to decide on their behalf, as 
used to be the case in the Soviet Union. 
Some people come to the reception to write anonymous requests. we would 
say, ‘Please sign it, we can’t deal with anonymous [requests]…’ - ‘No, I won’t 
sign it, then something might…’ That is, people want someone to decide their 
problem for them, take care of their property for them so that they can live 
well, but without making any decisions about it themselves. (Oleg Vikhtiuk)
Today, for example, I had a conversation … ‘we have a chairman, and he raised 
his salary just like that’… I said, ‘well, did you have a pre-election meeting?’ 
… ‘Yes, but not many people go there’. The activity of people is like that: they 
don’t go to the meetings themselves, and then when it turns out that a pay-
ment has been raised or something… cries will start. (marina Akimova)
Although there is a general lack of interest in associations’ work, there 
is a small group of active people in each association. It is probably com-
mon to all organisations around the world that some members are more 
active than others. However, previous studies have shown that it is typical 
of Russian social organisations to be built on a small group of activists 
(Clément 2008). In the old buildings the association was created by these 
activists and would not have existed without them. The enthusiasts were 
very determined to improve things, although it required a lot of effort to 
convince their hesitant neighbours. It can be said, without exaggeration, 
that the existence of some associations rested on the shoulders of only a 
few activists. These activists were irritated by the indifference of some resi-
dents or opposition to investments in the maintenance, beautification and 
repairs of the common areas. It is not certain whether the reluctance to 
invest in common areas is due more to a lack of money or pure indiffer-
ence but financial resources are definitely a factor in this matter, which the 
affluent owners did not seem to realise. 
There is a bunch of people, who are very active, and whose heart goes out to 
everyone, but the majority, something like 70 percent, is still indifferent. For 
them it doesn’t matter, maybe it’s laziness to some extent even. (Resp. 5, chair, 
TSZh Primorskii, suburbs)
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It was just indifference, non-participation, they didn’t realise what it [a TSZh] 
is. Even now, many don’t realise and they’re not interested in it. The whole 
house rests simply on some kind of a group of people who take the initiative 
to maintain the common property, pay for it and improve their living condi-
tions and increase the security of their housing, that’s all. (Resp. 1, chair, TSZh 
Petrogradskii 1, centre, old house)
For me, as a homeowner, the idea [is important] that my life should be pro-
tected and good in terms of housing, I know that there are places of common 
use, where the responsibility of every apartment owner is to participate in 
proportion to the expenses for maintenance of the common property. many 
people don’t understand this, they think that there is their apartment… and 
then begins another world that doesn’t concern them. That kind of mentality 
applies to about 30 percent of the people here. (Resp. 1, chair, TSZh Petro-
gradskii 1)
Because people are not used to owning personal property, the concept 
of ownership and the responsibilities connected with apartment owning 
may be unclear. The chair of TSZh Frunzenskii compared Russia to the 
Baltic states, where, according to him, the reform was easier to carry out, 
as people there had been living under the Soviet regime for a shorter pe-
riod and thus had not adapted their social norms as strongly as Russians. 
whether the transition has been an easier process in the Baltic states can 
be questioned but studies show that problems similar to those in Russia 
have been experienced in implementing reforms elsewhere, such as in 
Estonia (Kährik et al. 2003). 
-- we were not educated about ownership, that this is common, this is ours. 
we think that our property, that’s only the apartment. That’s the general idea 
and from that stems all the mistakes. 
- And this mentality doesn’t change?
- It’s very difficult to change quickly. All our lives we were told that all this 
is common, that ownership was depraved. It was thought that if you were a 
proprietor, you were a bad person. In the Baltic States people lived for a little 
less time [under this regime]. I often travelled there, I had an aunt there, she 
was sent there during the Soviet era. I just saw and understood that people 
there, they [the Soviet power] didn’t have time to change them. They lived for 
168
HOmEOwNERS’ ASSOCIATIONS IN RUSSIA AFTER THE 2005 HOUSING REFORm
a shorter time… That’s why it has been easier there. But here the reconstruc-
tion takes longer. If you’ve been raised in one way, and then… That’s why it’s 
difficult here. (Resp. 37, chair, TSZh Frunzenskii, suburbs)
Apart from the ‘Soviet mentality’, one other Soviet institution may have 
had an effect on today’s situation. Soviet communal apartments were con-
trolled by one of the residents, who was the apartment supervisor (kvartu-
polnomochennyi) (see Chapter 2), thus there is a tradition of housing con-
trol by the residents. According to the interviewed lawyer who specialises 
in housing, this is the reason why today’s pensioners are active in the board 
of the association; they have “all their life dreamt of being in charge of 
house administration”. Thus, although the Soviet Union raised its citizens 
to be passive receivers, at the same time there was a certain, albeit modest, 
tradition of self-governance. while the Soviet system gave the people lit-
tle opportunity for decision-making, it did encourage residents to partici-
pate, in the form of voluntary cleaning-up days (subbotniki) for example. 
Participation was important as part of the communal way of life and the 
communist ideology. Community activity in voluntary work days contrib-
uted to housing maintenance and was politically harmless, unlike private 
management, which on a larger scale would have contradicted with the 
state’s policy of monopolising the housing sector. 
4.7. Social Relations and Informal Participation
Although housing management depends to a great extent on financial re-
sources, good social relations are also important in order for decision-
making to succeed. Social pressure can also push residents to participate in 
an association’s payments and decision-making. Close social relations can 
potentially prevent non-payment, pressuring residents to pay simply out 
of solidarity towards their neighbours. According to Putnam, associations 
foster closer social networks, trust and norms of reciprocity. Cooperation 
benefits all parties and strong norms prevent free-riding (Putnam et al. 
1993, 167–169). Considering how common free-riding is in homeowners’ 
associations, however, social relations do not seem to have this effect. Social 
relations are not close enough, especially in the newer buildings that have 
hundreds of apartments. As these houses were only built recently, their 
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residents have not lived there for long and have not gotten to know each 
other that well. In addition, some large building complexes are built slowly, 
in phases, and it may take time to sell them. Residents move in slowly, af-
ter completing the interior finishing, as new apartments in Russia are usu-
ally sold without any interior materials. As a result, a ‘community feeling’ 
is hard to develop in a half-empty house. 
In the Soviet era neighbours were an important part of one’s social 
network. Neighbours relied on each other frequently for help, to acquire 
goods, favours and information (see Salmi 2006). Knowing your neigh-
bours was also a question of security; neighbours could keep an eye on an 
apartment when its occupants were away (Salmi 2006, 153). The security 
issue is still relevant (Shomina 2004b, 8–9) but otherwise neighbours are 
no longer as important for daily survival as the living standard has risen 
and most people can afford to purchase goods directly from the market. 
It was claimed as early as the 1980s that privatisation and a greater focus 
on family may have made neighbours less important for the individual 
(Shlapentokh 1989, 179). After the tough years of the 1990s neighbours’ 
social relations are probably even less necessary. The economic decline 
that started in autumn of 2008 may restore the importance of personal 
relations but this cannot be examined through this data, which was col-
lected before those recent economic developments. Changing one’s place 
of resident was not easy in the Soviet Union, due to the propiska and regis-
tration regulations and apartments were allocated by the state. Therefore, 
moving was not very common and people lived in the same apartment for 
years, even decades. Now that neighbours change more frequently, they do 
not have the same bond with one another. moving to St. Petersburg from 
elsewhere in the country has also become easier than it was in the Soviet 
era. People coming from different parts of the country might have less in 
common with each other and less interest in socialising with each other, as 
the manager of TSZh Vasileostrovskii 1 suggests. One homeowner (resp. 
2) in TSZh Petrogradskii 1 also had a negative attitude towards people who 
come to St. Petersburg from the “republics” (the former republics of the 
Soviet Union).
Residents in the old buildings got to know each other better during 
the initiative stage of establishing the association. In newly built houses, 
association meetings and voluntary work days, one manager claimed, 
have the potential to bring neighbours together. The manager of TSZh 
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Vasileostrovskii 1 hoped for closer contact between neighbours, because 
like-minded residents are easier to manage and fewer disagreements can 
be expected between friends than between strangers.
what are the relationships between neighbours like?
- There are not many people who socialise with each other. It’s a rare floor 
where people visit one another. There aren’t close relationships like there used 
to be … well, I’ve lived in my house for a long time and my neighbours are 
also like that. Sometimes they say hello, sometimes not. And here they’re all 
from other towns, some have come from other towns, from other districts. 
Not many socialise with each other. But the voluntary work day brings them 
closer. After they’ve worked in the voluntary work day already… although 
they’re from different staircases, different floors, they socialise with each oth-
er. But no, there’s no close contact, unfortunately. I’d very much like to have 
that, very much. 
- why would you want that?
- Because when there’s contact in the floor between each other, there’s better 
order. (Resp. 38, engineer/manager, TSZh Vasileostrovskii 1, suburbs)
The chair of TSZh Vyborgskii 2 also shared the hope for a community 
spirit that would foster a feeling of responsibility towards the community. 
By referring to the TSZh as a “family” the chair implied that he would like 
the association to be more than just a management body. He juxtaposed re-
sponsibility for the common good with the selfishness of those who do not 
participate for the common good. He hinted that participation is needed in 
order for the association to work democratically.
People don’t realise that their neighbour is also a member of the TSZh, that 
this is one family … On the one hand there is the public housing agency, while 
on the other hand this is TSZh. TSZh is taken as this dwelling – this is TSZh, 
they don’t think that they’re all TSZh. That is the general psychological atmos-
phere. (Resp. 30, chair and bookkeeper, TSZh Vyborgskii 2, suburbs)
However, homeowners in some associations have started to participate 
more actively. One chairperson explained this as residents waking up to 
the current situation: 
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People understand that if they don’t do it, then who will? who will look after 
them? The state is not going to look after us. (Resp. 14, manager, TSZh Vy-
borgskii 1, suburbs)
Although participation in decision-making was generally low, the 
members were active in other, less formal ways. Residents were constantly 
approaching the chairs with ideas and initiatives for improvements, such 
as landscaping, planting flower-beds or developing children’s playgrounds. 
There was a continuous dispute in many associations between those who 
wished to beautify the courtyard, plant flower-beds etc., and others who 
wanted to have more parking spaces. In many associations homeowners 
tend to meet and socialise in the courtyard. The tradition of voluntary 
work days stems from the Soviet era, when subbotniki were ideologically 
motivated occasions34 in which the workers built a healthier environment 
together and participated en masse (Humphrey 2005, 52). This is probably 
the reason why the most active participants in the ‘greening’ or gardening 
activities (ozelenenie) today are often elderly women, who remember the 
traditions of the Soviet era.
we organise traditional voluntary work days in April, after winter. People 
come out, tidy up the lawns, plant trees, bushes, flowers… we socialise with 
those who take care of the flowers… people bring me seeds, show me what 
kind of flowers they have and we plant them. (Resp. 10, manager, TSZh Ki-
rovskii, suburbs)
while some residents showed no interest towards maintenance of the 
house or the association in general, others were very keen to improve the 
condition of their surroundings. Landscaping and enhancing the court-
yard seemed very important for them, in contrast to the indifferent attitude 
that prevailed before. many homeowners and chairpersons were proud of 
their well kept association and had a strong sense of belonging to it, the 
landscaping of which they had themselves participated in. In this way as-
34 Originally subbotniki had a more political nature. They were organised on 
Lenin’s birthday, for example, when voluntary work was done in workplaces. 
These days, which involved a few hours of voluntary work, were popular, may-
be because they often ended in a drinking party (Shlapentokh 1989, 100–1). 
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sociational activity created and strengthened social capital. Respondents 
of TSZh Centre 3 noted that the association had created community spirit, 
which had not existed before, as the residents had come to know each other 
only after establishment of the association. 
- Have other residents of the house started to get to know each other better?
- Yes, thanks to establishment of TSZh, now they know each other. Every Fri-
day we get together for a conversation about how things are, for a meeting, 
we eat and drink shampanskoe [Russian champagne]. It creates a community. 
(Resp. 22, vice-chair, TSZh Centre 3, old house) 
In the same building, which has a significant number of elderly resi-
dents, a ‘veterans’ council’ was formed after the establishment of the as-
sociation, in order for the pensioners to socialise with one another. The 
pensioners, who barely knew each other before the TSZh, were now get-
ting together once a week. Sometimes they had visitors who would talk 
to them about military history or another subject of interest, and some-
times they would just gather together for company. Homeowners would 
also get together four times a year to celebrate the establishment of the 
association and they would spend New Year’s Eve, the 1st of may and other 
major holidays together. In addition, residents organised an annual cel-
ebration to honour the well known architect who had designed the house. 
This association was also exceptional in the sense that they had established 
a small ‘museum’, which was actually more of an exhibition dedicated to 
the memory of the architect. According to the vice-chair, the architect had 
been made into a symbol for the association because the residents “needed 
to have something in common”, something that would make them feel that 
they belonged to the same community. Residents were proud of the fact 
that they had repaired the old house and there was a board on the court-
yard wall with photographs of the house before and after the repairs, along 
with text describing the process. 
The homeowners of this association, especially the pensioners, have 
taken action in other ways as well. They were present in the trials against 
the city regarding the proprietary rights of the basement and they publish 
their own house newspaper, called “Our house”. It should be noted that the 
house of TSZh Centre 3 was unusual, in terms of its location in the heart 
of St. Petersburg in a prestigious old house. The association cherished this 
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point of difference and the extent to which the residents identified them-
selves with the house rather than the association cannot be distinguished. 
Nonetheless, it is the association that brought the neighbours together, 
made considerable renovations and improvements in the house, thereby 
highlighting the symbolic value of the house and making the residents 
aware and proud of it. Socialising to this extent was not common in other 
associations, however. For example, the manager of TSZh Vasileostrovskii 
2 said that the association was about management and they did not have 
any get-togethers. 
These activities speak to the community’s relations and trust for each 
other. Trust has been accomplished through socialising in common activi-
ties. However, trust in TSZh Centre 3 did not extend to include the neigh-
bours who had recently moved into the house. These neighbours were 
greeted and treated politely but the old inhabitants were not interested in 
socialising with them. It seems that good relationships and reciprocity had 
been created within a small group of ‘insiders’ but that this excluded newer 
members of the association. Outsiders, that is, non-residents of the house, 
were also greeted with suspicion, as the next chapter will show. Thus, the 
association had created social capital between its members, who had not 
even known each other prior to its establishment. However, social capital 
here was of the bonding and inclusive type, created among people who 
were similar to each other, inside a small community. Bridging social 
capital, which would have joined different kinds of people together, did 
not emerge in this case. In TSZh Petrogradskii 1 there was similar bond-
ing within the core group of enthusiasts but the poorer homeowners were 
clearly outsiders to this group. 
In TSZh Kirovskii the community was represented with their own flag. 
This was the chairperson’s idea and the flag was designed in conjunction 
with the residents. To outsiders the flag indicates that there is an associa-
tion and to the residents it indicates that they belong to the same commu-
nity. The design and colours of the flag are the same as the colours of the 
Russian Federation’s flag, with a silhouette of a house in white against a 
blue background. The Russian flag and the St. Petersburg flag are hung 
side by side on flagpoles in the yard, next to the association’s flag. The flags 
can also be educational by teaching children the national and city symbols, 
which, to the surprise and disappointment of the manager, they apparently 
did not know before. This indicates the development of patriotism as well 
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as the promotion of community spirit. The flag was also used as a sym-
bolic boundary between the association and the outside world. According 
to Ostrom, symbolic boundaries may help to foster trust and reciprocity 
between members, thereby helping prevent free-riding (2005, 261). 
- So what does your flag symbolise?
- well, the homeowners’ association, that this is our territory. Notice that in 
the world, when a state is formed, including small and island-like ones, the 
first thing that it does is to create a state symbol… The president just talked 
about state symbols, didn’t he? we’re not supposed to advertise but to demon-
strate them, right? That’s why I talked to people about that … I had a conver-
sation with a schoolboy, I said: ‘Do you know the flag of the Russian Federa-
tion?’- ‘No’ - ‘what about the coat of arms?’ - ‘No’. He probably hadn’t heard 
about Saint Petersburg’s flag and coat of arms, and because of this we decided 
on our own signs of the TSZh. I said, ‘Let’s hang the Russian Federation’s flag 
and Saint Petersburg’s flag’. (Resp. 10, manager, TSZh Kirovskii, suburbs)
This shows that a homeowners’ association is not merely a management 
organ. Socialising between neighbours took place in an informal setting 
and bonding social capital was created among people in similar socio-eco-
nomic positions. Bridging social capital, that is, social ties between poor 
and wealthy neighbours, was not as common. A different kind of social 
networking took place in the form of the clubs (such as the veterans’ coun-
cil), voluntary work days and celebrations of national holidays rather than 
in less popular activities like official decision-making. Although a home-
owners’ association cannot and does not need to be a family-like com-
munity, good relationships between neighbours and a more closely-knit 
community do facilitate decision-making.
4.8. Conclusions
The data shows that although there are significant differences between as-
sociations, homeowners’ associations generally work better in newly built 
houses. The residential composition in these newer houses is relatively 
even and disagreements between homeowners of different socio-economic 
status are less likely to arise than they are in old buildings, where the social 
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structure of the residents is less consistent. The difference between poor 
and wealthy homeowners in terms of interests and opportunities to pay for 
the maintenance and renovations makes it hard to reach consensus in joint 
decision-making. The tension between the poor and more affluent home-
owners has led them to divide into their own groups. An example of this 
is TSZh Petrogradskii 1, where cooperation in the common meetings had 
not produced bridging social capital between the two homeowner groups. 
In TSZh Centre 3, on the other hand, there was no such division; instead, 
the more affluent homeowners expressed solidarity towards the poorer 
pensioners by exempting them from maintenance and repair payments. 
Although, in general, there has been tension between different socio-
economic groups, homeowners’ associations have managed to create bond-
ing social capital among people with similar social backgrounds. The proc-
ess of establishing the association and the informal activities, such as get-
togethers, clubs, voluntary work days and joint celebration of national holi-
days, brought neighbours who had previously been strangers closer togeth-
er. Neighbours did network with each other, although more in an informal 
setting than in official decision-making. Homeowners’ associations have 
thus fostered social capital in informal activities. The associations’ leaders 
believed that a sense of community can make members feel responsible for 
participating in decision-making, thereby decreasing free-riding (the non-
payment of housing services). Community spirit was therefore fostered by 
creating symbols for the association. Examples of this were seen in TSZh 
Centre 3, in the form of celebrations of the architect who had designed the 
house, and in TSZh Kirovskii, whose association designed their own flag. 
This had succeeded in the sense that the homeowners were proud of their 
association and proud to be its members. Social capital in an informal set-
ting does not directly contribute to effective decision-making but close rela-
tions between residents create a better foundation for cooperation. Having 
said that, inadequate participation in decision-making remained a problem 
and social capital by itself was not strong enough to prevent free-riding. 
Free-riding is a significant problem, which can arise due to a lack of 
money but also from indifference towards maintenance of common prop-
erty. Free-riding is particularly difficult to fight due to the fact that eviction 
or expulsion of the member is not legally possible. The absence of effec-
tive sanctions makes it somewhat pointless to monitor whether the rules 
are followed by other homeowners. Free-riding is a serious problem as it 
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creates debts for the association and prevents it from working effectively 
as a self-governing organisation. Associations have therefore had to come 
up with alternative sanctions for free-riding. Court action is rarely used 
because confidence in the efficiency and fairness of the justice system is 
low. However, sometimes the mere threat of a lawsuit has led free-riders to 
pay. Other sanctions have included denying free-riders certain rights such 
as the plumbing service or a parking spot. The problem with the constant 
shortage of parking spaces was resolved by making parking chargeable 
and regulated, in other words, turning it from a common to a club good 
to which only certain members have access. Although this did not create 
more parking spaces, it ensured that members of the system did not have 
to compete for parking spots. Pay parking was also an important source of 
income for the association that could partially compensate for the finan-
cial difficulties caused by free-riding.
A lack of participation in decision-making is another problem that 
homeowners’ associations face. The respondents largely blame this on 
the Soviet mentality, that is, familiarity with the role of a passive receiver 
of state-allocated goods and an inability to take matters into their own 
hands. However, the phenomenon is more complex: the system has left 
people unprepared to act under the new regime. In other words, institu-
tional impediments lie behind people’s behaviour. Non-participation can 
also be the result of disinterest towards maintenance of the common ar-
eas, which used to be the prevailing attitude when homeowners were not 
responsible for it. Rejection and opposition towards the TSZh, which is 
common in older buildings, can also be the result of fear of the unknown, 
a lack of knowledge of the housing reform and fear of being cheated in the 
new management system. while there are some passive residents, who do 
not take part in decision-making, there are also some very enthusiastic 
homeowners who are willing to make considerable effort to improve their 
housing conditions. The chairperson, who has a lot of power, is often one of 
the most active. A very authoritative chairperson may present a risk to the 
association’s democracy if he or she prevents other members from taking 
part in decision-making. Some associations depend on the activity of a few 
individuals, without whom the TSZh would not even exist. Apart from the 
residents’ relations, other actors, including authorities, companies and in-
dividuals, also play a role in the associations’ governance. This dimension 
is the subject of the next chapter.
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5. Homeowners’ Associations’ Relations with 
Other Actors
while the previous chapter analysed the relations and conflicts between 
homeowners inside the associations, this chapter examines the associa-
tions’ relations with outside actors. The key question is how outsiders af-
fect a homeowners’ association’s chances of success as a self-governing or-
ganisation. The term ‘outside actors’ refers here to all parties, both compa-
nies and individuals, that are in contact with homeowners’ associations. 
As the regulatory body at the local level, district housing authorities are 
important for homeowners’ associations, but management and construc-
tion companies are often in close connection with TSZhs as well. In addi-
tion, the media has a significant role in the associations’ relations with lo-
cal authorities. 
Conflicts and disputes with local authorities and housing companies 
can be severe and may appear to be quite frequent. The relations are not 
purely hostile, however, as the associations also cooperate with each oth-
er and with outsiders. The key player in the association, as the previous 
chapter highlighted, is the chairperson or manager, who is also the per-
son through whom relations with outsiders are mediated. Other residents 
may also play an important role, if they have expertise that is relevant for 
the TSZh, or are otherwise particularly active. In addition to conflicts and 
cooperation in personal relationships, this chapter also examines how the 
physical boundaries of public and private are regarded in homeowners’ 
associations and whether the privatisation and closure of homeowners’ as-
sociations’ territories could be leading to the creation of gated communi-
ties in Russia. 
I use the design principles of a CPR regime to help analyse how relations 
with outsiders affect the associations’ self-government. Clear boundaries 
(Ostrom 2000, 149) regarding membership and also the physical bounda-
ries of the association are important in order to clarify the extent of the 
association’s jurisdiction. This design principle is questioned by the unclear 
property rights that, in turn, make the boundaries unclear, as will become 
evident. Secondly, the design principle of conflict-resolution mechanisms is 
used to examine how disputes between associations and officials are solved. 
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According to this design principle there should be easy access to local are-
nas to resolve conflicts between users and officials (Ostrom 2000, 152). In 
disputes between the homeowners’ association and outside actors, the court 
of law is the obvious arena for conflict resolution. The effectiveness of this 
system in practice is examined through the data. Furthermore, a CPR re-
gime should have “minimal recognition of the right to organise by a national 
or local government” (Ostrom 2000, 152). In theory there should not be 
any ambiguity with this principle, as the establishment of the associations 
is encouraged by the housing reform and the associations are recognised by 
the federal government in the legislation. The local authorities may regard 
the associations differently in practice, however, and may either contribute 
to or interfere in the association’s work. In addition to the common-pool 
resource approach, the concept of social capital is used to analyse how rela-
tions with outsiders affect the associations’ internal dynamics. The level of 
trust regarding outsiders, networking and cooperation with other actors all 
contribute to an association’s ability to foster democracy. 
5.1. Property and land Registration Disputes
Perhaps the most hotly debated issue between associations and authorities 
in St. Petersburg today is property rights. This is an important issue, as a 
homeowners’ association’s main task is to manage the joint property, the 
common good. In order to make the association’s members responsible for 
the property, it needs to be in the association’s private ownership, shared 
by the homeowners and not owned by an outsider. The common property 
is privately owned by the association but for the residents of the house it 
is a common good in that residents cannot be excluded from using it. The 
common good is also subtractable, that is, limited. when one resident uses 
the good, there is less left for others to use, in the case of parking spaces, 
for example. 
A CPR regime should have clearly defined boundaries, according to one 
of Elinor Ostrom’s design principles, in order to be able to effectively man-
age the common good. This means having clear rules about who has the 
right to use the resources (Ostrom 2000, 149). This can be interpreted as 
including property rights, which are not always unambiguous in home-
owners’ associations. Particularly in old houses, the attics, basements and 
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empty apartments are subject to competition between the authorities and 
associations. The Committee for the Administration of City Property 
(KUGI) often seizes such premises, claiming them as city property. They 
became city property when the housing stock was nationalised in 1917 but, 
according to the current legislation, the common areas of the house are in 
common ownership of the homeowners and should be taken care of by the 
homeowners (Zhilishchnyi kodeks, Articles 36–39). In case the city is one 
of the homeowners, it is entitled to a share of the common property but 
cannot take the whole property into its jurisdiction. In spite of this, several 
property seizures have been carried out by KUGI, especially in the centre 
of the city. There have been cases in which the technical premises of the 
house have been declared to be uninhabited, registered to the city’s owner-
ship and then sold to private companies. This breaches the law, as technical 
premises are part of the common property and belong to the homeowners 
of the building (Ekspert Severo-Zapad, 43 2005). Over the past few years 
there has been a constant dispute in the city court and in the high court 
over whether attics are the property of the city or the homeowners. KUGI 
has been accused of immediately registering the attics and basements to the 
city as soon as it finds out that a homeowners’ association is being estab-
lished in the house (Novosti Peterburga, 14 November 2006). An interview 
with a KUGI official would perhaps have shed light on the authorities’ view 
on the property captures. Repeated requests for such an interview were 
made by phone and e-mail, but without success. The study must therefore 
rely on media reports and the associations’ side of the story.
The property captures are called ‘raids’, in English as well as in Russian 
(reid, reiderstvo). The term raid in English usually refers to a business raid, 
such as a hostile takeover of one company by another. In the Russian me-
dia the word has also been used in the context of eviction due to unpaid 
housing payments. This shows that the prevailing attitude towards evic-
tion, even when there are solid grounds for it, is negative. Forced take-
overs of private companies are probably the best known type of raid in 
Russia but private dwellings have been captured as well. Raids are based on 
claims that the premises are the property of the capturer, and often there 
are underlying economic reasons. Fraud used to acquire a private apart-
ment, which can also be categorised as raids, was described in Chapter 
3. Therefore, instead of apartments, the focus here will be on takeovers 
of common property of the house (basements, attics, empty apartments) 
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that have been conducted against the residents’ will. Apart from the above-
mentioned KUGI, private companies have also conducted property raids, 
according to the newspapers. Corrupt authorities may be involved in prop-
erty captures, by falsifying documents for the raid, ignoring the faultiness 
of the documents, or not taking up the necessary investigations to clear 
the issue (Obshchestvennaia palata 2006, 56). In 2006, over 40 people and 
three officials (two from the tax administration) who had connections with 
organised crime groups were arrested for organising raids in St. Petersburg 
(Delovoi Peterburg 5 march 2007).
The data included examples of severe property disputes that had lasted 
for years. These disputes are examined here in detail because they are not 
exceptions but examples of the property rights battles that are constantly 
taking place in St. Petersburg. TSZh Centre 1, an old house with a very 
attractive location in the centre, has had several disagreements on prop-
erty rights with the city authorities. The first interviews in the house were 
conducted in the autumn of 2005, when a private company had captured 
a former attic and turned it into an apartment, with the consent of KUGI. 
One day the company came to the house and broke the locks that the resi-
dents had set on the door. This is typical behaviour for the raiders; they 
simply break the locks and install new ones and throw out the resident’s 
personal belongings or any things that have been stored there. The home-
owners’ resistance led to a physical confrontation between the chair of the 
association and the police supporting the company. A dispute over owner-
ship of a garage had also taken place in the house. 
… there was a fight for a garage, which was also a disputed property. It was not 
even disputable, the garage wasn’t registered anywhere. It wasn’t the property 
of KUGI, it simply wasn’t anyone’s garage. And people came to take over this 
garage based on the order of the head of the Central district; and residents, 
there wasn’t a TSZh yet then… the more active ones, there was something like 
10 people, they opposed the taking over of that garage. we said that we, as the 
residents, we have problems with parking spaces in the centre and cars should 
be parked in this garage by residents of our house and no one else. (Resp. 8, 
member of the board of TSZh Centre 1, old house)
This quote accurately describes the situation in many old houses, where 
the common property seems to belong to no one in particular. In the prop-
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erty disputes, both parties wanted to make the disputable property private 
and exclude outsiders from using it. The proprietary rights of the garage 
were sorted out in court at the time of the first interviews in the autumn 
of 2005. The dispute over property rights of the attic had led to a dispute 
over a mansard roof as well. KUGI, claiming the attic was the city’s prop-
erty, had given two private companies permission to build a mansard roof 
on the house. Complementary construction in the form of mansard roofs 
is common in old houses in St. Petersburg to make use of the extra space 
in the attic. As mentioned in Chapter 3, there is a social movement in St. 
Petersburg called ‘Zhivoi gorod’ (Live City) that protects architecturally 
valuable houses from new construction. Building a mansard roof without 
the residents’ consent is illegal, as it means tampering with the homeown-
ers’ property, but this has not stopped the construction. Building mansard 
roofs can also harm the people living in the house during the construction: 
it can create water leaks or other damage in the house. 
Demonstrations have been organised to protest the construction of 
mansard roofs elsewhere in the central districts of the city (see, e.g., Ekho 
moskvy 30 march 2008). In TSZh Centre 1 the residents also organised 
a small demonstration, joined by residents from other houses, creating a 
total of around 50 people. The mansard roof case also pushed the residents 
to establish the association. In this case the common property was subject 
to a competition between the mansard constructors and the homeowners, 
who wanted to keep it for their own use. The common threat brought the 
neighbours together, as they had to form a united front to defend their 
interests, which produced social capital as a result. The social capital in 
this case is the bridging type, as the association is composed of a socio-
economically diverse group, which is typical of old buildings. Picketing is 
an activity that is not typical for a management organisation but is more 
likely to be undertaken by a social organisation. Property disputes make 
homeowners’ associations resemble social organisations more than pure 
management organisations.
Neighbours mobilised, literally, in the last few days, when this was heard, 
there was even a demonstration, on Saturday we went picketing against  build-
ing mansard roofs, and when all the neighbours mobilised, it’s like they’re 
more cohesive. You know, to take some kind of action, for a Russian it takes 
an extreme situation, and now this extreme situation happened and the neigh-
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bours achieved solidarity. But I wouldn’t say, of course, that everyone has it. 
But many of them, let’s put it like that. (Resp. 8, member of the board of TSZh 
Centre 1, old house)
In an interview approximately six months later, in spring of 2006, the 
association was trying to bring the house under the management of the 
residents but this was denied by the authorities. The chair was worried that 
a company would take over management of the house illegally, and he had 
a pessimistic view of how things would turn out.
A raider group wants to take over the house. They will establish their TSZh, 
another illegal one. They will legalise it in the registration body. And they will 
sell everything there is. That is, attics, basement, the land, everything will be 
sold. After that they will disappear, after selling everything. It’s possible that 
residents of the house will be kicked out in the process. (Resp. 7, chair of TSZh 
Centre 1)
The escalation of the situation into a crisis had further united the resi-
dents, who needed to be well organised in order to effectively resist the 
external threat. The outside force had thus affected the internal dynamics 
of the association, bringing the residents together.
- How are residents taking this situation?
- Everybody’s against it.
- But did it in some way bring you together?
- Yes. Yes, of course. we were united already before that but now we are even 
more. we live amicably together. we gather together constantly. we are mak-
ing plans of action. we don’t have much power, because we don’t have much 
money. we are considering paying a bribe to the court. (Resp. 7, chair of TSZh 
Centre 1, interview in may 2006)
The chair thus believed the conflict could be solved with money, by 
paying a bribe, which shows that his trust in the justice system is low. Not 
trusting that a dispute could be fairly solved in court was common among 
the respondents, as noted in the previous chapter in the context of free-
riding. Trust in the justice system in general is low in Russia. In a Levada-
Tsentr study from 2006, only 25 percent of respondents answered “yes” 
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to the question “Do you feel you are protected by the law?” compared to 
68 percent who answered “no” and seven percent who were undecided. 
In response to the question “Are there groups in Russia today that think 
they are above the law, and who are they?” 59 percent indicated the public 
authorities, 52 percent responded “people with a lot of money”, 41 per-
cent opted for politicians and 41 percent nominated power structures, such 
as the police and tax authorities. Sixteen percent felt that neither people 
in power nor ordinary people follow the law (Levada-Tsentr, Problemy 
demokratii). This low degree of trust in the justice system can prevent 
homeowners’ associations from suing free-riders or taking property right 
disputes with authorities to court. Furthermore, scholars have noted that 
court proceedings tend to be slow and verdicts may be enforced and unjust 
(Volkov 2002, 46–47). And even though the court might rule in favour of 
the complainant, the decision may not necessarily be honoured and car-
ried out in practice (Clément 2007b). 
Although the external intervention had brought the residents of TSZh 
Centre 1 together and fostered bridging social capital between them, their 
unification was hindered by the complex spatial and social structure of 
the house. The house was relatively large, with several points of entry into 
the courtyards, from two streets. Some apartments were owned by private 
companies, some by the city and there were also non-privatised or partly 
privatised35 communal apartments. Although some of the apartments be-
long to the city, the city is just one of the owners and being a co-owner does 
not justify taking over the common property. Further, some of the home-
owners were very poor, while others were very wealthy and had differing 
interests, which decreased their motivation to join together. 
The chair and the other interviewed homeowner were disappointed in 
the other homeowners, who they said were scared to take action against the 
authorities and to openly show their discontent. These other homeowners 
were reluctant to intervene when a company came to take ownership of the 
apartment, for example, and they did not want to place placards declaring 
their opinion in their windows, as the chair had suggested. The residents’ 
solidarity did not last long: in a follow-up interview in 2008 it was revealed 
35 Partly privatised means that some rooms of the apartment were privatised, 
while others were not. Privatisation of a communal apartment room was pos-
sible in the first years of privatisation.
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that the mansard lawsuit was still continuing but there were not many resi-
dents backing up the chair because most had lost interest in the dispute. 
The chair of TSZh Centre 1 saw management of the house as a one-man job 
or a task for an inside group, not trusting all the residents to participate. In 
this association, the shared difficulties had originally brought the residents 
together and united them but most of the residents’ interest had waned as 
the dispute continued for years. Thus, the peak moment of togetherness 
passed quite quickly. This is not surprising, as it requires a lot of effort to 
continue the battle for years. Instead, it can be seen as an accomplishment 
that residents were gathered together in the first place.
The seriousness of the dispute is illustrated by an incident that took 
place in autumn of 2006. The chair was attacked and stabbed in the back 
by two men, without being robbed. The chair himself was certain that the 
attack was due to the property dispute and although the connection cannot 
be proved, it seems very probable considering the circumstances. Several 
newspapers and websites reported the murder attempt, which he survived 
only due to good luck. In a follow-up interview in January 2008 he said 
he was constantly receiving death threats by phone, which he saw as an 
attempt to pressure him to give up the mansard roof case. In his attempt 
to preserve the property rights the chairperson had also become active in 
the movement of Civil Initiatives (GDI), which is related to the Regional 
Party of Communists (RPK). According to one newspaper, another simi-
lar attack took place in December 2007 against another chairperson, also 
related to a property dispute (Konserg 11 January 2008).  
Possibly connected with the property disputes was the authorities’ 
attempt to liquidate the entire association in the spring of 2006. A self-
governing system should have recognition from the national or local gov-
ernment that should otherwise not interfere in the CPR regime’s work, as 
also stated in one of the design principles (Ostrom 2000, 152), but this 
is not the case here, as the authorities have questioned the association’s 
legitimacy. The city claimed that the association had been established on 
false grounds, alleging that not all of its members were homeowners. The 
authority that made these claims was not specified by the chair but the 
liquidation was brought forward by the prosecutor. The chair’s view was 
that economic forces drive the authorities and their actions are based on 
commercial reasons.
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There are no homeowners in our house. In our house there are no homeown-
ers, as it turned out, not one. Because all our certificates of ownership are 
illegal.
-- On the grounds that not all members of the board are homeowners in this 
house.
In other words they are breaching the law. On the grounds that when TSZh 
was established 50 percent [agreement] was not reached. when the TSZh was 
established… and everything else they were claiming. All arguments of the 
prosecutor are false. But we will fight them in court. It will take 10 years. But 
the [current] TSZh will be liquidated already now. And another kind of TSZh 
will be established. (Resp. 7, chair of TSZh Centre 1)
The authorities had impugned the legitimacy of the association on 
three counts (despite the association having been legally registered before). 
It is difficult to estimate the validity of these claims having only heard the 
residents’ side of the story and not the authorities’. According to the home-
owners, the authorities’ first claim was that the residents had false docu-
ments of ownership and were not legal apartment owners, only residents. 
Secondly, they claimed that “not all members of the board are homeown-
ers”. The third claim was that majority support to establish the associa-
tion was not reached. This contradicts one resident’s story about how the 
residents made an effort to acquire the support, and in his words, finally 
achieved it. 
The most interesting question in this case is what the city’s interest in 
the house is and why the authorities are trying to liquidate the association. 
According to the chair, the city’s allegations were false and stemmed from 
their attempt to find grounds to liquidate the association and sell the house 
to a private company. In this sense the local authorities have a negative at-
titude towards the homeowners’ associations because they did not expect 
them to gain that much power. In the chair’s opinion the city is conducting 
the property captures due to a shortage of money. It is possible that, as the 
chair suggested, the liquidation demands are grounded on the commercial 
interest of the house, which is located in the historical centre of the city. 
On the other hand, according to the Housing Committee’s vice-president, 
Vladimir Gaidei, there have been cases of associations that were estab-
lished illegally, in ways mentioned above, which have later been liquidated 
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following complaints by residents. In this case, however, the liquidation 
attempt was not based on the demand of any resident.
Disputes with outsiders can also affect the relationships inside the as-
sociation. The external and internal aspects overlapped in TSZh Centre 
1, where the mansard roof case had caused a feud between the chair and 
one affluent family. The situation was quite tense; the family had sued the 
chair on the grounds of violating their property and the family were refus-
ing to pay the maintenance charges as a form of protest. According to the 
chair, he was removing the family’s property from a garage following a de-
cision made at a common meeting because of the family’s unpaid charges. 
The chair said that the lawsuit was generated to get rid of him because 
the family supported the mansard construction. In November 2008 the 
situation was that the St. Petersburg’s Committee on city-planning and 
architecture (KGA) had stated, based on a court decision, that the roof on 
top of the attic in TSZh Centre 1 was the homeowners’ common property 
and therefore the mansard could not be built without the homeowners’ 
consent. However, it is possible that the dispute will continue if the losing 
party disagrees with the decision.
TSZh Centre 3, also located in an old house in the centre, had a similar 
disagreement with KUGI regarding the proprietary rights of a basement. 
According to KUGI, it was the city’s property, while the association con-
sidered it as the stone base of the house, and therefore the property of the 
homeowners. The association had placed a heating system in the basement, 
which was then removed when the city took the premises for its use. This 
was especially upsetting to the residents, as it meant a considerable de-
crease in the heating efficiency of the house during winter. A lawsuit was 
ongoing at the time of the interview, in may 2006. 
These property disputes and seizures have been presented above because 
they are not rare, isolated occurrences, but represent cases that are con-
tinually happening in St. Petersburg. Although the case in TSZh Centre 1 
culminated in an extreme conflict, perhaps due to the location of the house 
and persistent opposition by its chair, property captures by the city author-
ities and private companies are not uncommon in the city. The boundaries 
of the association are not unambiguously clear, therefore, as the associa-
tions compete for the proprietary rights with the city authorities. 
Another problematic issue concerns proprietary rights of the land plot 
underneath and around the house. The land plot on which the associa-
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tion is located is given to the shared ownership of the homeowners free of 
charge, as stated in the 1996 Law on Homeowners’ Associations (Article 
11). In the new legislation, Article 16 of the Law on Implementation of the 
Housing Code (O vvedenie v deistvie Zhilishchnogo kodeksa RF) corre-
sponds to the 1996 law, which states that the land plot can be registered to 
the homeowners’ shared property. In St. Petersburg, requests for privatisa-
tion are submitted to the Committee for Land Resources, KZR, while bor-
ders for the land plot are defined by the Committee for the Administration 
of City Property (KUGI), which is also the organ that collects rent from 
non-privatised land plots. Registration of the land has proven to be a com-
plicated process, often hindered by bureaucracy and, according to the as-
sociations and the media, the reluctance of authorities to give up the land. 
Historically, land has largely been publicly owned in Russia, starting from 
the Tsarist era. Nevertheless, legal prerequisites for owning private land 
exist nowadays. 
From the point of view of self-government, the land plot is very important, 
a precondition for effective management of the association. In order to be an 
actual self-governing entity, the association needs full jurisdiction of its terri-
tory. The land is capital that can be rented and used according to the owner’s 
decision, which makes ownership of the land financially important for the 
association. Privatising the land plot was also important for the homeown-
ers in order to avoid any other party – the city, a neighbouring building or a 
company – profiting from the land through construction or rental.
First of all it’s more affordable, the land tax is much cheaper than the rent. Sec-
ondly, not to have any demands on the part of the city in the future. If it’s their 
land, the city can put benches there or a public toilet, things like that. Or some 
neighbouring houses, this is a suburban area36 after all. (Resp. 12, manager of 
TSZh Centre 2, new, elite house)
The associations that had initiated the privatisation had discovered that 
it was a long and bureaucratic process that had taken between one year 
and over three years to complete. Documents are handed out slowly and, 
36 The association is located in a one of the central districts of the city, but in a 
quiet, even remote area, which is why the chair considered it to be in the sub-
urbs.
188
HOmEOwNERS’ ASSOCIATIONS IN RUSSIA AFTER THE 2005 HOUSING REFORm
according to marina Akimova, the chair of the St. Petersburg’s Association 
of Homeowners’ Associations and Cooperatives, this is because the au-
thorities do not want to lose a valuable land plot that could be exploited by 
the city by constructing, renting or selling it (Ekspert Severo-Zapad 43/05). 
At the time of the fieldwork, some associations were in the middle of the 
process, while some had decided not to go through with it at all, as it was 
so complicated and they considered the land tax too expensive (in reality 
the land tax should not be much higher than the rent). In 2004 the legisla-
tion was changed so that registration of the land to the shared ownership 
of the homeowners now requires the written consent of all homeowners. 
According to the chair of TSZh Kalininskii this can be hard to obtain 
because participation in common meetings tends to be low and some of 
the owners live in other locations and are not registered to the apartment. 
These people are difficult to contact as the chair might not know where they 
live. Changes in legislation can also hinder registration. Two associations 
had started the process when the old Law on Homeowners’ Associations 
was still in effect but the process slowed down once the new Housing Code 
came into force. 
Clear boundaries are one prerequisite for the effective management 
of common property. At first glance a housing association seems to be a 
clearer case of a common-pool regime than many natural resources to 
which examination CPR theory is often applied. The boundaries of a natu-
ral resource may be more difficult to define, whereas the boundaries of an 
association seem to land nicely at the courtyard or front door of the house. 
In practice, however, the question of where exactly the association’s bound-
aries should be drawn, concerning the land plot as well as the premises 
of the house, is often disputed between the associations and the local au-
thorities. One of the interviewed experts, mikhail Amosov, the Yabloko 
party’s deputy in the St. Petersburg Legislative Assembly and leader of the 
Assembly’s Commission on city management, says that disputes concern-
ing borders often arise when the associations want to privatise a larger unit 
of land, not just under the house but the surrounding area as well. 
On the other hand, according to Oleg Vikhtiuk, the St. Petersburg 
Housing Committee official, specialists of the Committee for Land 
Resources (KZR) and the Committee on City Planning and Architecture 
(KGA) are trying to register a smaller land plot than the norm. According 
to Vikhtiuk, the norms for measures of land plots are set at the federal level 
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but for some reason these norms are not applied in St. Petersburg. This 
shows that the implementation of a federal regulation at the local level is 
not always simple, as local regulations or the actions of local authorities 
may contradict with the federal regulations. There are contradicting views 
between the local authorities and associations as to exactly what area is 
part of the association’s property. The extent of the associations’ borders 
seems to be the main area of dispute in the process of transferring the 
land’s proprietary right. 
Furthermore, if a neighbouring house registers the land plot before an-
other neighbour, it might get a larger share and extend its property closer 
to the other house, perhaps by setting up a parking lot, for example (Aif 
Peterburg, 30 November 2005). This had not happened to any of the asso-
ciations used in the data. marina Akimova explained the difficulty of the 
land issue by saying that the authorities do not execute land subdivision 
for settling the boundaries because it is an expensive process. Thus, some 
of the city authorities seem to be intentionally preventing the land reg-
istration, compromising the association’s position as a self-governing en-
tity. Depriving residents of the means for self-government contradicts the 
housing reform’s idea of empowering residents to handle housing manage-
ment independently. This is also against the design principle concerning 
recognition of the association by authorities and allowing the associations 
to operate independently. Although the associations are officially recog-
nised in the legislation and by the federal government, the local authorities 
do not always respect their self-government or provide the means neces-
sary for it.
5.2. technical Problems and Relations with Private 
Companies 
I used to think that in new houses everyone lives happily because there are 
almost no problems, no damage or anything. Now it has turned out that there 
are so many problems! And so often they want to dismiss the constructor that 
manages the house, who won’t let them do that, and there are so many prob-
lems because of how it all has been constructed, overall… because everything 
breaks down. (marina Akimova)
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Although newly built houses do not have the problems with commu-
nal apartments and mixed ownership structure that the older houses have, 
they do have difficulties with various technical problems and disputes with 
private management companies. Poorly built housing seems to have long 
been a feature of Russian housing, starting from the ‘khrushchevki’ of 
the 1950s. Of course, not all new construction can be generalised as being 
of low quality, and the so-called elite houses in particular can be of very 
high quality. But in the ‘economy class’ houses, which most of the data’s 
TSZhs represent, construction flaws were common. Although the newly 
built houses are not on the verge of collapsing like some old buildings, in 
need of repairs that have been neglected for decades, building defects in 
terms of piping or insulation, for example, are very common. Often the as-
sociation changes the pipes and roofs for better quality ones within only a 
couple of years of construction, which means that it can be difficult to keep 
the association’s common property in good condition. many respondents 
mentioned the poor quality of construction, which has “not yet reached a 
very high level”, expecting that the situation may improve in the future. 
The chair of one association, whose house was built two or three years ago, 
described the situation as follows:
The first thing that has to be repaired is the roofs … soft roofs, next risers, 
pipes and so on. I have already started to switch pipes. It seems that the sup-
pliers fooled the constructor on the quality of the pipes and the zinc pipes 
have already started to show signs of wearing off, corrosion, they corrode... I 
have already changed two riser pipes (Resp. 10, manager of TSZh Kirovskii, 
suburbs, new house)
The building defects and technical problems can be divisive and cause 
disputes between the constructor and the association. The constructor is 
legally obliged to fix building defects free of charge during the guarantee 
period. However, it is not always easy to get the company to pay. Big con-
struction companies seemed well prepared and protected from residents’ 
complaints and are powerful actors compared with the non-professional 
associations.
- But during the guarantee period the constructor should …
- So far we have not received anything from them. 
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- Have you tried?
- we’ve tried. we’ve written letters. There’s a lot… the roof is done poorly, and 
for the roof we called architects here… Representatives of the company did 
not come, of course, but we put up an act ourselves. But it’s worthless fighting 
with them, one has to have extra staff just to go to court against the construc-
tors. There are many flaws, everywhere. (Resp. 38, engineer/manager of TSZh 
Vasileostrovskii 1, suburbs, new house)
In addition to technical defects, one of the biggest maintenance-related 
problems was rats, attracted by the rubbish chutes that are common in 
Russia. Common technical problems in the houses concerned water sup-
ply and heating: poor water pressure, unclean water, overly cold or hot 
water or air temperature. The water pressure is often insufficient to reach 
the highest levels in houses with five or more floors, or the heating may 
be uneven, meaning that people on the lower floors would be sweating 
and opening windows to cool off, while residents of upper floors would be 
freezing from cold, or vice-versa depending on whether the heating was 
distributed bottom-up or top-down. Due to the centralised energy supply 
system, residents cannot adjust the temperature of their homes by adjust-
ing the radiator and they must adapt to the prevailing temperature (see 
Bychkova & Popova 2008, 18).37 These are common problems in Russia’s 
infrastructure. The problems were either due to building defects or caused 
by defects in the water or heating supply. 
we have had many challenges because of erosion of the seams between panels 
... In the beginning there was some erosion of roofs. That is, there were many 
cases of erosion of pipes, both in cold water supply and in hot water supply, the 
heating system was then repaired. There was all this. But now there is less and 
less of that, because insulation is being done ... The quality of the construction 
is not yet at a high level here. (Resp. 15, ex-chairman of TSZh Kalininskii 2, 
suburbs, new house)
37 Bychkova & Popova described the common way of coping with the problem: 
residents suffering from cold would bribe the municipal housing technician to 
manipulate the heating system to work the other way around. This would lead 
the now under-heated residents to bribe the technician to reverse the system 
again, creating a vicious circle (Bychkova & Popova forthcoming, 20).
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Associations in newly built houses often also had to fight with the con-
structor or manager about the management authority of the house. In 
newly built houses the construction company usually hires a manager for 
the house during the construction phase. Sometimes the constructor and 
manager were from the same company. The newly built houses are usu-
ally managed by ‘genuine’ private management companies rather than by 
Zhilkomservis, that is, previous municipal management agencies that have 
been turned into private companies. Usually after a few years of being ad-
ministrated by a management company the homeowners wanted to move 
to self-government as they felt that the company did not work in the resi-
dents’ best interests. Here the homeowners strived for more independence 
and self-governing, instead of passively tolerating the situation. Instead of 
staying under the management company’s rule, they wanted to undertake 
the management themselves. 
management by a professional company might be good for an asso-
ciation in the first phase, as a large multi-family house complex may be 
constructed in phases over a few years and the residents move in slowly. 
Because the apartments are sold gradually and the furnishing and interior 
finishing of the apartments takes time, it often takes a while for the new 
owners to settle into the building. In an ideal situation the management 
company would fix all the building defects when a new house is built, and 
also take care of the land privatisation and all other initial arrangements, 
thereby making it easy for residents to start the management. In practice, 
however, it is rarely that simple. If the management company is connected 
to the constructor, it is probably in its interest to hide the faults in construc-
tion until the end of the guarantee period, during which the constructor 
is legally obliged to fix the faults free of charge. One chairman claimed 
that this is the reason why the association should replace the constructor/
manager as quickly as possible. 
The first task when a constructor establishes a TSZh is to release it from the 
TSZh, more correctly from the constructor’s administration, because we have 
totally different tasks. when a TSZh is formed by the constructor, his idea is to 
play for time so that those construction guarantee periods would expire. That 
is, that administration does not work in the interests of the residents, because 
it was formed by the constructors, basically, to cover themselves. And then the 
residents start to make a fuss, raise initiatives and choose their own board. And, 
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naturally, the representative of the constructor is not the chair any more, he is 
not included in the [new] board. (Resp. 30, chair of TSZh Vyborgskii 2, suburbs)
Conflicts often occurred between residents and companies when the 
company did not approve the dissolution of the management contract as 
this would cause them to lose revenue. This is a case of an external au-
thority attempting to hinder self-government. In order to be independent 
as one of the design principles notes, the association needs minimal rec-
ognition from the authorities, which should otherwise not interfere with 
the management (Ostrom 2000, 152). In TSZh Kirovskii the residents had 
proposed replacing the original manager of the house with a man who was 
the chair in a neighbouring house and was known for his good work. The 
manager chosen by the residents then had to persuade the construction 
company to give up the management. 
I understood what the problem was. I went to X – that’s the constructor of 
these two buildings, naturally, I got a negative answer, and … I said, ‘well, 
okay, then we have the right to turn to wherever. I have the protocol in my 
hands, decisions, this document, although you didn’t take that and me myself 
as a person [seriously]’. Some time went by, and they gave up. I won’t say that 
I took over, but I didn’t just sit there, I took action. They gave up. (Resp. 10, 
manager of TSZh Kirovskii, suburbs)
The interviewed residents believed that the constructor/manager does 
not really work for the residents’ good but primarily aims to secure its own 
position. Some constructors had tried to take illegal advantage of the as-
sociation. In order to increase competition in the market, management 
companies no longer require a licence, which may tempt dishonest entre-
preneurs to the market. In two associations the residents discovered mal-
practice, which led them to fire the company.
-- At first our TSZh was organised by the constructor and managed by the 
constructor, and it was managed very badly. And we the homeowners were not 
given account; we paid a lot, not knowing what we were paying for, it became 
obvious that the constructor was also constructing the building next to us 
with our money. That’s why, when we discovered that, we decided to choose a 
new board. (Resp. 32, chair and activist in housing issues)
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well, mainly because the management company, in general, took money and 
used it,
in practice, for other purposes, as it turned out later. On the other hand, 
it meant that it was very difficult to manage. Even the craftsmen that worked 
didn’t get anything from them. For example, various materials were needed, 
or small renovations, they just didn’t do it, for different reasons. (Resp. 15, ex-
chair of TSZh Kalininskii 2, suburbs)
According to a lawyer specialising in housing issues, a chair is some-
times fired because he or she has insufficient authority, in the opinion of 
the residents. Similarly, when the association is run by a professional man-
ager (in addition to a chair), the homeowners may wish to fire the man-
ager because they feel he or she is not interested enough in the building’s 
management because they are not a homeowner in the house. In one case 
the chairperson felt this way about a member of the board who owned an 
apartment in the house but did not live there:
Our board is so terrible because of one person. He’s a stranger altogether, he
doesn’t live in our house, he doesn’t give a damn about all this, all our prob-
lems. (Resp. 5, chair of TSZh Primorskii, new, suburbs)
Another thing is that, although a TSZh is meant to be managed by a 
private company or by the residents’ administration, some are still man-
aged by municipal housing companies. This is possible in old buildings that 
were managed by the municipality before the association was established. 
when a homeowners’ association wants to transfer its administration 
from municipal management (GUZhA) into the hands of a private compa-
ny, there are often problems obtaining the necessary documents, the most 
important of which is the building’s technical document (tekhnicheskii 
pasport). Because moving housing administration to a private company 
means a financial loss for GUZhA, it often tries to complicate the proc-
ess by not providing the documents. without the documents TSZh is un-
able to make contracts with the private maintenance providers that supply 
heating or water, for example (Ekspert Severo-Zapad 43, 2005). This al-
lows the local authorities to prevent homeowners’ associations from acting 
as self-governing entities, which challenges the whole idea of the housing 
reform. If the association is not allowed to make independent decisions 
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about its management and maintenance, it effectively becomes powerless 
as an association. 
There is one peculiarity – they have registered in the new form but they have 
not started to manage the house accordingly because they have not been given 
the papers. A lot has been done, but they have not been given the papers: the 
technical registration document, the document regarding the lifts, the docu-
ment regarding the inner infrastructure networks, that is, the heating centre… 
and as a result they cannot make contracts [with housing service companies]. 
Thus, they are registered as a TSZh but can they be considered as a TSZh or 
not? I don’t know. (Akimova)
In the case described above, the change is only nominal and does not 
lead to empowerment, activation or self-government by the residents. The 
problem of artificial, ‘marionette’ associations, established and managed 
by the authorities in order to fulfil the obligation of the Housing Code, 
was discussed on a more general level in Chapter 3. According to Vladimir 
Gaidei from the Housing Committee, there have been cases in which a 
homeowners’ association has started to manage the house anyway, before 
getting the documents, that is, before the management has been legally 
transferred to the association. In this case the association has charged 
homeowners without the legal right to do so, at the same time as the mu-
nicipal company has charged the residents as well. As a consequence, some 
residents have paid to the old manager and some to the new one, resulting 
in a chaotic situation.
Conflicts have also arisen between the homeowners and commercial 
enterprises that either own or rent their business premises located in the 
same building complex. The large amount of garbage the company pro-
duced was a common cause of the disagreement. Another disputed matter 
was the non-payment of rent when the business premises were rented to 
a company. This indicates that free-riding is not practised only by private 
individuals but also by companies.
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5.3. Maintenance Practices
Outside staff, companies or workers are often required for maintenance of 
the house, even though associations try to manage on their own as much 
as possible by using their own service staff. It was more common for the 
associations to have their own cleaners, electricians, plumbers and the like 
than to hire a maintenance company. whether the association had its own 
maintenance staff or not, they usually had a hired accountant, especially 
in larger associations, to handle the bookkeeping. The workers lived near-
by, sometimes even in the association’s building, so they were available 
when needed. many respondents emphasised the importance of being able 
to reach staff quickly in case of an emergency. Some associations also had 
their own 24-hour service number to dial in case of a sudden problem. 
One chairperson felt that the association’s own staff was more reliable 
and easier to manage than outside workers from a large company. The abil-
ity to recruit the residents of the house for the task indicates a certain den-
sity of social relations. This could not happen if the neighbours were not 
communicating with each other. The associations prefer to use their own 
resources as much as possible instead of turning to less familiar external 
sources. 
- why did you decide that you need your own maintenance service?
- Because it is easier to manage a collective of, let’s say, 10 to 12 people, than for 
the municipal housing company to manage a collective of unknown people. 
where these workers are from and who they are and where they are located 
in relation to the house, it’s very difficult to manage a big collective. (Resp. 14, 
manager of TSZh Vyborgskii 1, suburbs)
we even organised our own emergency service … Selected members of the 
personnel carry a mobile phone, so the person must live nearby. One mechan-
ic lives right in our house, another lives five minutes by foot. Therefore, no 
municipal emergency service can compete with us in terms of mobility, in 15 
to 20 minutes the emergency situation is already solved. (Resp. 10, manager 
of TSZh Kirovskii)
The chair emphasised the difference of municipal management, which 
“could not compete” with the internal workers. municipal housing agen-
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cies are generally known for being inefficient and unreliable so it was im-
portant to distinguish the association from them. Having their own staff 
is also important to keep the association ‘private’. This means a commu-
nity that does not hire just anyone but where the administration selects 
the staff, who may even be residents and know each other. Still, resorting 
to friends and acquaintances should not be automatically considered as 
something intrinsically Russian. It is naturally more convenient to have 
someone you know or who lives nearby to work for you. Likewise, it is 
easier to ask a friend for advice and friends are, as a rule, more reliable. 
Reliance on friends is practised all over the world and there is nothing 
exceptional about it. 
Nevertheless, associations tended to trust friends but also friends of 
friends and to use social networks in a way that seems typical to Russia. 
Finding a worker through networks is not necessarily easier than just pick-
ing up the Yellow Pages and calling a specialist, but it is still a customary 
way for homeowners’ associations to act. Contacts acquired through ac-
quaintances or internal staff (referred to as ‘our people’) are seen as more 
trustworthy. This is understandable, considering that there are frauds and 
unprofessional actors in the market. Relying on their own staff is an asso-
ciation’s attempt to be as autonomous as possible. Strangers, on the other 
hand, are often regarded with suspicion. In this sense it seems that the pre-
sumption of the decreasing role of networks does not hold true. The idea of 
acquaintances as more reliable partners was expressed by one resident from 
TSZh Centre 1. He said that the premises of the house should be rented to a 
fellow homeowner who is known by the homeowners and shares the same 
interests of landscaping of the yard. This attitude is understandable given 
the property rights disputes that his building had experienced.
The abovementioned maintenance practices mainly concerned newly 
built houses, the maintenance of which is privately handled right from the 
start. In old houses that had originally been municipally managed, the as-
sociations had difficulty making contracts directly with private compa-
nies because the local authorities refuse to provide the association with 
the necessary documents, as mentioned above. This shows that although 
the legislative basis for the associations’ independence does exist, it is not 
followed. If the association continues to be controlled by the municipal 
housing authorities’ leash it will not have any real decision-making or self-
governing power. 
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As a result of a long escalated conflict between TSZh Centre 1 and the 
city, the residents refused to pay the municipal housing maintenance fee. 
They felt they were not getting value for money from the city. As the city 
was not upholding its own part of the deal, that is, handling the mainte-
nance, the residents responded by disregarding the rules on payments set 
by the city.
I don’t pay. why should I pay? They threaten me with a lawsuit. I threaten 
them with a lawsuit back. That’s all. I don’t see a reason to pay somewhere, if 
they won’t do anything whether I pay or not.
-You mean you don’t pay the housing payments at all or for…?
 - At all. 
 - what about other residents?
- Now there are more and more of those who don’t pay. Of course, they [the 
city] now have a big shortage in the budget, billions of roubles. And they have 
started to scare people – they are making ‘show’ evictions, the Housing Com-
mittee. (Resp. 10, chair of TSZh Centre 1)
Some associations have been established without proper knowledge 
about how to handle the management and maintenance. One chairperson, 
having fired the constructor-appointed manager, described the initial situ-
ation: “None of us knew [how to do] this job, I didn’t have a clue … not 
about those pipes, not about those advertisements, not about those janitors, 
it was all just gibberish” (chair of TSZh Primorskii). Having established 
the association and taken the maintenance into their own hands, the as-
sociations are easily left on their own. managing the association without a 
professional manager or without chairperson who has a background in the 
housing field can be very difficult and tiring. Some houses are in very poor 
condition and at the time of establishing the association the residents have 
not been aware of all the flaws and the expenses of repairs, which suggests 
that authorities should be better at informing residents. This is not the best 
starting point for the association and the residents may not be able to af-
ford the unexpected financial expenses. These difficulties may also end up 
causing disputes between neighbours. when the administration is handled 
by the residents without a professional manager or a company, residents’ 
personal relationships become more important. 
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Now they are establishing homeowners’ associations. Nobody has told them 
that there will be management expenses, banks… external electricity, that 
their lift is old and in the near future will stop working, that they will have to 
form a plan about how to change that and so on… That is, no one tells them 
anything about this. (Akimova)
Some respondents felt they had been left completely on their own once 
they had established the TSZh and were expected to take care of all the main-
tenance independently. In the following case the chair was surprised to learn 
that, because the association was privately maintained they were not entitled 
to any help from municipal housing authorities in the case of a sudden main-
tenance problem. without arranging emergency maintenance service the as-
sociation would be in trouble when an unexpected problem arose. 
For example, in the autumn we had some problems with the heating, I called 
everywhere and they said … ‘oh, you have a TSZh, you’ll find out yourselves’. 
what do they mean by ‘find out yourselves’? ‘Let your plumber solve the prob-
lem’ [they say]. For example, if we did not have a contract with the emergency 
service, even in the case of a volcano eruption the emergency service wouldn’t 
come to us. Those kind of difficulties. (Resp. 5, chair of TSZh Primorskii, sub-
urbs)
5.4. Cooperation with Outside Actors and Relations with the 
Media
Despite all the conflicts and disagreements, associations’ relations with the 
authorities are not purely hostile; good relations and cooperation also ex-
ist. Naturally, the authorities are not one uniform category, although some 
respondents regard all authorities as one unreliable group. The Housing 
Committee provides information and advice for citizens on housing mat-
ters and most respondents regarded the Housing Committee as a “friend-
ly” authority that is on the same side as the associations. The Committee 
for the Administration of City Property (KUGI) on the other hand, is 
known for taking property into its possession and none of the respondents 
had positive feelings about it. Considering the experiences some associa-
tions have had with KUGI and its bad reputation in the media, it is not sur-
200
HOmEOwNERS’ ASSOCIATIONS IN RUSSIA AFTER THE 2005 HOUSING REFORm
prising that it was despised and disrespected and seen as a money-gather-
ing organ, operating only for its own interest. 
The interests of the Housing Committee and residents are similar. The Hous-
ing Committee’s task is to preserve the housing stock and to operate it prop-
erly. KUGI’s task is only to gather money. -- KUGI’s task should be just to pro-
vide state housing stock to the homeowners, the users. But it does it the other 
way around. It does business. It even captures basements. (Resp. 22, vice-chair 
of TSZh Centre 3, old house)
Although the Housing Committee and KUGI were often mentioned by 
the respondents, the district level authorities, that is, the municipalities 
and municipal councils, have more concrete importance for the associa-
tions than the city authorities. The Housing Committee has been very vis-
ible in promoting TSZhs and it defines St. Petersburg’s housing policy, but 
the executive power is in the hands of the district and municipal councils’ 
authorities, which are therefore closer to the associations on an everyday 
management level. municipal housing authorities have organised meetings 
to inform the associations about management questions and the heating 
period,38 for example. These situations were also important opportunities 
for the associations’ representatives to network with each other.  
Some respondents felt it was very important to maintain good relations 
with the local authorities. The main reason for this is the potential financial 
support that the authorities could give to the associations. If an association 
has good relations with the municipal council, it may be able to have the 
council finance repairs or landscaping of the courtyard. For example, in 
TSZh Centre 3 the lift was repaired after pensioners’ constant pleas, while 
in TSZh Vasileostrovskii 2 the construction of a children’s playground was 
paid for by the municipal authorities. According to one chairman, having a 
deputy or other important official living in the house could help the TSZh 
receive technical or other improvements related to landscaping or repairs 
of the house. when the same chair had requested financial support from a 
38 The heating period for centrally heated houses lasts from October to may, de-
pending on the weather. Turning on the heating requires a lot of preparation 
as the technical details in each house have to checked first (Bychkova & Pop-
ova forthcoming, 38).
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local deputy, he had been refused on the grounds that not many residents 
of the house had voted for the deputy’s party. 
Good relations can be used as a form of PR strategy and to prevent 
problems that could occur between the association and the authorities, or 
between the association and a company, for example. In the latter case, 
having good relations make it easier for the association to request support 
from the authorities. It could also spare the association from conflicts con-
cerning property rights or other matters. Relations with the authorities are 
also sometimes relevant for internal disagreements. In TSZh Vyborgskii 1 
the chair actively maintained the existing relationships with local authori-
ties and created new ones. He was so well known that he was even invited 
to the Northwestern Federal District’s Public Chamber39 as an advisor on 
housing reform. This shows that it is possible to have cooperation between 
authorities and associations, and that the associations are not isolated from 
the outside world. The chair of TSZh Vyborgskii 1 invited local politicians 
and officials to the residents’ meetings to give speeches and to introduce 
them to the association. According to the chair, the reason was that some 
of the apartments in the house were non-privatised and state-owned, so 
they invited representatives of the city to see how things were going. more 
importantly, there was strong opposition in the house, which attempted to 
use technical defects as a reason for firing the chair. The opposition con-
tacted the authorities to check the fire safety and other technical details of 
the house. According to the chair of Vyborgskii 1, the opposition’s agenda 
was to find a valid reason to change the chair and the board but the lack of 
flaws meant that they were unsuccessful. In this case the chair used good 
relations with the authorities as a defence strategy. 
Fire inspection officials are somewhat corrupt in Russia and as a result 
of fire safety defects in fire safety in the old buildings, the maintenance 
of which has been neglected, it is easy to use fire regulations as an excuse 
39 The Public Chamber is a local consultative organ for the authorities of the 
Northwestern Federal District that comprises St. Petersburg, Kaliningrad, 
Vologda, murmansk, Novgorod and other districts of the area.
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for another agenda.40 It has been said that if a company is visited by both 
the tax police and fire inspectors within a short time, it is a sure sign they 
are in trouble, for a non-official reason (Stolyarova 2008). The problem of 
corruption has been officially recognised and the new federal law entitled 
“Technical regulations for fire safety requirements” was approved in July 
2008. The law aims to reduce corruption by decreasing the authorities’ 
power to interfere with fire safety and leaving the matter more in the hands 
of the owners of the premises (IA Regnum 14 November 2007). 
Some associations had received publicity in television and newspapers 
and some used the media to create a positive public image or to bring at-
tention to the mistreatment they were experiencing. Being a new, fast-
spreading phenomenon, homeowners’ associations were quite visible in 
the media and some were presented as examples of the new type of man-
agement. Homeowners’ associations have received much more media at-
tention than social organisations in Russia in general, being at the core of 
the new reform that concerns all citizens. Besides reports on the housing 
management novelty, the ‘hot topics’ of the moment, such as registering 
land or property rights disputes, were widely reported. The associations 
that received positive publicity were pleased to be mentioned in the me-
dia, while some chairpersons had a suspicious attitude towards journalists 
(TSZh Petrogradskii 1). The associations that were struggling with lawsuits 
and felt mistreated by the authorities were happy when the media took 
their side. Although media freedom has been restricted in Russia in recent 
years, there still seems to be room for criticism in the housing field, at least 
towards local level authorities. 
For example, TSZh Centre 1’s small-scale demonstrations against 
KUGI’s property seizures were reported in some local newspapers and 
the radio. The chairperson of TSZh Centre 1 was mentioned frequently in 
newspaper reports as an activist defending the residents’ common prop-
erty. TSZh Centre 1 received a lot of publicity because the extent to which 
40 Fire safety defects were the official reason for the temporary closure of the Eu-
ropean University at St. Petersburg in February–march 2008, while the real 
reason was generally believed to be either politically or economically moti-
vated. The university had planned research to monitor presidential elections 
with funding from the European Union and secondly, the university is located 
in an historically valuable building in the centre of the city (Kommersant’ 11 
February 2008).
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the property raids had led to  - the KUGI taking over the property - was 
quite exceptional, though not unique. The chair of TSZh Centre 1 did not 
value the media very highly; he saw the exposure simply as the only way to 
fight the injustice. 
… I don’t see how to have the strength to protest this. The only thing there is 
to do now is to make a noise in the newspapers … But newspapers now are too, 
you know what… Television is scum, as a whole. (Resp. 7, chair, TSZh Centre 
1, old house)
The residents also contacted the media themselves in order to make 
their mistreatment public. This tactic is usually favourable for the resident, 
as the media tends to be sympathetic and supportive of individuals and 
present them as victims, regardless of the matter. Residents, particularly 
chairpersons, are quite active in this matter, which counters the descrip-
tion of residents as being passive. The media was greeted positively, despite 
its representatives being outsiderss, because it could be used to strengthen 
the community and its borders against another outside force, the authori-
ties. 
TSZh Vyborgskii 1 had been presented in three TV reports, which in-
troduced it as an example of a homeowners’ association, as a new form of 
management. The TSZh was quite well known in the neighbourhood and 
therefore residents from other buildings were asking for advice in estab-
lishing and managing TSZh, in terms of legal and practical questions. The 
TSZh even had plans to open a consultation office for other TSZhs and 
cooperatives. 
Soon we’ll establish a public consultation, where we’re going to take in par-
ticular, first of all, not [ordinary] people, because the people, for them there is 
the administration thathas its own power, a bunch of responsibilities that they 
fulfil, but for social organisations, for non-profit organisations, like TSZh, 
ZhSK. They need consultation, in general. (Resp. 14, manager of TSZh Vy-
borgskii 1, suburbs)
The manager felt that a good reputation was important for the associa-
tion, so one reason for the consultation service could have been to achieve 
more publicity. Still, this shows that the chair did not see outsiders as a 
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threat but instead wanted to cooperate with them. The manager clearly 
stated that associations lack information and there is a need for the consul-
tation service, although the authorities and voluntary organisations pro-
vide information as well. In general, it was common for chairs and manag-
ers to contact each other. more experienced leaders advised their younger 
colleagues about technical and other practical management issues, which 
is a good way to share experience and to warn others of fraud. Some as-
sociations (at least TSZh Centre 2) shared the maintenance staff with their 
neighbouring association. In TSZh Centre 2 there had originally been plans 
to form a single association for both houses but separate associations were 
eventually established. According to Clément (2008, 77), housing associa-
tions (TSZhs and similar associations) tend to build alliances and organise 
networks or coordinating councils through which to share information. 
Clément describes the networks as informal (ibid., 79–80), which is con-
sistent with the data in this study, where the networks between associa-
tions were not very structured or organised. One example of networking is 
the Association of TSZhs in the central districts of St. Petersburg. Founded 
in 2006, this association gathers the TSZhs (or their chairpersons) of the 
district together to defend their common interests.
The above shows that issues are handled the same way in housing man-
agement as they are with other aspects of life in Russia: by relying on friends 
and acquaintances rather than contacting professionals or the responsible 
authorities. Local authorities were sometimes contacted as well but more 
as an authority than for advice. For example, TSZh Vasileostrovskii 1’s 
chair had resorted to the Housing Inspection, an organ of the Housing 
Committee, for help in a situation with a resident. The resident was using 
the heating system “not according to purpose” (“ne po naznacheniiu”). The 
chair did not specify what exactly had been done, but it is common for 
residents to install additional radiators into their apartment, which dis-
turbs the heating balance of the house (see Bychkova & Popova forthcom-
ing, 20). In any case, the resident’s actions disturbed the neighbours and 
he only agreed to cooperate when the authorities threatened him with a 
fine. This was a case of resorting to an outside force to solve an internal 
conflict.
Besides having good relations with the authorities, it helps associations 
if they have influential people as residents. One association had managed 
to register its land plot with the help of a deputy of the St. Petersburg’s 
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Legislative Assembly, who lived in the house. This is not surprising, as the 
deputy had actively promoted land registration in public. The exact way 
in which he had helped the association is unclear but it probably involved 
him using his connections to forward the matter and/or by advising the 
chair during the legal process. All in all, homeowners’ associations do not 
operate in isolation but politics and personal connections do play an im-
portant role. 
Housing authorities also gave recognition for associations for good land-
scaping or for repairing the house to a good condition. TSZh Vasileostrovskii 
2 received a diploma from the municipality for landscaping, while TSZh 
Centre 3 was awarded a diploma from the Housing Committee for repair-
ing its building and for establishing a museum in its premises in memory 
of the architect who had designed the house. The diplomas were awarded 
on the authorities’ initiative, without the associations approaching them. 
In this way the authorities are trying to encourage good maintenance by 
making good examples known to other houses. The diploma system is a 
Soviet tradition, reminiscient of the time when accomplishments at work 
were highly praised as good examples for other workers. 
TSZh Centre 3 wanted to maintain its positive public image through the 
museum, good relations between neighbouring houses, a veterans’ council 
for older inhabitants, etc. Nevertheless, the interviewed members of the 
veterans’ council had a rather indifferent attitude towards newer home-
owners in the building, contrasting with the friendly and warm image of 
the association. Although the veterans’ council brought the pensioners to-
gether to socialise, it was still a closed community and its members were 
not interested in befriending other homeowners of the house. A bonding 
type of social capital was produced in this association by uniting people 
from similar backgrounds together. Bonding social capital was more com-
mon for the associations as a whole, although there was also some bridging 
social capital, at least in TSZh Centre 1. The associations were generally 
inward-oriented but connections with the outside world were made and 
relations with the authorities and other homeowners’ associations actively 
maintained. 
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5.5. Privatisation and the Common Property
Since privatisation of housing was started in the early 1990s there has been 
a visible change in the city landscape of St. Petersburg. Locks have started 
to emerge on staircase doors and courtyard gates and respondents stressed 
the importance of locking the courtyards. As noted in Chapter 4, the need 
to close the courtyard to outsiders was often a reason why residents called 
meetings and eventually established homeowners’ associations in old hous-
es. The most obvious reason for this has been to protect the property from 
criminals. Statistics from the ministry of the Interior show that criminal-
ity increased in Russia in the early 1990s (Volkov 2002, 2) and a study in 
the 1990s in St. Petersburg indicated that people felt less secure than they 
had previously and were afraid of robberies and break-ins (Serebrennikova 
1999, see also Lentz 2006, 216). Judging by the interviews, criminality con-
tinues to be a real problem in St. Petersburg and burglaries are common, 
which has led to calls for action to prevent the crimes.
There is stealing, like everywhere. For the period of time that we have been 
here [almost 2 years], 21 apartments in two houses have been broken into, 
including that of the chairman’s daughter. (Resp. 15, ex-chairman, TSZh Ka-
lininskii 2, suburbs)
why did we decide to install the video surveillance? In this country and in 
our city, minor crimes are practically everywhere. But because – and this is 
my personal opinion – our people as a whole are not organised, in the sense 
of obeying the effective legislation, that’s why things like apartment robberies 
and burglaries happen. -- Since the New Year, suddenly our house became 
exposed to [robberies]. I mean those robberies that I’ve heard of, people who 
turned to me and to the police, naturally. A robber came, broke into [the 
apartment]. So by the end of February there were 15 robbed apartments. In 
two months there were 15 robberies. (Resp. 14, chairman, TSZh Vyborgskii 
1, suburbs)
The first thing done was to increase security, in order to prevent un-
wanted trespassers and wanderers (homeless people, alcoholics and drug 
addicts seeking shelter in the staircases, basements and attics) and poten-
tial burglars from accessing the area. In addition, courtyards were closed 
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to avoid people passing through the property.41 Another reason was to 
prevent non-residents from parking in the association’s area, as there is 
a chronic shortage of parking spaces in the city. It was sometimes neces-
sary to close the garbage container in the courtyard with locks because it 
was being used by residents of neighbouring buildings, filling it quicker 
and causing more expenses for the association’s garbage disposal. These 
are all examples of setting clear boundaries to the association and prevent-
ing outsiders from using the resources: the common areas, the parking lot 
and the garbage container. Closing the association’s area is necessary for 
private management of the resources, that is, for the association to func-
tion as an effective CPR regime. Technical equipment was acquired in or-
der to strengthen security. Door codes, intercom systems, video surveil-
lance, gates and fences were set up and guards and concierges were hired. 
Sometimes video surveillance or guards were established only in those 
staircases where the residents had agreed to pay for the service. One elite 
house (TSZh Petrogradskii 2) had a contract with a private security firm 
who would arrive at the property within a few minutes of being called. 
This kind of service is quite common in St. Petersburg. 
Locks, fences, guards and video surveillance were not used solely for 
security, although that certainly was the primary reason. The closed court-
yard has a symbolic meaning as well, located as it is between the private 
space (apartments) and the public (street). The idea behind closing the 
courtyard is to extend the private space to include the courtyard. Entering 
a monitored, private area that is open only for residents and invited guests 
makes residents feel secure. But the security guards and their guard booths 
in the yard, as well as the fences and locks on staircase doors, are not there 
just to make the residents feel secure; they are also sending a message to 
the outside world. Their function is also to demonstrate to outsiders that 
the area is protected and private and that trespassers are not welcome. 
The privatisation tendency and the restriction of access to the associa-
tion’s area is a notable difference from the Soviet era. After the 1917 October 
Revolution the entire society was communalised: the old elite houses were 
nationalised and access to them was opened for all people. Gateways, fenc-
es and locks that had protected private property were removed or opened. 
41 In St. Petersburg old houses are often linked to each other by courtyards and 
taking shortcuts through them is very common.
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This was an ideologically significant gesture; the formerly private court-
yards were now public space that belonged to the people and could be used 
by everyone. Passers-by could shortcut their way through the courtyards 
when fences separating the houses were removed (Staub 2005, 341–342). 
The open-doors policy was based on the idea of total trust among the Soviet 
people, developed further in the plans for shops without salespersons and 
trams without conductors (Lebina 2003, 190), which were, like many other 
utopian plans of the socialist era, left unrealised. 
Now that private ownership is possible again and has become very com-
mon, a shift towards the pre-revolutionary era has been made in restrict-
ing the access of outsiders to private property. The Housing Committee is 
encouraging this development as well, hoping it will make homeowners 
realise that they are now legally responsible for the maintenance of their 
own property. Private management at the house-level can also be seen 
as a return to the first decades of the Soviet era, when management was 
practised at the level of one or a few houses by the house committees and 
each house had its own janitor. Since housing management was central-
ised in the 1950s and house committees were merged into larger ZhEKi 
(local housing agencies), the maintenance of individual houses deterio-
rated (Lebina 2003, 190–191). As a result, everybody’s property became 
nobody’s property, for which no one felt responsible. This is the problem 
with the public good: there is no incentive to help maintain it as everyone 
can enjoy it, regardless of their participation (see Putnam et al. 1993, 163). 
Unrestricted access has made the staircases seem public in the same way 
as the street, the condition of which is not a cause of concern. State prop-
erty has been neglected by residents and passers-bys, who have carelessly 
littered in, and even vandalised, the areas in common use. In order to stop 
this development, St. Petersburg’s Housing Committee is now promoting 
closing up the staircases and courtyards, to make the residents feel that the 
area is their own, private property that they would want to keep in good 
condition, as they would take care of and guard their apartments. From 
the point of view of a common-pool resource regime, it is important that 
the common areas actually are the associations’ private property (as op-
posed to just feeling that way) and that homeowners’ associations have full 
jurisdiction of the common areas.
209
5. HOmEOwNERS’ ASSOCIATIONS’ RELATIONS wITH OTHER ACTORS
In 2005 the number of staircases that were closed with security systems in-
creased over three times. we have neighbourhoods, even a whole administra-
tive district, where over 90 percent of houses are closed, that is almost all the 
houses are closed. Hence, we are crossing the psychological line that my home 
is my apartment. -- Doors to the apartments are good, made of steel in many 
cases, reliably protecting my apartment – my castle. But we want to change the 
situation so that my staircase is also my castle. That is, a reliable door, impos-
sible for a person to break into without a magnetic or other key to the staircase 
or the ability to contact his apartment to be let in – well, a regular entry door. 
when I have to take a key from my pocket to access my floor … a psychologi-
cal barrier is defeated and I start to think of my floor as my home. At the same 
time of installing of these systems in 2005 a contest was announced by which 
we would renovate only those floors that were reliably secured. And as a result, 
the floors were closed off and renovated and the mentality is changing. when 
a person sees that change is in progress on his floor, that he’s protected, the 
floor becomes clean and he doesn’t want to behave how he used to behave. 
That is, he will start littering less and regard the property differently. (Oleg 
Vikhtiuk, Housing Committee)
From this point of view, privatisation and closing courtyards is a good, 
even necessary move, as it makes residents care for them, with the goal 
of a safe, clean and pleasant living environment. However, the applied se-
curity measures sometimes seemed excessive, such as when the associa-
tion’s management was planning to install more and more video cameras, 
guards and fences. The question of privacy rights of the individuals who 
are under surveillance did not concern the interviewed respondents, nor 
the chairpersons or the authorities. However, in January 2008 one Housing 
Committee official stated that there had been cases in which protecting 
the property was taken too far, when ambulance and police vehicles could 
not enter the courtyard because of the gates and strict security. Another 
respondent (Resp. 23) told of how neighbours had refused to open the stair-
case door (closed with a door phone system) to paramedics. Accordingly, 
some discussion about the limits of the privatisation seems to be needed and 
could be emerging. when one chairperson was asked whether he viewed 
the hidden camera surveillance as questionable, however, he said that it 
was acceptable as long as the cameras are in the common areas and not 
in anyone’s apartment, and that he would even like to have more of them 
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in order to minimise disturbances. As the interviewed respondents were 
mostly chairpersons and managers, whose duty is to keep the area secured, 
it is not surprising that they did not feel the surveillance was exaggerated.
- You said you have a video surveillance? was it there from the beginning? 
- No, we installed that ourselves too. There was nothing! In the beginning 
homeless people bunked in the attics… and in the basement everything was 
stolen. That’s why we [set up] the video surveillance. To tell you the truth, I 
feel that it’s the most effective [measure]. And if in the future everything goes 
okay, I’m going to install more and more cameras. They have to be put up, 
everything will be monitored. Then there will be order in the staircases. (Resp. 
37, chair of TSZh Frunzenskii, suburbs)
Some residents feel differently, however, such as one who rejected the 
development altogether, as well as plans to establish a TSZh in his building. 
He felt that such changes would eventually lead to segregation and social 
exclusion and would widen the gap between social classes. Delimiting ac-
cess to places that he viewed as public, such as staircases and courtyards, 
was unacceptable. 
And here I’m personally experiencing how the borders are being established, 
on the level like that steel door.
I think that this is going to be a policy of segregation, a policy of establishing 
TSZhs and indigent people will be pushed aside in one way or another.
-- Anyway I think that it’s not that kind of private property, like in German 
‘Eintritt verboten’, passage denied, entry denied. I think it has an element of 
symbolic borders --. 
I think that a house is, after all, a public place. Therefore, there should be open 
access. (Resp. 23)
This respondent seems to have digested the Soviet idea of a courtyard 
as an extension of the public space. His attitude shows that although TSZh 
leaders and the authorities do not consider the closing of access to court-
yards and residential buildings as a negative development, there may be a 
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psychological barrier among ordinary people constraining privatisation. 
However, this respondent’s view was not shared by other interviewees, who 
also tended to compare today’s situation with the past but mostly by ex-
pressing that things were now heading in a better direction. 
5.6. Homeowners’ Associations and Gated Communities
Closing private properties from outsiders is not merely a Russian devel-
opment. ‘Fortress urbanism’, people secluding themselves behind gated 
communities, is a phenomenon that has become apparent in metropolis-
es all over the world. Gated communities have been studied by urban ge-
ographers and sociologists, such as Blakely & Snyder (1997), Atkinson & 
Blandy (2006) and Glasze, webster & Frantz (2006); the first of these stud-
ies examined the phenomenon in the United States, while the other two 
took a global perspective. Separation from the outside world can be driven 
by a fear for personal safety but the separation does not necessarily stop 
at security measures. Some residential communities have their own water 
and power supply and provide leisure services for their residents (such as 
gyms, swimming pools, saunas and tennis courts), which the apartment 
complex a self-sufficient, luxurious ‘mini-world’ (makarova 2006, 9–10). 
On a wider scale this privatisation can contribute to a more segregated 
society, where the rich live in their gated areas and the poor in their rent-
ed dwellings. Gated communities with their own private infrastructure 
devices leads to further segmentation, especially in developing countries, 
as access to basic infrastructure is differentiated economically and locally 
(see Graham & marvin 2001). Considering the poorly handled municipal 
maintenance and deteriorated infrastructure in Russia, there is an obvious 
motivation for private residential infrastructure and private provision of 
gas, water and electricity (Lentz 2006, 216).
Gated communities are not a novelty in Russia. During the prerevo-
lutionary period and in the Soviet era the elite’s homes and dachas (sum-
mer houses) were protected from outsiders with guards and fences. Now 
gated communities have started to emerge in Russia, particularly in the 
outskirts of moscow, where exclusive single-family detached houses, or 
‘cottages’ (kottedzhi), have been constructed (Blinnikov et al. 2006). Inner 
city guarded communities have been built, for foreigners primarily, such as 
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in moscow’s Pokrovsky Hills, Donskoy Posad and Vorobevy Gory (Lentz 
2006, 209–211). These luxurious communities, some of which provide also 
services to their members (club goods, such as children’s daycare), are far 
from the average, middle class homeowners’ associations. Homeowners’ 
associations are primarily a form of management, established on the basis 
of the housing legislation. many associations have been formed in houses 
that were previously municipally owned and later privatised, which results 
in a very heterogeneous social structure. These associations cannot afford 
the self-sufficiency mentioned above, and these limitations prevent segre-
gation. most associations cannot afford to choose their members as they 
barely can afford essential repairs. many average associations could have 
a greater degree of exclusion if their economic situation permitted it. Still, 
considering the context, this seems unlikely to happen to any great degree. 
Drawing the line between protection for security reasons and for the crea-
tion of an exclusive private domain is not necessarily simple. while post-
ing a guard at the entrance of an apartment building is not ‘fortressing’, 
strictly limiting access, combined with installing private infrastructure 
devices and leisure services for residents, might well be. 
Homeowners’ associations are primarily management organs but segre-
gation is still a potential threat that needs to be acknowledged and requires 
action from the city planning authorities. No public debate has surfaced re-
garding the limits of public and private or concern about where the privati-
sation process may lead, although the housing reform is discussed actively 
from other angles. On the other hand, according to Ekaterina makarova, 
the current architectural discourse in Russia views the building of bounda-
ries in new apartment buildings as a positive tendency. ‘Social equalization’, 
that is, the removal of ‘inappropriate social elements’ and homogeneity of 
the residential structure, is viewed as a solution to many social problems. 
The interaction between public and private is left unaddressed (makarova 
2006, 13–14). This mindset may be affected by the Soviet period. Because 
the limits of privacy were very tight in society during that era, people are 
now taking advantage of the opportunity to extend their private territory 
as much as possible. In addition, residential segregation in the Soviet era 
was quite modest (Bater 1980, 111), meaning that segregation is still a quite 
recent development in Russia, which may be why it is not necessarily iden-
tified as a negative tendency. A completely different system from the Soviet 
era, the communal apartment (shared by several families) represented the 
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socialist ideology, which officially condemned private property. Private 
space was very limited in communal apartments and residents were under 
constant surveillance from each other. Gated communities may reflect the 
values of today’s society – privacy and the ability to exclude oneself from 
the outside world – which were not possible in the Soviet era.
Even if privatisation and enclosure of courtyards does not entail segre-
gation, it can still have psychologically negative consequences, as the fear 
of crime is not conducive to an atmosphere of trust. This can prevent as-
sociations from networking with other parties and make it difficult to es-
tablish flourishing social relations with outsiders. Bridging social capital is 
not easily created under these circumstances. On the other hand, as Susan 
French notes in her study on common-interest communities (which are 
similar to homeowners’ associations in that the use of the common prop-
erty is jointly regulated and managed but often gated and well protected), 
although segregation is a possibility, the communities are important for 
making the environment safer and/or providing its residents with a sense 
of security, even if it is a false one (2000, 5). The sense of security arising 
from the closedness and the homogeneity of the residential structure can 
be an important factor for residents, protecting them from the insecurity 
and disorder of the outside world (Lentz 2006, 217). Robert Putnam (2000, 
210–211) has noted that the privatisation trend transforms neighbourhoods 
from being extroverted to being introverted. Bridging social capital can-
not be expected to emerge in closed, segregated communities, as they are 
socially very homogenous. Bonding social relationships can, potentially, 
be fostered instead.
Privatisation is therefore a complex phenomenon. It is necessary from 
the point of view of a CPR approach and self-governance in order to make 
the residents care for the common property and to keep it in good condi-
tion, to avoid vandalism and to ensure security. A common-pool resource 
regime requires clearly defined boundaries so that the limits of the regime 
are obvious. Having said that, a CPR regime does not need to be an isolated 
system. From the point of view of enhancing democracy and fostering so-
cial capital, excessive privatisation is a potentially negative phenomenon. If 
a homeowners’ association builds up extensive security measures, exclud-
ing outsiders can lead to overreaction to external threats. It may create an 
exaggerated feeling of fear and suspicion towards outsiders, psychologi-
cally isolating the association from the outside world. most associations, 
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however, do not strive for complete exclusion but they try to make their 
residents think of the common areas differently than they had before, 
as part of their private property. Judging by the urban landscape in St. 
Petersburg they seem to have succeeded in this regard; many courtyards 
and entrance ways have cleared up and are in visibly better condition than 
they were previously. According to the respondents, the change has indeed 
taken place since the establishment of an association. It can be concluded, 
therefore, that this improvement is not just a result of the privatisation of 
apartments, which only encouraged homeowners to care for the inside of 
their apartments, but also a consequence of the privatisation of housing 
management and the common areas.
5.7. Conclusions
while a homeowners’ association is, in principle, a common-pool resource 
regime, established to take care of common resources collectively, it does 
not always work as an effective CPR regime. The housing legislation states 
that a homeowners’ association is supposed to be a self-governing struc-
ture, defining the association’s rules that enable autonomous decision-
making. Yet, in practice, the local authorities often restrict self-governing. 
Some local authorities do not recognise the association’s self-government 
and do not allow them to work independently. who has the right to use 
the resources in a homeowners’ association is often the subject of disputes 
regarding property rights. Unclear property rights and delimitation of 
common property make the association’s physical boundaries vague and 
complicate the management of common property. This is also inconsist-
ent with the design principle that states a CPR regime should have clear 
boundaries. municipal authorities are hindering the associations’ autono-
my by not providing the documents necessary for private management or 
maintenance, while city committees such as KUGI and KGA are seizing 
association property and impeding the privatisation of land plots. The re-
form may therefore be stumbling partly on the opposition of individual of-
ficials. moving to private maintenance or management and registration of 
the land plot requires residents to make an effort. Conflicts and property 
rights disputes have compelled associations to confront the authorities and 
demand self-government and autonomy through the courts and in dem-
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onstrations. It is somewhat incongruous that organisations that the federal 
authorities encouraged the establishment of have to fight to be able to act 
as expected to by the legislation.
Associations are resorting to the courts to solve property disputes, 
which is a customary way of proceeding in any constitutional state. 
According to the CPR design principles, property disputes between an 
association and outside actors are best resolved in local arenas (Ostrom 
2000, 152). However, the justice system seems somewhat inefficient, given 
that lawsuits can take years to conclude, weakening residents’ faith to-
wards it. As the raid cases prove, residents are in a weak position when 
the raids occur and there are corrupt authorities working in the housing 
field. when it comes to homeowners’ associations in respect to the local 
authorities, it seems fair to say that the establishment of a “law-governed 
state” (pravovoe gosudarstvo), which has been the aim of the post-Soviet 
reform (see Remington 2002, 231), has not succeeded here. Several studies 
show that public opinion supports this view. In Richard Rose’s study, for 
example, “71 percent of Russians say that the national government is a long 
way from the idea of a law-governed state” (Rose 2001, 69). Similar dis-
coveries have also been made in more recent studies, such as the Levada-
Center survey on democracy in December 2006 (Levada-Tsentr, Problemy 
demokratii) and Karine Clément’s finding that Russians tend not to trust 
those in power and avoid official contact with formal institutions (Clément 
2008, 72). Although the prerequisites for a law-governed state are written 
in the legislation, they are not always fulfilled in practice, as noted earlier, 
when the local level authorities responsible for executing the laws do not 
work accordingly. 
Homeowners’ associations deal with the public authorities but also with 
private construction, management and maintenance companies. Newly 
built houses have had disputes with constructors regarding responsibility 
for building defects. Associations often had to persuade management com-
panies to hand the management over to the homeowners. Here is another 
case of outsiders preventing the associations’ self-government, interfering 
in the associations’ management. As mentioned, the outside actors cannot 
be considered as one uniform group (and neither can the associations), 
so the associations’ attitude towards them is not consistent either. while 
the associations strived for autonomy and privacy and tried to be as self-
sufficient as possible, some associations felt it was important to have good 
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relations with the housing authorities, either because this could help them 
financially or because the authorities may defend the association in dis-
putes with private companies or in internal disputes. The outside world 
and the association’s internal relationships are in constant interaction. 
Disputes with outside actors have had implications for internal relations 
as well, leading to disagreements between neighbours. Correspondingly, 
authorities have been contacted in case of inside conflicts. 
media publicity and journalistic interest was not viewed as outside in-
tervention, rather as more of a positive phenomenon – or the only way to 
have an influence, as the chair of TSZh Centre 1 saw it. Associations used 
the media to get their voice heard in property disputes and other cases in 
which they believed they had been mistreated. The media supported the 
associations and was therefore viewed in a positive light by the residents. 
The media seems to be quite free to comment and criticise the authorities 
in their disputes with the associations. It could be, however, that hard criti-
cism is possible only at the local level. This could indicate that democracy 
works at the local level, even though it might not work particularly well at 
the federal level. Furthermore, the residents themselves mainly criticise the 
local authorities rather than the government. This is understandable given 
that the residents are mostly in touch with local actors whose decisions 
affect the associations directly. whether the respondents actually make 
a difference between the local and federal authorities or if they identify 
them both simply as ‘authorities’  is not exactly clear. It is possible that no 
great distinction is made, given that power was centralised in the Soviety 
Union and that people only have limited experience with local government 
rule. Secondly, associations’ positive image in the media is probably also 
because they have been part of an above-conducted reform. Homeowners’ 
associations are probably viewed in a positive light in public because they 
are not politically critical and do not threaten existing power structures, 
unlike many social organisations in Russia. Instead, they are beneficial for 
the state, handling responsibilities that used to belong to the state. Some 
social organisations deal with social services in conjunction with the local 
authorities (see Kulmala 2008) but not as part of a systematic, nationwide 
reform, unlike homeowners’ associations.
Homeowners have been accused of being passive, that their partici-
pation in decision-making has been insufficient. However, the disputes 
regarding property rights and management described above show that, 
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when a conflict arises, residents do take action. The data proves that home-
owners’ associations are more than just management organisations: when 
problems are experienced, residents unite and solidarity increases. As one 
respondent put it, “for a Russian it takes an extreme situation [to lead them 
to take action]” (member of the board of TSZh Centre 1). But although the 
residents inside the associations may become closer and achieve bridging 
social capital between people from different social backgrounds, this does 
not make the residents regard outsiders more positively; in fact, the op-
posite tends to apply. The associations tend to rely on personal networks 
when hiring maintenance staff and they avoid using outside strangers. 
One’s ‘own people’ are considered to be more reliable, easier and quicker 
to reach in case of an emergency or unexpected task. This seems logical, 
considering that personal relations have always been important in Russia. 
Personal social networks have been found to be characteristic of grass-
roots social organisations in Russia (Henry 2006b, Salmenniemi 2008). 
Individuals are trusted more than impersonal companies, although people 
can be deceitful to each other as well. According to Höjdestrand’s research 
into homelessness in St. Petersburg in the 1990s and 2000s, a personal ac-
quaintance was often relied on in real estate business, but that ‘friend’ later 
turned out to be a fraud (Höjdestrand 2005, 55). A private company may or 
may not be reliable but people often do not trust them because of a general 
belief in their unreliability. marina Akimova provided examples of these 
beliefs that lacked any factual foundation. 
On the one hand there is a need for associations to maintain good rela-
tions with authorities and other associations because of the support, in-
formation and education they can provide. On the other hand, there was 
a certain degree of suspicion and rejection towards outsiders. The latter 
stems at least partly from bad experiences with outsiders, such as prop-
erty disputes with authorities. Protecting the association’s area by closing 
the courtyards is necessary in order for a CPR regime to exclude outsiders 
from using the common resources. However, a CPR regime does not have 
to be a gated community, which could be destructive for the development 
of social capital and democracy. most homeowners’ associations are not 
elite ‘fortresses’ but middle class dwellings that do not seem to be head-
ing towards isolation and exclusion. Instead, privatisation of associations’ 
areas and housing management has clearly led to a better condition of the 
common areas. This change is very visible in the urban landscape. Not 
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long ago the staircases in most apartment buildings were shabby, dirty and 
neglected, whereas the trend is now moving in the opposite direction. Even 
though serious problems continue to hinder self-government, homeown-
ers’ associations seem to be succeeding where the privatisation reform of 
the 1990s failed: improving the condition of common areas by making 
homeowners responsible for them. 
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6. Conclusions
In this book I have studied St. Petersburg’s homeowners’ associations 
within the framework of the current housing reform in Russia. This sub-
ject is of particular interest for this study because of the fact that home-
owners’ associations are self-governing structures, although their estab-
lishment has been ordered by a higher authority. The housing reform that 
came into force in 2005 obligates all homeowners to organise the manage-
ment of their house privately. One alternative to this, the establishment of 
a homeowners’ association, has since become increasingly common. The 
other two alternatives are direct management by the homeowners, with-
out an association, and management by a private company. In this study I 
have concentrated on homeowners’ associations as, unlike the other two 
alternatives, they are interesting from the point of view of residents’ par-
ticipation and democratic governance. my intention has been to study how 
this kind of above-conducted reform succeeds in practice. what happens 
when the residents take charge and adjust the rules and regulations stated 
in the legislation to their own use? The change of regime from state social-
ism to market economy has been tremendous. In the Soviet Union’s econ-
omy of shortages people used creative ways to obtain goods, but the offi-
cial politics relegated them to passive receivers of state allocated goods, in-
cluding housing. Now people are expected to be active, independent con-
sumers and financially capable of managing their own property. Proper 
maintenance and repairs of the housing stock have been neglected for dec-
ades and management of the deteriorated housing stock is therefore a great 
challenge for homeowners.
This study discusses not only the associations but also the consequenc-
es of the housing reform as a whole, through some of the homeowners’ 
associations that have been part of it. Privatisation of the housing sector 
and housing management is a process that has taken place or is currently 
going on in all post-socialist countries. A study on housing reform and 
homeowners’ associations in Russia is valuable, therefore, as the change 
concerns not only Russia but is a part of larger international development. 
In addition, the absence of previous studies of homeowners’ associations 
in Russia makes this a valuable overall presentation of the subject. 
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I have used two perspectives to examine the homeowners’ association as 
a self-governing entity in civil society. Firstly, the common-pool resource 
regime approach has been used to observe how homeowners’ associations 
take collective care of their common property. A homeowners’ association 
is a kind of common-pool resource (CPR) regime, established to manage 
and maintain the common property of the homeowners, which consists of 
both public and common goods. Public goods, such as staircases, courtyard, 
basement, lifts and attics, are non-excludable, meaning that their use cannot 
be restricted to certain residents. Common goods, on the other hand, are 
not only difficult to restrict but also limited; that is, when someone uses the 
resource, there is less left for others to use. An example of such a subtracta-
ble common good is hot water supply, which will run out if too many people 
are using it at the same time. Another example is the parking lot, which has 
a limited amount of parking spaces available. managing these public and 
common goods is the association’s job. The effectiveness of homeowners’ 
associations is examined with the help of the so-called design principles, 
defined by Elinor Ostrom (2000), which describe a successful CPR regime. 
These design principles consist of clear boundaries for the association, 
including physical boundaries as well as membership of the regime, the 
participation of members in rule-making, monitoring of users by other 
users and graduated sanctions for those who break the rules. According to 
the design principles, conflicts among users or between users and officials 
should be resolved locally and the regime should have minimal recogni-
tion from a national or local government (Ostrom 2000, 149–152). with 
the help of the design principles, the ways in which the association man-
ages common property – the dynamics, cooperation and practices inside 
the association – have been examined. Taking joint care of the courtyard, 
staircases, basements, lifts, attics, etc. requires participation from the 
homeowners, both financial and in the form of decision-making. This can 
lead to disputes and dilemmas, such as the free-rider problem, when some-
one benefits from the efforts of others without participating themselves. 
I have studied the associations from ‘inside’ as well as from the ‘outside’, 
that is, how relations between the association’s members affect its manage-
ment, as well as the roles of outside actors in promoting or preventing the 
associations’ self-government.
In addition to the CPR approach, I have also examined how social capital 
contributes to the associations’ effectiveness and democratic governance. 
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According to Robert Putnam, social capital consists of generalised reci-
procity, trust and networks that reinforce one another and help to create a 
civic community (1993, 167, 177). For Putnam, associations are the ground 
upon which elements of social capital can flourish. Trust is important in 
homeowners’ associations; members need to trust each other that they are 
all contributing to the common good, for example in making payments for 
maintenance of the common property. Generalised reciprocity means that 
people can expect favours or benevolent behaviour to be returned by other 
members of the same community. Reciprocity is generalised, as the good 
or favour is not returned immediately but at some time in the future, pos-
sibly in a different form or by some other member of the community. The 
community benefits when its members know they can rely on each other 
when they need help. Reciprocity leads to closer social networks and vice-
versa: when dense social networks prevail, people are more likely to engage 
in reciprocal relationships (Putnam 1993, 172–175). 
According to Putnam, social capital can be bridging or bonding. The 
former is an inclusive type that draws different people to act together, 
while the latter occurs inside an exclusive, homogenous group of individu-
als. Both bridging and bonding social capital can exist within the same 
community, in different situations (Putnam 2000, 22–23). while bridging 
social capital has more obvious potential to create a civic community, both 
types can be productive for a community. A homeowners’ association may 
connect people who are very different socio-economically, people who 
might not otherwise cooperate, thereby creating bridging social capital.
Thus, homeowners’ associations are a potential breeding ground for so-
cial capital, which can contribute to strengthening of civil society. Both the 
CPR and social capital perspectives consider the free-rider problem, which 
is central for homeowners’ associations, but in a different way. In a com-
mon-pool resource regime free-riding is destructive for the community, as 
it reduces the effectiveness of cooperating for the common good. Secondly, 
the so-called neo-Tocquevillian theorists, including Putnam, regard social 
capital as a force that prevents free-riding and facilitates cooperation be-
tween individuals. Communities in which social capital flourishes and in 
which cooperation is fluent create a society that is more effective than one 
in which social networks, generalised reciprocity and trust are weaker. In 
the same way, social capital in a homeowners’ association can reduce free-
riding and make the association work more efficiently as a self-governing 
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association. Ideally, by fostering the ‘civic virtues’ of which social capital 
consists and by succeeding in democratic decision-making, a homeown-
ers’ association may help build a more democratic society. 
These questions are examined through the interview data, collected in 
St. Petersburg in autumn of 2005, spring of 2006 and winter of 2008. The 
interviews were conducted with association leaders and residents, as well 
as housing authorities and experts, some of whom were interviewed re-
peatedly during the fieldwork period in order to observe the development 
of the situation. The 17 associations that were chosen randomly for the 
data represent the variety of St. Petersburg’s associations, with a range of 
old and new, small and large houses, located in the suburbs as well as in 
the centre of the city. 
The main difference between the associations, which turned out to be a 
decisive factor for the associations’ management, is between old and new 
houses. In the old houses the socio-economic structure was very heteroge-
neous, consisting of homeowners who had privatised their previously rent-
ed apartments for free, as well as wealthier homeowners who had recently 
bought their apartments in architecturally prestigious but deteriorating 
old houses. These homeowners had varying financial resources and, there-
fore, differing degrees of interest in maintaining the common property, 
which led to disputes and problems for the association’s decision-making. 
The opportunity to privatise state-owned apartments for free has result-
ed in large numbers of poor homeowners in Russia. Homeownership in 
Russia, therefore, does not represent a certain level of financial well being, 
as it does in the west where buying an apartment usually requires con-
siderable financial resources. The poor homeowners do not have adequate 
financial resources to maintain their property, which causes problems for 
housing management. In addition, old houses may also contain non-priva-
tised communal apartments with poor tenants. In the ‘new’ houses, built 
in the 2000s, the homeowners had all purchased their apartments, instead 
of taking advantage of free privatisation, meaning they had approximately 
the same level of financial resources. The more uniform social structure 
can make decision-making easier in new houses. Having said that, the new 
houses are often very large complexes of hundreds of apartments, in which 
social capital is more difficult to cultivate. 
Secondly, the initiative to establish associations in both old and new 
houses came from different directions. In the old houses the initiative 
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came from the residents, who felt that private management would improve 
maintenance and increase security in their house. In newly built houses, 
built by private constructors, associations had already been established by 
the constructors in the construction phase. The new apartment owners 
agreed to become members of the association when they moved in and 
there was no debate as to whether the association should be established. 
This was a much easier starting point than in the old houses, where poorer 
homeowners strongly opposed the establishment of associations. 
Besides the differences in residential social structure, the old houses 
in the data represent totally different housing stock, materially speaking. 
The old houses were built in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, while 
the new houses were constructed between 1996 and 2004. This means that 
maintenance and repairs are much more necessary and large-scale in the 
old houses than in the new ones. Large-scale repairs constitute a serious 
financial burden for an association’s budget, even though the city of St. 
Petersburg has promised to help finance the major repairs of the house. 
Some findings of this study are particularly characteristic of St. 
Petersburg. For example, property disputes are relatively common in the 
city, due to the large old housing stock where property rights are often dis-
puted between the city authorities and homeowners’ associations. However, 
the practices and problems in St. Petersburg’s homeowners’ associations 
are similar to those throughout Russia, so the study is fairly representative 
of the situation in the country as a whole. Because the housing reform is 
taken into practice at the local level, it is worth studying the local outcomes 
of the reform as well. Given that, as of spring 2005, 25 percent of the city’s 
housing stock was managed by homeowners’ associations, a significant 
proportion of the inhabitants are involved in them. In other words, the ac-
tivity of homeowners and the success of homeowners’ associations reveals 
how the housing reform has succeeded so far, in general. The first section 
of this chapter pondered the results of the study in terms of the associa-
tions’ degree of democracy and self-government, while the second section 
examined the results from the point of view of social capital. The final part 
of the chapter considers homeowners’ associations from the perspective of 
the housing reform and as part of civil society in Russia.
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6.1. Managing Common Property
How do homeowners’ associations succeed as self-governing, democrat-
ic organisations, taking care of common property in practice? One of the 
main findings of this study is that the associations’ management is serious-
ly obstructed by insufficient resident participation in common decision-
making. The associations’ decisions are made in the common meetings, in 
which all members can participate. As Ostrom also notes, it is important 
for a self-governing CPR regime that members affected by the rules of the 
regime can participate in making and modifying the rules (Ostrom 2000, 
150). However, in homeowners’ associations the ability to participate is not 
enough for the management to succeed; over 50 percent of the owners have 
to participate in order for the meetings and decisions to be legally valid 
and participation rarely reaches this level. One solution to this problem 
has been to use remote voting systems, such as voting forms, so that most 
issues are decided before the meetings. This method seems to work quite 
well but this is not necessarily the best solution for democratic govern-
ance as matters are decided without the prior discussion that would take 
place in a meeting. The voting system therefore runs the risk of members 
voting without sufficient knowledge on the matter. Not everyone needs to 
take part in meetings in order for the association to qualify as democrat-
ic. However, according to the resident interviews and especially according 
to the experts, it seems that people are not used to democratic governance 
and easily consent to undemocratic, autocratic leadership. Residents may 
sometimes even want someone to decide on their behalf because they feel 
it is easier and are used to someone else being in charge of such issues, as 
was the case in the Soviet era. 
Besides the problem of low attendance, democratic governance is some-
times hindered by an overly authoritative leader who misuses their posi-
tion and/or commits financial fraud. According to the Housing Code, an 
audit committee should control accounting and other tasks of the associa-
tion’s board. This system of internal monitoring, that is, members of the 
association monitoring other members, is also characteristic of a CPR re-
gime (Ostrom 2000, 151). Not all associations follow this rule, however. On 
the other hand, judging by the data, severe cases of malpractice do tend to 
become revealed in time and, in the data, association members did manage 
to displace their leaders when necessary. However, there have been cases 
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outside the data where enforcement by lawyers or even by the police has 
been necessary if the chairperson refused to give up his or her position.
In practice, there are three options for leading a homeowners’ associa-
tion. From the point of view of residents’ self-government, the best alterna-
tive is that the association is led by one of the homeowners, a chairperson. 
The second option is that a professional manager is hired to work in coop-
eration with the chair. The third alternative is that a manager handles the 
management, in which case the homeowners’ role is secondary. The first 
two options were the most common in the data. In many newly built houses 
the association had initially been led by a professional manager but residents 
had later taken charge and replaced the manager. Dissolving a contract with 
a management company has proven to be complicated and has required ne-
gotiations and persuasion by the residents. Here the management company 
intervenes in the association’s management and hinders its self-governance, 
depriving it of the minimal recognition of the right to organise that a CPR 
regime should have. Old houses with fewer financial resources were more 
often led by the residents, without a hired manager. The most affluent as-
sociations (located in the so-called elite housing) were managed according 
to the third alternative, with decision-making power resting mostly in the 
hands of the manager and residents making only a nominal contribution. 
The degree of democratic governance and residents’ participation therefore 
varies considerably between the associations. In general, however, more 
homeowners take part in smaller associations than in larger ones. 
Besides the problems with democratic decision-making and lack of 
participation, this study has shown that free-riding is one of the most seri-
ous problems that the associations face. Not paying for housing mainte-
nance and service charges is quite common and it can be a serious threat 
to the association’s financial situation. Some of the non-payers do not 
pay because they cannot afford to but there is another group, the actual 
free-riders, who neglect the payments deliberately. The free-rider problem 
arises in part from the use of the common goods in the house, such as the 
common areas, which cannot be restricted only to the paying members. 
The common property is a non-excludable good, meaning that regardless 
of whether certain residents pay for the maintenance of these areas, they 
cannot be excluded from using them. Common goods are also subtracta-
ble, that is, there is a limited amount of them, so that when one person uses 
the good, there is less left for others. 
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Free-riding is difficult to prevent as there are no specific sanctions 
against non-payment defined in the Housing Code, other than taking the 
offender to court (Article 137). Expelling or evicting a homeowner due to 
non-payment is not possible. However, a member of a cooperative42 can be 
expelled based on the decision of other members and can be evicted if the 
participatory share of their apartment is not paid (Zhilishchnyi kodeks, 
Articles 130, 133). The lack of sanctions is a definite problem that needs 
to be corrected in order for the associations to function effectively. A CPR 
regime needs graduated sanctions in order to strengthen the rules and en-
sure they are followed, according to one of the design principles (Ostrom 
2000, 151) but the legislative system in Russia is slow, inefficient and not 
trusted by most people (see e.g. Rose 2001, 69). The data shows that lawsuits 
are filed only in cases of very large debts and that non-payers will rarely 
have to answer for their debts in court. In the absence of real sanctions 
to impose, the chair or manager must resort to other methods. These in-
clude talking to and pressuring free-riders to pay, or trying to shame them 
by placing the names of heavily indebted residents on bulletin boards. 
In practice, the inefficient and untrusted justice system fails to fulfil the 
design principle of an arena in which conflicts between members of the 
association (or conflicts between members and authorities) can be solved 
efficiently (Ostrom 2000, 152). Accordingly, the circumstances for free-
riding are favourable and it is therefore very common. Free-riding seems 
to be a problem that associations cannot solve on their own. The legislation 
should be modified with effective sanctions that can be easily executed by 
the associations.
A CPR regime needs clear rules defining its physical boundaries. 
Associations’ boundaries have been tested in property disputes with au-
thorities. According to respondents, St. Petersburg’s Committee for the 
Administration of City Property (KUGI) has illegally taken over premises 
by claiming that they are city property. Property ‘raids’ of attics, basements 
and empty apartments have been conducted, especially in old houses with 
valuable central locations. Disagreements over property rights have been 
sorted out in court but the proceedings have been slow, often taking years 
42 Housing cooperative: a system by which the apartment is obtained on hire 
purchase. A cooperative’s decision-making structure is very similar to that of 
a homeowners’ association.
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to conclude. Clear boundaries are very important for the associations be-
cause if the boundaries within which an association operates are unclear, 
it cannot work properly. If all the premises of the house are not in the as-
sociation’s ownership, the association’s jurisdiction and self-government 
are limited. Secondly, there have been problems registering the ownership 
of land plots under and around buildings from the city to the association. 
Owning the land plot would allow the association to profit from renting 
or otherwise exploiting it, thereby strengthening the association’s self-
management. According to the legislation the association has the right to 
privatise the land plot but the practical process is often complicated. There 
is disagreement regarding the extent of the association’s borders and some 
experts claim that the Committee on Land Resources, KZR, intentionally 
hinders the registration process because they do not want to give up profit-
able land plots (Ekspert Severo-Zapad 43/2005). By preventing the associa-
tions from acquiring ownership of common property and land plots, the 
authorities are obstructing self-government.
This study shows that local authorities also obstruct associations’ self-
management in other ways, besides impugning its physical boundaries. 
Problems have been experienced when associations have tried to move 
their maintenance from the municipality to a private company. municipal 
housing authorities have not given the associations the necessary techni-
cal documents because doing so would mean losing a customer for the 
municipal maintenance service. Some authorities are therefore resisting 
the reform if it weakens their own position but, in doing so, they are actu-
ally sabotaging the self-management that is supposed to be the aim of the 
reform. Contradiction therefore exists between the federal level at which 
the reform is formulated and the local level at which it is implemented. 
Although legal preconditions for self-government do exist, city authorities 
such as KUGI and KZR and also some municipal authorities fail to fully 
recognise the associations and their independence. The corruption and 
inefficiency that plagued authorities during the Soviet era has not disap-
peared, although it may have decreased. In sum, the design principle under 
which a national or local government should give minimal recognition of 
the right to organise for the CPR regime (Ostrom 2000, 152), is fulfilled 
only partially. 
The serious conflicts with the authorities are somewhat unexpected, be-
cause the housing reform is strongly promoted by the federal authorities 
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as one of the major current national reforms. Homeowners’ associations 
play an important role in the reform and, because of this, the authorities 
could be expected to cooperate with the associations. The authorities are 
not a single, uniform group, however, and there is cooperation between 
some authorities and the associations, but the negative experiences and 
disagreements with outside actors tended to dominate the interviews. Of 
the authorities that support the homeowners’ associations, the most visible 
is the St. Petersburg Housing Committee, which supervises implementa-
tion of the city’s housing policy. The Housing Committee, unlike KUGI 
and KZR, does not own property or land and therefore has no direct finan-
cial interest in the homeowners’ associations’ property. Despite the trou-
bles that some associations have experienced, municipal councils, that is, 
neighbourhood-level housing authorities, typically cooperate with home-
owners’ associations in management and maintenance, for example in the 
technical preparation of centrally heated houses for the heating period. 
The associations contact authorities for help as well, to receive guidance in 
management matters or for help solving a dispute inside the association. 
Homeowners’ associations have made a great difference to the condi-
tion of the common areas in apartment buildings. During the Soviet era 
there was open access to courtyards and staircases that were owned by the 
state and thus in the ‘common ownership’ of the people. As a result, eve-
ryone’s property was treated as no one’s property and the courtyards and 
common areas deteriorated. Now that the common areas are homeown-
ers’ associations’ property and have been started to be closed to outsiders 
through locks, fences and guarding, the attitude has changed. Residents 
have started to treat their surroundings with greater care. In Russia it seems 
that privatisation of the common areas has been necessary in order for self-
governing management of the common property to succeed. Turning the 
common areas into private property of the homeowners association, rather 
than being public property that anyone can access freely, makes manage-
ment of the property meaningful. Better maintenance of buildings, as well 
as safer living surroundings, were also the main reasons behind the estab-
lishment of associations in old houses. In this sense the housing reform has 
succeeded in making residents care for their surroundings and improving 
the condition of the common areas. 
Homeowners have also started to pay greater attention to the protec-
tion of their property. Over the last few years there has been a tendency in 
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Russia to increase security measures in apartment buildings; in particular, 
homeowners’ associations are closing up their areas. Courtyards and stair-
cases that used to be opened or closed with a simple mechanical code lock 
have started to be secured with intercom systems, more advanced code 
locks, fences and gates. Security guards have been hired and video cam-
eras installed in order to prevent intrusions. while there is evidence that 
criminality has increased in recent years, increased security measures are a 
sign of privatisation to outsiders. New owners want to show outsiders that 
theirs is private property, while residents want to feel secure and ‘at home’. 
Some associations were eager to increase security measures and to restrict 
outsiders’ access to the area. However, the average homeowners’ associa-
tion in Russia does not appear to be aiming at excessive fortressing. Some 
associations’ managers and chairpersons also explained that they did not 
wish to isolate the association from the outside world. most homeowners’ 
associations could not afford this type of fortressing even if they wanted to, 
as they can barely afford the basic maintenance and repairs of the house. 
However, segregation is not a clear public concern in Russia. moreover, 
architects and urban planners regard fortressing and strict separation of 
private and public, such as apartment-buildings and the street, as a desired 
development (makarova 2006, 13–14).
6.2. Social Capital and Relations with Other Actors
Do relations between homeowners assist or hinder homeowners’ associa-
tions from working effectively? Do neighbours become closer in home-
owners’ associations, that is, does the association produce social capital 
and can it help to overcome the free-rider problem? These questions have 
been examined by using the concept of social capital, as defined by Putnam, 
consisting of norms of reciprocity, social networks and trust. According 
to Putnam, social capital is the key for solving collective-action problems 
and it explains why people choose to cooperate, even though the rational 
choice for an individual would be to defect (Putnam 1993, 167, 169, 177).
The elements of social capital are interconnected and reinforce each 
other, so that norms of reciprocity are based on trust and reciprocal rela-
tionships strengthen trust between members of the community (Putnam 
1993, 172). Trust is needed in homeowners’ associations in order to facili-
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tate cooperation. Although homeowners may be ordered from above to 
organise into associations, trust cannot be imposed from above. mutual 
trust that the rules of the association are being followed is especially im-
portant in the absence of effective sanctions for free-riding. According to 
marc morjé Howard (2003), general distrust towards associations prevails 
in post-Soviet Russia, because people regard the present-day associations 
as a continuation of the Soviet organisations in which participation was 
virtually obligatory. If Howard is right, creating trust between members of 
the association can be a challenge. Furthermore, the low level of trust in 
the justice system that prevails in Russia does not create a trusting atmos-
phere either and may prevent trusting relationships between neighbours. 
This study has found that free-riding and low participation in meet-
ings stemmed from and had consequences not only for the association’s 
management but for residents’ social relations as well. Social relations and 
management of the association cannot be totally separated, as manage-
ment is based on residents’ social relations. Reaction to these problems 
varied between large associations in newly built houses and in old houses 
with varying residential composition. It was particularly difficult to get 
residents in large buildings with hundreds of apartments to participate. 
Dense social networks are also more difficult to develop in huge building 
complexes than in small houses. It is easier for residents to network with 
neighbours from the same floor or staircase than with the entire building. 
Large associations attempted to activate people to participate by organis-
ing decision-making not only at the association level but also on the floor 
level. Each floor had their own meeting and chose their own chairpersons, 
which were subordinate to the meetings and the chairs of the overall asso-
ciation. Networking therefore took place in smaller units, either instead of 
or in addition to the whole association. Generalised trust and reciprocity 
are based on people belonging to the same group; they do not need to know 
each other personally. Networking, however, requires that members know 
each other and in this sense a smaller association is a more fruitful ground 
for social capital. 
Secondly, residents’ socio-economic heterogeneity in old houses is an-
other obstacle to good social relations and, as a result, smooth decision-
making. As noted before, residents in old houses have very different re-
sources and interests for maintaining common property. In some asso-
ciations, such as TSZh Petrogradskii 1, the differing interests between the 
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poorer and the more affluent owners had caused tension between the two 
groups. Common decision-making did not create bridging social capital 
between the groups and they remained closed, homogenous circles. The 
chair openly despised the free-riding poor homeowners, seeing himself as 
a more civilised person, who understood what was best for the community, 
while the “parasites” were obstructing the efforts of others. The wealthier 
homeowners in this particular association ended up paying the share of 
the free-riders, seeing no other solution to improve their housing condi-
tions. 
In another old house, TSZh Centre 3, there was a similar gap between 
the ‘rich’ and ‘poor’, although the problem of the poor members being un-
willing or unable to make the maintenance payments was solved different-
ly. Based on a joint decision by the members, the poor residents had been 
exempted from the maintenance payments in exchange for the poorer resi-
dents’ support in establishing the association. The members thus modified 
the articles of the association to better suit their use, which is character-
istic of a CPR regime. The vice-chair considered this to be the wealthier 
residents’ moral responsibility towards the poorer ones and, in return, he 
felt that the poor residents contributed in their own way, by respecting the 
common property and not littering, a change from the previous situation 
when the common areas were treated as a public space. This is a reciprocal 
relationship but it is not generalised reciprocity based on equal relation-
ships, as the poorer residents are financially dependent on their wealthier 
neighbours. On the other hand, the poor residents have leverage as well, 
because without their consent the association could not have been formed. 
The above examples represent different ways that associations have dealt 
with the challenges of decision-making and the free-rider problem. This 
study has shown that associations have had to find their own solutions, 
as the legislation lacks efficient regulations and sanctions to control the 
problems.
This study shows that a homeowners’ association has increased infor-
mal interaction between neighbours. Hence, although the associations had 
difficulty getting their members to participate in decision-making, social 
capital was still produced. In old houses the initiation of the association 
required a lot of negotiation and going from door-to-door, convincing resi-
dents to support the association. Voluntary get-togethers were popular in 
all associations and many had some kind of joint celebration of big national 
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holidays, especially New Year. It was common for neighbours to take part 
in cleaning and beautifying the courtyard. Some associations organised 
voluntary cleaning-up days (subbotniki) once or twice a year. Subbotnik, 
a tradition that originated in the Soviet era, have not been systematically 
organised in the post-Soviet era, prior to homeowners’ associations, as 
there was no organisation to carry it out. Besides the beautification of the 
courtyard, some associations had clubs for their members, such as the vet-
erans’ council – another Soviet tradition – for the elderly residents in TSZh 
Centre 3. Thus, although the homeowners’ association is a new phenome-
non in Russia, certain Soviet traditions prevail there. Neighbours form so-
cial networks in recreational activities, through socialising in an informal 
environment. This study shows that social capital is therefore created in 
another context within the association, although participation in official 
decision-making is low. ‘Unofficial’ networking shows that homeowners’ 
associations have another important function besides management of the 
house, that of bringing people together. The informal activities make the 
association a community rather than just a management organisation. 
while individual responsibility is heavily stressed in the housing reform, 
cooperation is necessary in order for the reform to succeed. Neighbours’ 
networks may not be as close as they were in the Soviet era but homeown-
ers’ associations have certainly invigorated cooperation. In the old houses, 
such as TSZh Centre 3, the residents got to know each other only after the 
association was established, even though they had lived under the same 
roof for decades. Neighbours’ relations had not been close in this house, 
contrary to the notion of previous research, which found that neighbours 
actively network with each other (Salmi 2006). Homeowners’ associations 
have thus furthered residents’ networking and built trust and social capital 
between neighbours. Considering the informal activities and their popu-
larity, in these cases residents do not seem to associate homeowners’ as-
sociations with the semi-mandatory organisations of the Soviet era. This 
shows that Howard’s interpretation of people identifying modern organi-
sations as descendants of Soviet organisations does not apply here. 
Some associations’ leaders hoped that residents would be in close con-
tact with each other, believing that a tighter-knit community would make 
decision-making easier. Symbols were also used to strengthen residents’ 
togetherness. TSZh Kirovskii had its own flag, flying in a flagpole in the 
courtyard, which showed outsiders that the area is private and that there 
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is a homeowners’ association. TSZh Centre 3 honoured the famous archi-
tect who had designed the house by establishing a ‘museum’ in his mem-
ory. This was, according to the vice-chair, done because the association’s 
lead wanted the homeowners to have something they could identify with, 
something to make them feel that they are part of the same community. A 
homeowners’ association does not need to be a community of friends but 
good social relations do make decision-making simpler, as mutual under-
standing is easier to achieve. 
Despite disagreements with authorities, some associations actively 
maintained good relations with the municipal council or city authorities. 
more often, however, the associations’ leaders cooperated with each other, 
sharing knowledge and experience regarding technical and practical mat-
ters. The leader is in a key position in the association and the association’s 
management depends largely on the competence of the leader. Exchanging 
information on management matters is extremely important, therefore, 
because homeowners’ associations are still a new phenomenon and the 
leaders may find practical matters somewhat unclear. As private manage-
ment is a new development in Russia that has not yet become firmly rooted 
in the country, the association’s leader’s personal qualifications carry more 
weight than they probably would under more stabilised circumstances. 
Although financial resources are needed to run the association, a lot de-
pends on the chairperson´ s or manager’s technical and legal knowledge. 
Perhaps even more importantly, he or she needs to be trusted by the resi-
dents and able to activate them to participate. The tendency of the asso-
ciation to revolve around the chairperson is also characteristic of Russian 
NGOs, which, according to previous studies, often depend on one person 
and his or her social networks (Salmenniemi 2008, 41). 
The data reveals that although homeowners’ associations have managed 
to cultivate some reciprocity, trust and networks between members, they 
are quite inward-oriented systems. This can be perceived in the pattern of 
relying on acquaintances when hiring maintenance or administrative staff. 
Associations tended to employ their own residents, relatives or acquaint-
ances for such jobs rather than use a private company. Using personal so-
cial networks to get by and obtain goods that are otherwise difficult to 
access was done in the Soviet era. This reliance on networks of friends is 
not unique to Russia, of course. what differentiates St. Petersburg’s home-
owners’ associations is that efforts were made to use the networks to hire 
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people even when hiring an outsider would have been simpler, and outsid-
ers were treated with a certain degree of distrust. Respondents would also 
sooner rent their association’s premises (a garage for example) to a resident 
of the house than to a stranger, regarding the latter as less reliable. On the 
other hand, distrust towards outsiders is not mere paranoia but based on 
experience, as break-ins and thefts are quite common in St. Petersburg, 
while property disputes and raids have made residents reluctant to rent 
their premises to outsiders. As Putnam has noted in his study in the United 
States, the ‘have-nots’ are less trusting than the ‘haves’: the socially exclud-
ed, victims of crime and people that have had bad experiences in their lives 
are less trusting, based on their experiences, than more fortunate people 
(2000, 138). 
The social capital produced in homeowners’ associations is mostly the 
bonding, exclusive type that strengthens the group’s homogeneity. The 
same kind of pattern of exclusivity has been noted in other empirical stud-
ies on civil society in Russia. Suvi Salmenniemi (2008, 228) found inward-
ness in a trade union and women’s centre in Tver’, concluding that even 
though there was a strong level of trust and commitment to the organisa-
tion, this did not extend outside the group.
On the other hand, disputes with authorities brought residents from 
very different backgrounds together to oppose the outside threat, thereby 
creating bridging social capital. In the case of a management company 
defrauding residents or the manager refusing to give up his or her posi-
tion, or in the case of a dispute with the authorities over property rights, 
neighbours gathered together to defend their cause. An outside impulse 
therefore activated the residents and generated networking between them. 
In TSZh Centre 1, old building with a varied socio-economic structure, 
bridging social capital was created between the residents when they fought 
together against the city authorities on the property rights of the house. 
Although this bridging social capital may be temporary, it still shows that 
the associations are capable of bringing different people together. On the 
other hand, a dispute with the authorities could also lead to a conflict in-
side the association. This happened in TSZh Centre 1, where one of the 
residents supporting the authorities ended up in a conflict with the chair. 
Social networks are especially important in old houses, where the 
residents’ networking had led to the establishment of the association and 
played an important role in finding maintenance staff for the association, 
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for example. Other previous research shows that social organisations in 
Russia tend to be established based on social networks. Social organi-
sations have been viewed as a continuation of the Soviet pattern of net-
working (see Salmenniemi 2008, 41–42, Henry 2006, 224). Some scholars, 
including Howard, have claimed the opposite: that networks inhibit the 
development of social organisations because strong networks make asso-
ciations useless. However, this study’s data supports the first theory, and 
the idea that homeowners’ associations as both social and management 
organisations can hardly be replaced with social networks. Despite the 
strong inward-orientation and bonding social capital, this does not mean 
that the bridging type of social capital could not be created in homeown-
ers’ associations. The association obligates homeowners with very different 
social statuses to cooperate in joint decision-making. Although member-
ship of the association is voluntary, members cannot choose with whom 
they cooperate. As the data shows, in some associations this has brought 
together people from very different backgrounds who would otherwise be 
unlikely to interact with each other. 
6.3. Outcomes of the Reform
As homeowners’ associations are at the centre of the current housing re-
form in Russia, a study of the associations presents the overall situation 
in the housing field. The reform’s central goal is to transfer housing man-
agement from the public sector to the private sector, the consequences 
of which are reflected in homeowners’ associations. The Housing Code 
states that homeowners’ associations are self-governing organisations for 
management of common property. Housing reform is put into practice 
on the local level and, as has become evident, there is a contradiction be-
tween the national policy and local practices. Some local authorities in St. 
Petersburg pursue their own interests at the expense of homeowners’ asso-
ciations’ self-government. The authorities are not a uniform category and 
approach the associations differently. Some of them, such as the Housing 
Committee, support the establishment of homeowners’ associations, while 
other authorities have inhibited the associations’ land privatisation and St. 
Petersburg’s Committee for the Administration of City Property (KUGI) 
has taken over some associations’ premises. Because implementation of 
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the reform and the development of democracy take place at the local lev-
el, support from local authorities is crucial for homeowners’ associations. 
Considering that homeowners’ associations are established to enable pri-
vate citizens to take care of their property, they are facing a surprising 
number of difficulties. Overall, homeowners’ associations do not get the 
recognition they need as independent actors in order for the self-govern-
ment to work. In general, homeowners’ associations are not regarded posi-
tively or with a cooperative attitude by the authorities, unlike some other 
social organisations that provide social services in Russia (Kulmala 2008). 
There is some evidence that not that much has actually changed in 
housing management, in spite of the reform. Gigantic homeowners’ as-
sociations, consisting of dozens, even hundreds of buildings, have been 
established by the authorities in Russia. This is a result of pressure to ful-
fil the housing reform’s regulation of organising housing management 
anew. These ‘homeowners’ associations’ have been established to make it 
look like the regulation has been fulfilled. This is possible in buildings in 
which the city owns over 50 percent of the apartment area and thus has the 
power to establish the association without other homeowners’ consent. In 
the giant homeowners’ associations the public authority continues to be 
the actual manager of the houses and the residents have very little, if any, 
decision-making power. In practice this means that the old system is just 
working under a new name. This is an example of the reform being imple-
mented differently than what was originally intended. The result, central-
ised housing management, is quite the opposite of the aim of residential 
self-management and not that different from the old municipal housing 
management. 
The reform has been implemented very quickly and this is one example 
of its consequences. The establishment of false homeowners’ associations 
shows that there is a risk of pushing the reform forward too forcefully, 
resulting only in a formal change without an actual change in practices. 
These enormous artificial associations have been established in certain 
cities in Russia (Kvartirnyi riad 17 January 2008) but not, as far as can 
be ascertained, in St. Petersburg. However, respondents spoke of neigh-
bouring houses in St. Petersburg in which a homeowners’ association had 
been registered but the house continued to be under municipal manage-
ment without any change to the previous order. This is clearly not a social 
organisation but a “marionette” organisation, as Cook and Vinogradova 
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have called social organisations that are created and led by state or govern-
ment officials (2006, 34–35). 
According to the St. Petersburg’s Housing Committee, since 2007 man-
agement companies have started to become more common than before. 
This indicates that homeowners’ associations will not increase any more, 
at least in St. Petersburg, but will remain at the same level of approximately 
25 percent of the city’s housing stock. An established stock of homeowners’ 
associations still exists, however, and the role of homeowners’ associations 
is significant in the city’s housing sector. Despite the problems homeown-
ers’ associations are experiencing, they are valuable for encouraging civic 
engagement at the immediate surroundings of one’s living place. A man-
agement company does not have the same ability to activate residents and 
foster civil society as a homeowners’ association.
Although housing movements and organisations that defend residents’ 
rights are quite common in Russia nowadays, homeowners’ associations are 
regarded somewhat differently among the activists. According to one hous-
ing activist in Nizhnii Novgorod, NGOs tend not to be directed at housing 
management reform because it is not seen as a social question like HIV, 
children or youth issues, upon which grassroots NGOs in Russia usually 
focus. Instead, housing management is seen as a professional field, in which 
non-professionals should not get involved. On the other hand, the respond-
ents in this study, associations’ leaders as well as residents, often emphasised 
that homeowners’ associations are about self-government (samoupravlenie), 
comparing them with municipal management. In this sense the homeown-
ers seem to have correctly perceived the idea of a homeowners’ association, 
contradicting the often presented claim that people do not understand the 
essence of homeowners’ association and their role in it.
This study has shown that housing management in homeowners’ as-
sociations typically rests on the shoulders of a few active residents. most 
people are still quite passive about taking part in their association’s de-
cision-making but their passivity is compensated for by the activity and 
persistence of other individuals. These residents are determined to make 
improvements in the maintenance and management of their building and 
continue to push forward their initiatives, despite all the bureaucratic ob-
stacles and disagreements with local authorities. The active members are 
making considerable efforts to enable their association to work properly. 
Although insufficient participation in decision-making has been a prob-
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lem in both new and old houses, old houses at least had a small group of 
enthusiasts, the original initiators of the association. On the other hand, 
the old houses were troubled by sharp socio-economic differences, which 
have created conflicts between residents. The everyday management prob-
lems that the associations are dealing with show that running a homeown-
ers’ association in Russia demands more activity from its members than do 
typical homeowners’ associations and similar organisations in the west. 
Some associations are in practice run by a core group of active residents or 
a chairperson/manager, and without these few activists some homeown-
ers’ associations would not even exist. This is what differentiates Russian 
homeowners’ associations from western homeowners’ associations and 
similar systems, such as housing companies in Finland. In Russia hom-
eowners’ associations are indeed about civic action, as they require activity 
and participation from their members. As the data shows, members often 
need to settle misunderstandings and disagreements with the authorities 
concerning private management through the courts. In western home-
owners’ associations, such as those in Finland, these misunderstandings 
are not as common, which enables members to concentrate on routine ad-
ministration duties, thereby making associations mere management or-
ganisations. 
Despite the problem of low participation, the respondents, associations’ 
leaders and experts were optimistic, seeing that the residents’attitudes 
were changing and the general tendency was towards taking more respon-
sibility and activating. Evaluation of the success of homeowners’ associa-
tions depends largely on the point of comparison. Although members are 
not particularly active in associations’ decision-making, even small-scale 
participation is a change from the previous system of centralised housing 
management. In the past homeowners did not have the opportunity (or 
responsibility) to have their say on the management of their house. In this 
sense, the change is remarkable. However, as this study has shown, the 
main problem is not the passivity and “Soviet mentality” of the people. It 
is rather the institutional impediments and deficiencies in the legislation, 
such as the lack of sanctions towards free-riding that discourage participa-
tion and hinder the associations from working properly.
One thing that has clearly changed is the condition of the common are-
as. The general attitude towards common areas, which had previously been 
neglected, is now changing. The privatisation of common property and 
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restriction of the association’s area from outsiders through the use of locks 
and fences has led to residents caring more for its condition. Homeowners’ 
associations have brought neighbours together to socialise in informal 
activities, thereby strengthening social capital. Although formal decision-
making may not be working ideally, the association has fostered a feel-
ing of community and encouraged residents to respect the common areas, 
which are now regarded by residents as their own, private property. 
Privatisation of housing and housing management has been or is cur-
rently being conducted in all post-socialist countries. The socialist sys-
tem has left all of these countries with a similar institutional foundation 
for reforming the housing sector. Although reform of the housing sector 
has been realised differently in different countries, there are some simi-
larities in the outcomes of the reforms. As an example, the problems that 
homeowners’ associations are facing in Russia now are largely the same 
as those experienced at the beginning of the reform in the condomini-
ums of Estonia. These include a lack of interest towards common prop-
erty, the absence of a sense of community and variety in residents’ socio-
economic backgrounds, which inhibits cooperation (Kährik et al. 2003, 
232). However, this study shows that homeowners’ associations have either 
managed to overcome these problems or at least found ways to deal with 
them. The problems have not been defeated once and for all but they are 
not unconquerable obstacles either.
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Appendix 1. list of Interviewed Respondents 
Preliminary interviews, february and April 2005
A homeowner living in a TSZh in St. Petersburg
Staff of housing newspaper ‘Concierge’: Olesia Galkina, publishing direc-
tor and Aleksei Koltsov, general editor, St. Petersburg
Tatiana Lykova, Institute for Urban Economics, moscow
Professor Natalia Lebina, University of Economics and Finance, St. 
Petersburg
Katerina Gerasimova, CISR, Centre for Independent Social Research, St. 
Petersburg 
Elena Gribova, Petrostat, St. Petersburg’s Statistics Committee
Recorded interviews 
In chronological order, expert interviews noted separately.
Autumn 2005
Resp. 1:  Chair, TSZh Petrogradskii 1, male, 55 years, higher medical edu-
cation
Resp. 2: member of the board, TSZh Petrogradskii 1, female, 50 years, 
higher education
Resp. 3: Homeowner, TSZh Petrogradskii 1, female, 48 years, mid-level 
education
Resp. 4: Homeowner and cashier of the TSZh Petrogradskii 1, female, 43 
years, higher education
Resp. 5: Chair, TSZh Primorskii, female, 60 years, higher education
Resp. 6: Homeowner, TSZh Primorskii, male, 53 years, does not live in the 
TSZh (the apartment is occupied by his daughter), lower level of educa-
tion, technician
Resp. 7: Chair, TSZh Centre 1, male, 37 years, higher technical education
Resp. 8:  member of the board, TSZh Centre 1, male, 40 years, mid-level 
education
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Resp. 9: Chair, TSZh Kalininskii 1, female, 48 years, higher education, has 
worked as a teacher and in real-estate
Resp. 10:  manager, TSZh Kirovskii, male, 47 years, higher marine corps 
education
Resp. 11: member of the board, residents’ representative on his floor, TSZh 
Kirovskii, male, 42 years, works as a craftsman in the TSZh, mid-level 
education
Resp. 12:  manager, TSZh Centre 2, male, 64 years, higher technical educa-
tion
Resp. 13: manager, TSZh Petrogradskii 2, female, 55 years, higher educa-
tion, previously worked as a hotel manager
Resp. 14:  manager, TSZh Vyborgskii 1, male, 38 years, higher education, 
military-engineer
Resp. 15: Ex-chair, TSZh Kalininskii 2, male, 68 years, higher education, 
has worked in the construction field 
Resp. 16 (exp): Lawyer, male, 22 years, works in a law firm specialised in 
housing, also resident of TSZh Petrogradskii 1 
Resp. 17 (exp): Ekaterina Sidorchenko, approx. 50 years, deputy and chair 
of committee of economic matters of munitsipal’nyi sovet munitsipal-
nogo obrazovaniia “Grazhdanka”
Resp. 18 (exp): mikhail Amosov, 46 years, member of the Yabloko party 
and a deputy in St. Petersburg’s Legislative Assembly, lives and has an 
office in TSZh Kalininskii 1
Resp. 19 & 20 (exps): male, Amosov’s aide, and female, director of the 
project to establishTSZh in Kalininskii and Vyborgskii districts 
Resp. 21 (exp.): Elizaveta Dobkina, 24 years, journalist at Ekspert Severo-
Zapad magazine, specialised in housing, higher philological education
Spring 2006
Resp. 22: Vice-chair, TSZh Centre 3, male, 62 years, higher party and mili-
tary background, worked in the district administration before and also 
as a sailor and mechanic
Group interview: Interview with participants of the Sovet veteranov in 
TSZh Centre 3, all pensioners and homeowners living in the house.
Resp. 23: Female, 59 years
Resp. 24: Female, 75 years
Resp. 25: Female, 80 years
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Resp. 26: Female, 72 years
Resp. 27: Resident of a house in which the establishment of a TSZh is 
planned, male, 39 years, higher education
Resp. 28:  manager, TSZh Petrogradskii 3, female, 36 years, mid-level edu-
cation, has worked in GUZhA before and taken a TSZh management 
course
Resp. 29: Chair, TSZh Petrogradskii 3, male, 64 years, higher education
Resp. 30: Chairman and bookkeeper, TSZh Vyborgskii 2, male, 46 years, 
higher education
Resp. 31 (exp.): marina Akimova, 65 years, chair of the St. Petersburg’s 
Association for ZhSK and TSZh, higher education
Resp. 32 (exp.): Chairwoman of a TSZh and member of the “Russian par-
ty of life” that organises training courses for TSZh leaders, female, 52 
years, higher education
Resp. 33 (exp.): Oleg Vikhtiuk, 37 years, St. Petersburg’s Housing 
Committee, head of the department working with homeowners’ asso-
ciations and housing management companies higher education, tech-
nical and army
Resp. 34 (exp.): Gennadii Turetskii, about 60 years, member of Russian 
Communist workers’ Party, engineer
 
Winter 2008
Resp. 35: (exp.): Vladimir Tarasovich Gaidei, vice-president of St. 
Petersburg’s Housing Committee, 42 years, financial career
Resp. 36: manager, TSZh Centre 4, male, 47 years, higher education
Resp. 37: Chair, TSZh Frunzenskii, male, 61 years, higher education, also 
a director of a company 
Resp. 38: Engineer/manager, TSZh Vasileostrovskii 1, female, 48 years, 
mid-level technical education, engineer of exploitation.
Resp. 39: manager, TSZh Vasileostrovskii 2, male, 60 years, higher educa-
tion
Resp. 40: manager, TSZh Petrogradskii 4, male, 70 years, higher technical 
education
Additional data:  Four interviews with local authorities and housing activ-
ists in Nizhnii Novgorod (2 interviews), Perm and Tver’, from the New 
Eurasia Foundation’s Homeowners’ support project. 
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Appendix 2. Descriptions of the Homeowners’ 
Associations of the Data
1. tSZh Petrogradskii 1, centre, old 
This association was located in an old house in the Petrograd side of the 
city, which is now a very highly valued district due to its Stalinist architec-
ture but also known for its dilapidated housing. The district has 123,100 
inhabitants43 and, as of the beginning of 2006, there were homeowners’ 
associations in just over 10 percent of the buildings in the district.44 This 
means that homeowners’ associations are less common in Petrogradskii 
than elsewhere in the city, probably due to the large share of old housing 
stock. This house was constructed in the early 20th century and the home-
owners’ association was registered in 2002. A house committee, which pre-
ceded the association, was established in 1994. The situation in the house 
had been nearly intolerable before the residents took action. Common ar-
eas were dirty and homeless people were sleeping in the staircases, making 
the residents feel unsafe. The association had been maintained by the city 
until autumn of 2005, when the association moved responsibility for its 
maintenance to a private company. The house had approximately 100 res-
idents, 20–25 apartments, a few of which were communal. The chair and 
three homeowners of this association were interviewed. Residents of the 
communal apartments did not agree to requests for interviews.
2. tSZh Primorskii, suburbs 
This association is located in the northwest of the city, far from the cen-
tre, but within a short distance of the metro station. The district houses 
412,200 people and, as of spring 2006, there were homeowners’ associa-
tions in over 45 percent of the buildings. This is a huge difference from 
the Petrogradskii district, and could be explained by the large quantity of 
43 All population figures from Petrostat (2008, 18).
44 Shares of the homeowners’ associations stated here are from the St. Peters-
burg’s Housing Committee’s statistics from the first quarter of 2006.
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newly built houses. The house was built in 2001 on the so-called shared 
participation construction (dolevoe stroitel’stvo) and the association was 
established the same year by the constructor. There was a delay in complet-
ing the construction but, according to the chair, the contract was worded 
in such a way that it did not give the apartment buyers any option to com-
plain. The building is large, with over 500 apartments, and the residen-
tial structure can be characterised as middle class, or lower middle class. 
maintenance is handled by a private company.
3. tSZh Centre 1, old
Located in the centre of the city and built in the 18th century, this is the old-
est house used in the data. The Admira’teiskii district has 169,000 inhabit-
ants and the Central’nyi district has 216,900 inhabitants, a total of 385,900 
in the area. In the spring of 2006 fewer than 20 percent of the houses in 
the districts had a homeowners’ association, slightly below the city’s aver-
age (25 percent). Although most of the housing stock in the area is very 
old, it also holds architectural and locational value, so homeowners’ asso-
ciations may have established associations in order to better protect their 
dwellings. A homeowners’ association was established in this particular 
building by the residents in 2005. There are less than a hundred apart-
ments but the building is large, consisting of numerous inner courtyards 
and units of different shapes and size. There are communal apartments, 
business premises and city-owned premises. This association had serious 
disputes with the authorities about the property rights of certain premis-
es of the house. maintenance of the house was handled by the city and the 
association had encountered difficulties when it tried to move it to private 
maintenance. 
4. tSZh Kalininskii 1, suburbs
This association is located in the suburbs, in the Kalininskii district. Located 
in the northeast of the city, the Kalininskii district has a population of 
458,800, making it the largest of St. Petersburg’s districts. Homeowners’ 
association had been established in 28 percent of the buildings in this dis-
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trict by 2006. This particular building, with over 200 apartments, was built 
in the early 2000s and the TSZh was organised by the constructor at the 
same time. The land plot under the house was registered to the association 
and divided into shares between homeowners according to the size of the 
apartment. In registering the land plot the association had benefited from 
the expertise of a local politician who was active in housing matters and 
who happened to live in the house. The association does not use a mainte-
nance company but it has its own service staff.
5. tSZh Kirovskii, suburbs 
This newly built house is located in the south/southwest part of the city, in 
the Kirovskii district, which has 323,300 inhabitants. Some 20 percent of 
the houses in the district had a homeowners’ association as of spring 2006. 
The house was built in the early 2000s and the hoemowners association was 
established by the constructor around the same time. For the first few years 
the association was led by a manager who was hired by the constructor, af-
ter which the residents asked a man who had been leading a nearby TSZh 
and was known as a good manager to take the lead. The building is large, 
with over 500 apartments, and the association was well organised, with 
its own website and service staff. The land plot was also privatised and in 
shared ownership of the residents, as was the case in TSZh Kalininskii 1.
6. tSZh Centre 2, ‘elite’
TSZh Centre 2 is located in a central district, however, it is still quite diffi-
cult to reach and not  so close to the actual city centre. This elite house was 
completely rebuilt in the 2000s, following the style of the Tsarist era, when 
the house was originally constructed. The association was led by a man-
ager and the land plot was privatised, a process that took a year and a half. 
There were approximately 20 apartments in the house, each of which was 
quite large (200m² on average). The property is well protected with guards, 
fences and video surveillance.
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7. tSZh Petrogradskii 2, ‘elite’
TSZh Petrogradskii 2, constructed in the 2000s, is another elite house in 
which the homeowners’ association was established by the constructor. 
The land plot was privatised in 2004 or 2005 by the manager and the proc-
ess took a year. There are fewer than ten apartments in the house and the 
association is managed by a hired manager.
8. tSZh Vyborgskii 1, suburbs
This association is located in the north of the city, in a district of 411,600 
inhabitants. Nearly 30 percent of the buildings in the district had a home-
owners’ association as of spring 2006. The building was built in the 2000s, 
at which time the homeowners’ association was established, and has over 
400 apartments and has its own service staff. The process of privatising 
the land plot was unfinished, because the legislation had been changed in 
the middle of the process, rendering the previous decision of the common 
meeting invalid.
9. tSZh Kalininskii 2, suburbs
TSZh Kalininskii 2, built in the 2000s, has over 200 apartments and is lo-
cated in the northeast of the city. The process of privatising the land plot was 
unfinished as at the time of the interview, in autumn 2005. maintenance 
was handled by municipal maintenance firms rather than staff hired by 
the association, except for cleaning; the association has a janitor, cleaner 
and four telephone operators/secretaries, whose duties include reminding 
residents about their housing debts, for example. The association also has 
an accountant.
10. tSZh Centre 3, old 
This old building, located in the centre of the city, was built in the ear-
ly part of the 20th century. The homeowners’ association was established 
by the homeowners in 2002 and transferred from municipal to in-house 
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maintenance the same year. The building has fewer than 50 apartments, 
with a couple of privatised communal apartments. The association organ-
ises regular activities, such as voluntary cleaning-up days (subbotniki) and 
informal get-togethers for its residents in the courtyard several times a 
year, and has a veterans’ council, which meets weekly. The land on which 
the house is built has already been privatised, and the process of privatis-
ing the land around the house was underway at the time of the interviews 
in the spring of 2006.
11. tSZh Petrogradskii 3, centre, old
This house, in the Petrogradskii district, consists of two houses, one built 
in the 1950s and the other in the 1880s, which constitute one building 
block. A TSZh was established at the beginning of 2005. There are fewer 
than 100 apartments in the house, of which three are non-privatized, and 
one kommunalka. Some premises are under KUGI’s ownership but there 
was an ongoing lawsuit regarding the case. The land is registered to the as-
sociation. The association has its own maintenance man, but other main-
tenance staff (electricity and plumbing services, for example) are requested 
from a maintenance company when necessary. 
12. tSZh Vyborgskii 2, suburbs
This house of nearly 700 apartments was built between 1999 and 2001 and 
is located in the north of the city. The TSZh was established 1999 by the 
constructor. The land plot is owned by the city and the association has no 
plans to register it. The association has had its own technical and main-
tenance staff since the beginning and it has hired a security company to 
guard its area.
13. tSZh Centre 4, ‘elite’ 
This newly built house can be categorised as elite because its residents are 
clearly upper class, although the house itself is not as luxurious as the oth-
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er two elite houses in the data. The house was built in the beginning of 
the 2000s in the place of an old house, which was demolished, and the as-
sociation was established at the same time by the constructor. The land is 
owned by the city and the manager said that there are no plans to priva-
tise it because of the land tax. The association has its own technical staff 
and an emergency service agreement with a company that was city-owned 
but has now been privatised. This association is an exceptional case in the 
data, as it is the only one that has no management problems. According to 
the manager, some problems were encountered at the beginning but have 
now been solved.
14. tSZh frunzenskii, suburbs
This house is located in the Frunzenskii district, which is south of the 
centre and has 391,600 inhabitants. Forty-eight percent of buildings had 
homeowners’ associations in 2006, the largest proportion in St. Petersburg. 
The house of over 200 apartments was built in the 1990s. A condominium 
was established in 1996 and a TSZh was registered in 2000. The land plot 
has been in the process of registration since 2000 but the chair believed 
at the time of the interview (in January 2008) that it would soon be regis-
tered. The association also has its own technical staff. The association’s res-
idential structure is affected by the fact that poor people from the centre of 
the city (from communal apartments and houses in emergency condition) 
have been settled there.
15. tSZh Vasileostrovskii, suburbs
This house, built in the 2000s, is located in Vasilievsky Island, which has 
194,000 residents and is one of St. Petersburg’s oldest districts. Thirty-five 
percent of the buildings in the district had homeowners’ associations as 
of 2006. The association in this building of over 400 apartments was es-
tablished by the constructor but since 2005 has been managed by the resi-
dents. The association has its own maintenance staff and the land has been 
in the process of registration since 2005, despite problems with the proc-
ess.
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16. tSZh Vasileostrovskii 2, suburbs
This house is also located on Vasilievsky Island. It was constructed in 1996, 
when the TSZh was established, for employees of a state scientific institute. 
The building has over 200 apartments, the association has its own staff 
and, as of the time of the interview (January 2008), the land plot was in the 
process of registration.
17. tSZh Petrogradskii 3, centre, new 
This new, centrally located building was built in the 2000s, and the home-
owners’ association was established at the same time. The house is quite 
small, with fewer than 50 apartments. The association has its own service 
staff. There are several courtyards in the building complex and therefore 
the land is partly owned by the TSZh and partly by the city. The association 
has a chairperson as well as a manager, both of whom were interviewed.
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Appendix 3. Photos
1: A typical entrance way in the centre of St. Petersburg.
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2: Courtyard of an old house.
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3: Electrical system in an old house.
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4: An “elite” house.
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5: Suburban landscape in St. Petersburg.
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6, 7: 
“New” building 
complexes in the 
suburbs.
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8, 9: “New” building complexes in the suburbs.
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